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5Preface
This publication contains one page summaries of almost all decisions 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on trade mark 
law. Most decisions relate to the interpretation of the Trade Mark 
Directive and/or the Community Trade Mark Regulation. A few deci-
sions concerning related subjects have also been included.
The relevant rule of law and a representation of the facts of most deci-
sions is summarised in just a few sentences. This is followed by a more 
elaborate summary, consisting mostly of relevant quotations. A chron-
ological index is included at the end of this publication.
This publication is meant as a first introduction to and a brief survey of 
European trade mark case-law. Please always consult the full texts when 
appropriate. The full text of all decisions (after 1996) can be found on 
the CJEU website: www.curia.europa.eu.
This publication was compiled with the help of colleagues at Klos Morel 
Vos & Schaap. Decisions rendered after 1 Januari 2014 have not been 
included.
In cooperation with legal publisher deLex, a database will be created of 
all summaries and all full text decisions (also from before 1996). New 
decisions of the CJEU will be summarized and published shortly after 
they are handed down.
Any suggestions for revision are welcome at the following e-mail 
address: dirk.visser@kmvs.nl
Dirk J.G. Visser
Leiden University
Klos Morel Vos & Schaap
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9‘By prohibiting the registration as Community trade marks of such 
signs and indications, Article 7(1)(c) [Trade Mark Regulation] pursues 
an aim which is in the public interest, namely that descriptive signs or 
indications relating to the characteristics of goods or services in respect 
of which registration is sought may be freely used by all. That provision 
accordingly prevents such signs and indications from being reserved 
to one undertaking alone because they have been registered as trade 
marks (see, inter alia, in relation to the identical provisions of Article 
3(1)(c) [Trade Mark Directive], [Windsurfing Chiemsee, paragraph 25, 
Linde and others, paragraph 73]).’ (Para. 31).
‘In order for OHIM to refuse to register a trade mark under Article 7(1)
(c) [Trade Mark Regulation], it is not necessary that the signs and indi-
cations composing the mark that are referred to in that article actually 
be in use at the time of the application for registration in a way that is 
descriptive of goods or services such as those in relation to which the 
application is filed, or of characteristics of those goods or services. It is 
sufficient, as the wording of that provision itself indicates, that such 
signs and indications could be used for such purposes. A sign must 
therefore be refused registration under that provision if at least one of 
its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods or ser-
vices concerned.’ (Para. 32).
ABSOLUTE GROUNDS 
FOR REFUSAL (WORD AND 
FIGURATIVE)
Doublemint
(descriptive marks)
CJEU 23 October 2003, case C-191/01 P, Wrigley/OHIM; 
Doublemint
Article 7(1)(c) Trade Mark Regulation.
A word cannot be registered as a trade mark if it designates a characteristic 
of the goods or services concerned in one of its potential meanings.
Wrigley fi led an application with 
OHIM for registration of the word 
combination Doublemint 
for goods of inter alia classes 3, 5 
and 30 and in particular for 
chewing gum (without any proof 
of acquired distinctiveness).
See also: Biomild and 
Postkantoor
10
When examining whether a composite word is descriptive it does not 
suffice to define the descriptive nature of the elements of the combina-
tion; for the new word itself its descriptive nature has to be established.
A mark which consists of a new word which is constituted by elements 
which as such constitute a description of the goods or services which 
the registration is applied for, constitutes itself also a description of the 
characteristics of such goods or services in the sense of Article 3(1)(c), 
‘unless there is a perceptible difference between the neologism and the 
mere sum of its parts: that assumes that, because of the unusual nature 
of the combination in relation to the goods or services, the word creates 
an impression which is sufficiently far removed from that produced by 
the mere combination of meanings lent by the elements of which it is 
composed, with the result that the word is more than the sum of its 
parts.
For the purposes of determining whether the ground for refusal set 
out in Article 3(1)(c) [Trade Mark Directive] applies to such a mark, it 
is irrelevant whether or not there are synonyms capable of designat-
ing the same characteristics of the goods or services referred to in the 
application for registration.’ (Operative part).
Dutch dairy producer Campina 
fi led an application with the 
Benelux Offi  ce for Intellectual 
Property (BOIP) to register the 
composite word Biomild as trade 
mark for goods of classes 29, 30 
and 32 (various food products 
including diary products). Th e 
product marketed in the 
Netherlands under this mark was 
a ‘natural’ yogurt with a mild 
taste.
See also: Doublemint and 
Postkantoor
Biomild
(descriptive composite word)
CJEU 12 February 2004, case C-265/00, Campina Melkunie/
BMB; Biomild
Article 3(1)(c) Trade Mark Directive
A combination of discriptive words is also discriptive itself, unless there is a 
perceptible diff erence between the neologism and the mere sum of its parts.
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1. Taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances.
‘Article 3 [Trade Mark Directive] […] is to be interpreted as meaning 
that a trade mark registration authority must have regard, in addition 
to the mark as filed, to all the relevant facts and circumstances. It must 
have regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances before adopting 
a final decision on an application to register a trade mark. A court asked 
to review a decision on an application to register a trade mark must also 
have regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances, subject to the 
limits on the exercise of its powers as defined by the relevant national 
legislation.’
2.  Registration in another Member State not relevant.
‘The fact that a trade mark has been registered in a Member State in 
respect of certain goods or services has no bearing on the examination 
by the trade mark registration authority of another Member State of an 
application for registration of a similar mark in respect of goods or ser-
vices similar to those in respect of which the first mark was registered.’
3.  Existence of synonyms not relevant.
‘Article 3(1)(c) [Trade Mark Directive] precludes registration of a trade 
mark which consists exclusively of signs or indications which may 
serve, in trade, to designate characteristics of the goods or services in 
respect of which registration is sought, and that is the case even when 
there are more usual signs or indications for designating the same char-
acteristics and regardless of the number of competitors who may have 
an interest in using the signs or indications of which the mark consists.
Where the applicable national law provides that the exclusive right 
conferred by registration, by a competent authority in an area in which 
a number of officially recognised languages coexist, of a word mark 
expressed in one of those languages extends automatically to its trans-
lation in the other languages, the authority must ascertain as regards 
each of those translations whether the mark actually consists exclu-
sively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate 
characteristics of those goods or services.’
Koninklijke KPN Nederland, 
the Dutch post offi  ce, fi led an 
application with Benelux Offi  ce for 
Intellectual Property (BOIP) for 
the registration of the word 
‘Postkantoor’ (post offi  ce) for 
classes which include paper, 
advertising, insurance, 
postage-stamps, construction, 
telecommunications, transport, 
education and technical 
information and advice.
See also: Doublemint and 
Biomild
Postkantoor
(descriptive word)
CJEU 12 February 2004, case C-363/99, KPN/BMB; Postkantoor
Article 3 Trade Mark Directive
Refusal to register a descriptive word: existence of synonyms is not re-
levant. Registration in other countries is not relevant. A combination of 
descriptive words must have something extra. Disclaimers are not allowed.
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4.  Descriptiveness for specifi c goods does not result in distinctiveness 
for other goods.
‘Article 3(1) [Trade Mark Directive] must be interpreted as meaning 
that a mark which is descriptive of the characteristics of certain goods 
or services but not of those of other goods or services for the purposes 
of Article 3(1)(c) [Trade Mark Directive] cannot be regarded as neces-
sarily having distinctive character in relation to those other goods or 
services for the purposes of subparagraph (b) of the provision.
It is of no relevance that a mark is descriptive of the characteristics 
of certain goods or services under Article 3(1)(c) [Trade Mark Direc-
tive] when it comes to assessing whether the same mark has distinc-
tive character in relation to other goods or services for the purposes of 
Article 3(1)(b) of the Directive.’
5.  A combination of descriptive words must have added value.
‘Article 3(1)(c) [Trade Mark Directive] must be interpreted as meaning 
that a mark consisting of a word composed of elements, each of which 
is descriptive of characteristics of the goods or services in respect of 
which registration is sought, is itself descriptive of the characteristics 
of those goods or services for the purposes of that provision, unless 
there is a perceptible difference between the word and the mere sum 
of its parts: that assumes either that because of the unusual nature of 
the combination in relation to the goods or services the word creates 
an impression which is sufficiently far removed from that produced by 
the mere combination of meanings lent by the elements of which it is 
composed, with the result that the word is more than the sum of its 
parts, or that the word has become part of everyday language and has 
acquired its own meaning, with the result that it is now independent of 
its components. In the latter case, it is necessary to ascertain whether 
a word which has acquired its own meaning is not itself descriptive for 
the purposes of the same provision.
For the purposes of determining whether Article 3(1)(c) [Trade Mark 
Directive] applies to such a mark, it is irrelevant whether or not there 
are synonyms capable of designating the same characteristics of the 
goods or services mentioned in the application for registration or that 
the characteristics of the goods or services which may be the subject of 
the description are commercially essential or merely ancillary.’
6.  Disclaimers are not allowed.
‘[The Trade Mark Directive] prevents a trade mark registration author-
ity from registering a mark for certain goods or services on condition 
that they do not possess a particular characteristic.’
7.  All inadmissible marks should be refused.
‘The practice of a trade mark registration authority which concentrates 
solely on refusing to register manifestly inadmissible marks is incom-
patible with Article 3 [Trade Mark Directive].’ (Operative part quoted 
in full).
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‘Article 3(1)(c) [Trade Mark Directive] […]does not prohibit the regis-
tration of geographical names as trade marks solely where the names 
designate places which are, in the mind of the relevant class of persons, 
currently associated with the category of goods in question; it also 
applies to geographical names which are liable to be used in future by 
the undertakings concerned as an indication of the geographical origin 
of that category of goods’. (Para. 37).
‘A geographical name may be registered as a trade mark if, following 
the use which has been made of it, it has come to identify the product 
in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a par-
ticular undertaking and thus to distinguish that product from goods of 
other undertakings. Where that is the case, the geographical designa-
tion has gained a new significance and its connotation, no longer purely 
descriptive, justifies its registration as a trade mark.’ (Para. 47).
‘In assessing the distinctive character of a mark in respect of which 
registration has been applied for, the following may also be taken 
into account: the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geo-
graphically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; 
the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the 
proportion of the relevant class of persons who, because of the mark, 
identify goods as originating from a particular undertaking; and state-
ments from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and 
professional associations.’ (Para. 51).
Windsurfi ng Chiemsee owns 
the word and fi gurative mark 
Chiemsee for clothing and objects 
to the use of the name ‘Chiemsee’ 
on clothing by Huber and 
Attenberger in the surroundings 
of the Chiemsee (the largest lake 
in Bavaria,Germany).
Chiemsee
(geographical name, acquired distinctiveness)
CJEU 4 May 1999, cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, Windsurfi ng 
Chiemsee/Huber
Article 3(1)(c) and (3) Trade Mark Directive
A geographical name cannot be a trade mark if it may serve to designate
a geographical origin. Registration based on acquired distinctiveness is 
 possible.
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Article 3(3) of the Directive contains no restriction to ‘separate use’, 
referring solely to the ‘use which has been made’ of the mark.
‘The expression ‘use of the mark as a trade mark’ must therefore be 
understood as referring solely to use of the mark for the purposes of 
the identification, by the relevant class of persons, of the product or 
service as originating from a given undertaking. (Para. 29).
Yet, such identification, and thus acquisition of distinctive character, 
may be as a result both of the use, as part of a registered trade mark, 
of a component thereof and of the use of a separate mark in conjunc-
tion with a registered trade mark. In both cases it is sufficient that, in 
consequence of such use, the relevant class of persons actually perceive 
the product or service, designated exclusively by the mark applied for, 
as originating from a given undertaking.’ (Para. 30).
‘The distinctive character of a mark referred to in Article 3(3) [Trade 
Mark Directive] […] may be acquired in consequence of the use of that 
mark as part of or in conjunction with a registered trade mark.’ (Opera-
tive part).
Mars objected to the registration 
of the slogan ‘have a break’ on 
the basis of lack of distinctive 
character, because this slogan had 
not been used separately by Nestlé, 
but only as part of the combination 
‘Have a break, have a Kit Kat’.
Have a break
(acquired distinctiveness of a slogan)
CJEU 7 July 2005, case C-353/03, Mars/Nestlé; Have a break
Article 3(3) Trade Mark Directive
Th e distinctive character of a mark may be acquired in consequence of the 
use of that mark as part of or in conjunction with a registered trade mark.
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The Court of Justice has already held that the acquisition of the dis-
tinctive character of a mark may also be as a result of its use as part of 
another registered trade mark. It is sufficient that, in consequence of 
such use, the relevant class of persons actually perceives the product or 
service, designated by the mark, as originating from a given underta-
king. (Para. 49).
Inasmuch as L & D further submits that the assessment of the Court 
of First Instance, according to which the silhouette of a fir tree plays 
a predominant role in the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark, diverges from the 
case-law of the Court of Justice, it need only be stated that, contrary 
to what the appellant asserts, that case-law does not in any way show 
that, in the case of mixed trademarks comprising both graphic and 
word elements, the word elements must systematically be regarded as 
dominant. (Para. 55).
The Court of First Instance established that [the] mark has acquired 
a particularly distinctive character in Italy because of its well-known 
nature in that Member State, which stems in particular from its pro-
longed use as part of the ARBRE MAGIQUE mark and the well-known 
nature of that latter mark in Italy. (Para. 66).
In those circumstances, even if L & D could rely on the argument that 
mark No 91 991 possesses merely a very weak inherent distinctive 
character, since it consists of the shape of the product which is sold 
under that mark and that shape is necessary to obtain the de-sired 
technical result, the fact remains that such an argument, even if it were 
well founded, could not, in any event, cast doubt on the finding made 
by the Court of First Instance that that mark has acquired a particularly 
distinctive character in Italy because it is well known in that Member 
State. (Para. 67).
Opposition to the fi gurative mark 
of Aire Limpio based on the 
earlier Community, national and 
international fi gurative marks 
representing a fi r tree with various 
names.
L & D/
OHIM & Julius Sämann
(acquired distinctiveness)
CJEU 17 July 2008, case C-488/06 P, L & D/OHIM & 
Julius Sämann
Article 8(1)(b) and 73 Trade Mark Directive
Acquisition of the distinctive character of a mark may also be as a result of 
its use as part of another registered trade mark.
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Article 3(3) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the 
registration of a trade mark can be allowed on the basis of that provi-
sion only if it is proven that that trade mark has acquired distinctive 
character through use throughout the territory of the Member State or, 
in the case of Benelux, throughout the part of the territory of Benelux 
in which there exists a ground for refusal. (Operative part in 1).
As regards a mark consisting of one or more words of an official lan-
guage of a Member State or of Benelux, if the ground for refusal exists 
only in one of the linguistic areas of the Member State or, in the case 
of Benelux, in one of its linguistic areas, it must be established that the 
mark has acquired distinctive character through use throughout that 
linguistic area. In the linguistic area thus defined, it must be assessed 
whether the relevant class of persons, or at least a significant propor-
tion thereof, identifies the product or service in question as originating 
from a particular undertaking because of the trade mark. (Operative 
part in 2).
Registration in the Benelux for 
the trade mark EUROPOLIS 
will be refused, based on the fact 
the trade mark is not integrated 
in all countries of the Benelux.
Europolis
(distinctive character)
CJEU 7 September 2006, case C-108/05, Bovemij/BMB; 
Europolis
Article 3(3) Trade Mark Regulation
The distinctive character of a trade mark must be proven in the entire 
 territory where a ground of refusal exists.
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All marks made up of signs or indications that are also used as advertis-
ing slogans, indications of quality or incitements to purchase the goods 
or services covered by those marks convey by definition, to a greater 
or lesser extent, an objective message. It is clear that those marks are 
not, by virtue of that fact alone, devoid of distinctive character. In so 
far as those marks are not descriptive for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) 
of Regulation No 40/94, they can express an objective message, even 
a simple one, and still be capable of indicating to the consumer the 
commercial origin of the goods or services in question. That can be the 
position, in particular, where those marks are not merely an ordinary 
advertising message, but possess a certain originality or resonance, 
requiring at least some interpretation by the relevant public, or setting 
off a cognitive process in the minds of that public. (Para. 56-57).
Even if it were to be supposed that the slogan ‘Vorsprung durch Tech-
nik’ conveys an objective message to the effect that technological 
superiority enables the manufacture and supply of better goods and 
services, that fact would not support the conclusion that the mark 
applied for is devoid of any inherently distinctive character. However 
simple such a message may be, it cannot be categorised as ordinary to 
the point of excluding, from the outset and without any further analy-
sis, the possibility that that mark is capable of indicating to the con-
sumer the commercial origin of the goods or services in question. (Para. 
58).
In that context, it should be pointed out that that message does not 
follow obviously from the slogan in question. As Audi observed, the 
combination of words ‘Vorsprung durch Technik’ (meaning, inter alia, 
advance or advantage through technology) suggests, at first glance, 
only a causal link and accordingly requires a measure of interpretation 
on the part of the public. Furthermore, that slogan exhibits a certain 
originality and resonance which makes it easy to remember. Lastly, 
inasmuch as it is a widely known slogan which has been used by Audi 
for many years, it cannot be excluded that the fact that members of the 
relevant public are used to establishing the link between that slogan 
and the motor vehicles manufactured by that company also makes it 
easier for that public to identify the commercial origin of the goods or 
services covered. (Para. 59).
OHIM refused the slogan 
‘Vorsprung durch Technik’, 
made by Audi, as a trade mark.
Audi/OHIM
(slogan)
CJEU 21 January 2010, case C-398/08 P, Audi/OHIM; 
Vorsprung durch Technik
Article 7(1)(b) and 63 Trade Mark Directive
A widely known slogan which possess a certain originality and resonance, 
which makes it easy to remember, can be a trade mark.
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OTHER CASES 
ON DISTINCTIVE 
CHARACTER 
OF WORD (AND 
FIGURATIVE) MARKS
Article 3(1)(d) 
Trade Mark Directive
Article 7(1)(b), (c) and (d) 
Trade Mark Regulation
CJEU 29 September 2001, case C-383/99 P, P&G/OHIM; 
Baby-dry
According to the CJEU, Baby-dry was wrongfully refused as a Commu-
nity trade mark for nappies under Article 7(1)(c) Trade Mark Regula-
tion.
‘As regards trade marks composed of words, such as the mark at issue 
here, descriptiveness must be determined not only in relation to each 
word taken separately but also in relation to the whole which they 
form. Any perceptible difference between the combination of words 
submitted for registration and the terms used in the common parlance 
of the relevant class of consumers to designate the goods or services 
or their essential characteristics is apt to confer distinctive character 
on the word combination enabling it to be registered as a trade mark.’ 
(Para. 40).
Please Note: It is generally assumed that this decision in effect has been 
rendered obsolete by the decisions concerning Doublemint, Biomild 
and Postkantoor.
CJEU 4 October 2001, case C-517/99, Merz & Krell/OHIM; Bravo
The Bundespatentgericht refused the word mark Bravo for stationary 
under Article 3(1)(d) of the Trade Mark Directive, because the word 
‘bravo’ is for the relevant public purely an expression of applause. 
CJEU: ‘However, registration of a trade mark which consists of signs 
or indications that are also used as advertising slogans, indications of 
quality or incitements to purchase the goods or services covered by that 
mark is not excluded as such by virtue of such use. It is for the national 
court to determine in each case whether the signs or indications have 
become customary in the current language or in the bona fide and 
established practices of the trade to designate the goods or services 
covered by that mark.’ (Para. 40).
CJEU 19 September 2002, case C-104/00 P, Deutsche Kranken-
versicherung/OHIM; Companyline
Companyline is in the English language territory a descriptive com-
bination which does not have a distinctive character for ( a ‘line’ of) 
insurance products for undertakings (‘companies’).
‘What is in question here is a word mark composed of two descrip-
tive terms, where the combination of the two components does not 
embody any element of fancifulness overlaying the descriptive content 
of the word. The descriptive meaning is unambiguous and immediately 
discernible without the need for any analytical effort.’ (Para. 19).
CJEU 5 February 2004, case C-150/02 P, Streamserve/OHIM; 
Streamserve
The Court of First Instance considered, on the one hand, that the word 
Streamserve was made up of a basic verb (serve) and a noun (stream) 
and was therefore not unusual for the consumers concerned. On the 
other hand, it found that the word Streamserve referred to a tech-
nique for transferring digital data from a server, enabling them to be 
processed as a steady and continuous stream, and that this technique 
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did not merely constitute a field in which those goods are applied but 
rather one of their specific functions. Therefore, it concluded that 
the word Streamserve could serve to designate a characteristic of the 
majority of the goods listed in the application for registration [in class 
9] and that, therefore, in respect of those goods, the absolute ground 
for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(c) [Trade Mark Regulation] prevented 
its registration. In contrast, the Court of First Instance found that 
OHIM had established neither that Streamserve could be descriptive 
nor that it was devoid of distinctive character for goods within the cat-
egories manuals and publications.’ (Paras. 14-17).
‘In finding, […], that Article 7(1)(c) [Trade Mark Regulation] pursues an 
aim which is in the public interest, namely that the proposed signs and 
indications may be freely used by all, the Court of First Instance did not 
fail to take account of the objectives of those provisions and accord-
ingly interpreted them correctly.’ (Para 26).
CJEU 5 February 2004, case C-326/01 P, Telefon & Buch/OHIM; 
Universaltelefonbuch
In German, the words ‘Universaltelefonbuch’ and ‘Universalkommuni-
kationsverzeichnis’ mean ‘universal telephone directory’ and ‘universal 
communications directory’. They are properly formed in accordance 
with the grammatical rules of the German language and composed of 
common German words. The combinations of the words Telefonbuch 
and Kommunikationsverzeichnis designate the kind of goods and the 
intended use of the services in relation to which the application is filed 
and they can therefore be regarded as descriptive of those goods and 
services.
CJEU 16 September 2004, case C-329/02 P, Sat.1/OHIM; Sat.2
Sat.2 is a combination of a common abbreviation for ‘Satellite’ with a 
number, but may nevertheless have distinctive character for a televi-
sion channel. ‘The frequent use of trade marks consisting of a word and 
a number in the telecommunications sector indicates that that type of 
combination cannot be considered to be devoid, in principle, of distinc-
tive character.’ (Para. 40). The Community Mark has meanwhile been 
registered on 6 February 2006.
CJEU 16 September 2004, case C-404/02, Nichols/Registrar of 
Trade Marks; Nichols
A common family name may be a trade mark as such.
‘In the context of Article 3(1)(b) [Trade Mark Directive] […], the assess-
ment of the existence or otherwise of the distinctive character of a 
trade mark constituted by a surname, even a common one, must be 
carried out specifically, in accordance with the criteria applicable to 
any sign covered by Article 2 of that directive, in relation, first, to the 
products or services in respect of which registration is applied for and, 
second, to the perception of the relevant consumers. The fact that the 
effects of registration of the trade mark are limited by virtue of Article 
6(1)(a) of that directive has no impact on that assessment.’ (Operative 
part).
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See also: CJEU 28 April 2004, 
case C-3/03 P, Matratzen 
Concord/OHIM-Hukla.
CJEU 5 October 2004, case C-192/03 P, Alcon/OHIM; BSS
The CJEU confirmed that the Court of First Instance had applied Arti-
cle 7(1)(d) of the Regulation correctly, while ‘considered that the term 
BSS had, by the date of filing of the appellant’s application for regis-
tration of the mark BSS, become a current generic term among the 
public targeted by the goods concerned, namely ophthalmologists and 
ophthal mic surgeons, for a balanced salt solution. That was apparent 
from a number of scientific dictionaries and articles, and from the fact 
that various companies marketed ophthalmic products under designa-
tions containing the term BSS.’ (Para. 13).
‘In considering that the BSS mark consisted exclusively of signs or indi-
cations which had become customary in the current language of the 
target public to designate the goods for which that mark had been reg-
istered, and that it had been lawfully declared invalid on that ground 
by the contested decision, the Court of First Instance correctly pointed 
out, […], that it was not the descriptive nature of the mark that was 
decisive but current usage in the sectors covering trade in those goods.’ 
(Para. 28).
CJEU 21 October 2004, case C-64/02 P, Erpo/OHIM; 
Das Prinzip der Bequemlichkeit
Slogans may be registered as a trade mark and no other/stricter crite-
ria apply to their distinctive character. However, one should take into 
account ‘the fact that average consumers are not in the habit of making 
assumptions about the origin of products on the basis of such slogan’ 
(Para 34) (The CJEU confirmed the decision of the CFI to quash the 
decision of the Board of Appeal to apply stricter criteria.) See mean-
while Board of Appeal 27 January 2006 (R 392/1999-2): mark accepted 
and registered.
CJEU 9 March 2006, case C-421/04, Matratzen Concord/Hukla; 
Matratzen
‘Matratzen’ can be a valid trade mark in Spain for mattresses even if it 
is fully descriptive for mattresses in German.
‘Article 3(1)(b) and (c) of [Trade Mark Directive] […] does not preclude 
the registration in a Member State, as a national trade mark, of a term 
borrowed from the language of another Member State in which it is 
devoid of distinctive character or descriptive of the goods or services 
in respect of which registration is sought, unless the relevant parties in 
the Member State in which registration is sought are capable of identi-
fying the meaning of the term.’ (Operative part).
CJEU 15 September 2005 case C-37/03 P, BioID/OHIM; BioID
‘BioID’ is the abbreviation of the adjective ‘biometrical’ and of the noun 
‘identification’, and thus, as a whole, means ‘biometrical identifica-
tion’. ‘Therefore, that abbreviation, which is indistinguishable from the 
goods and services covered by the trade mark application, is not of a 
character which can guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked 
product or service to the consumer or end-user from the viewpoint of 
the relevant public’.
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‘In addition, in the light of the recurrent nature of the typographical 
features of the abbreviation BioID and the absence of any particular 
distinctive element, the characters in ‘Arial’ typeface and characters of 
different boldness do not enable the trade mark applied for to guaran-
tee, to the relevant public, the identity of the origin of the goods and 
services covered by the trade mark application.
Furthermore, the two graphic elements placed after the abbreviation 
BioID, namely a full stop (■) and a sign (®), do nothing to enable the 
relevant public to distinguish, without any possibility of confusion, the 
products or services covered by the trade mark application from others 
which have another origin. It follows that those graphic elements are 
not capable of fulfilling the essential function of a trade mark, […], in 
relation to the relevant goods and services.’ (Paras. 70-72).
ECJ 15 March 2012, C-90/11 en C-91-11, Alfred Strigl/Marke-
namt en Securvita/Öko-Invest
In these consolidated German cases registration was sought for, respec-
tively, and on the other hand an action for cancellation was filed for the 
trade marks ‘Multi Markets Fund MMF’ and ‘NAI – Der Natur-Aktien-
Index’. In the financial sector ‘Multi Markets Fund’ refers to a fund 
which invest in various financial markets. The combination of letters 
“NAI” is short for “Natur-Aktien-Index”.
The essence of the matter deals with a descriptive sign combined with 
its abbreviation.
‘Article 3(1)(b) and (c) of Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws 
of the Member States relating to trade marks must be interpreted as 
meaning that it is applicable to a word mark which consists of the juxta-
position of a descriptive word combination and a letter sequence which 
is non-descriptive in itself, if the relevant public perceives that sequence 
as being an abbreviation of that word combination by reason of the fact 
that it reproduces the first letter of each word of that combination, and 
that the mark in question, considered as a whole, can thus be under-
stood as a combination of descriptive indications or abbreviations 
which is therefore devoid of distinctive character.’ (Operative part).
ECJ 12 July 2012, C 311/11 P, Smart Technologies/OHIM
Wir machen das Besondere einfach
The slogan “Wir machen das Besondere einfach” lacks distinctive char-
acter in relation to computer software. ‘That the relevant public is a 
specialist one cannot have a decisive influence on the legal criteria used 
to assess the distinctive character of a sign. Although it is true that the 
degree of attention of the relevant specialist public is, by definition, 
higher than that of the average consumer, it does not necessarily fol-
low that a weaker distinctive character of a sign is sufficient where the 
relevant public is specialist.’ (Para. 48).
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ABSOLUTE GROUNDS 
FOR REFUSAL
(SHAPES)
It follows that, to be capable of constituting a trade mark for the pur-
poses of Article 2 of the Directive, the subject-matter of any application 
must satisfy three conditions. First, it must be a sign. Secondly, that 
sign must be capable of being represented graphically. Thirdly, the sign 
must be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one under-
taking from those of other undertakings. (Para. 28).
Although that provision mentions only signs which are capable of being 
perceived visually, are two-dimensional or three-dimensional and can 
thus be represented by means of letters or written characters or by a 
picture, it is however clear from the language of both Article 2 of the 
Directive and the seventh recital in the preamble thereto, which refers 
to a ‘list of examples’ of signs which may constitute a trade mark, that 
that list is not exhaustive. Accordingly, the Court has held previously 
that Article 2 of the Directive, although it does not mention signs 
which are not in themselves capable of being perceived visually, such as 
sounds or smells, does not expressly exclude them. (Para. 32).
However, if that condition is not to be deprived of all substance, it can-
not be accepted that the subject matter of any trade mark application 
necessarily constitutes a sign within the meaning of Article 2 of the 
Directive. As the Court has held previously, the purpose of that require-
ment is in particular to prevent the abuse of trade mark law in order to 
obtain an unfair competitive advantage. (Para. 33, 34).
In the present case, it is common ground that the subject-matter of the 
application in the main proceedings is not a particular type of trans-
parent collecting bin forming part of the external surface of a vacuum 
cleaner, but rather, in a general and abstract manner, all the conceivable 
shapes of such a collecting bin. (Para. 35).
Given the exclusivity inherent in trade mark right, the holder of a trade 
mark relating to such a nonspecific subject-matter would obtain an 
unfair competitive advantage, contrary to the purpose pursued by Arti-
cle 2 of the Directive, since it would be entitled to prevent its competi-
tors from marketing vacuum cleaners having any kind of transparent 
collecting bin on their external surface, irrespective of its shape. (Para. 
38).
Vacuum cleaner manufacturer 
Dyson applied for registration 
of a trade mark that exists of 
‘a transparent bin or collection 
chamber forming part of the 
external surface of a vacuum 
cleaner as shown in the 
representation’.
DYSON
(a characteristic is not a sign)
CJEU 25 January 2007, case C-321/03, Dyson/Registrar of 
Trade Marks
Article 2 Trade Mark Directive
Th e trademark application which relates, in a general and abstract man-
ner, to an object with a variety of diff erent appearances is no more than a 
characteristic of the product concerned and is not a sign in the meaning of 
a trade mark.
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The subject-matter of the application at issue in the main proceedings 
is, in actual fact, a mere property of the product concerned and does 
not therefore constitute a ‘sign’ within the meaning of Article 2 of the 
Directive. (Para. 39).
Accordingly, the answer to be given to the national court must be that 
Article 2 of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that the sub-
ject-matter of an application for trade mark registration, such as that 
lodged in the main proceedings, which relates to all the conceivable 
shapes of a transparent bin or collection chamber forming part of the 
external surface of a vacuum cleaner, is not a ‘sign’ within the meaning 
of that provision and therefore is not capable of constituting a trade 
mark within the meaning thereof. (Para. 40).
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‘When assessing the distinctiveness of a three-dimensional shape of 
product trade mark for the purposes of Article 3(1)(b) [Trade Mark 
Directive] […], a stricter test than that used for other types of trade 
mark must not be applied.’ (Operative part in 1).
By reason of the ‘perception’ of the public it can ‘in practice be more 
difficult to establish distinctiveness in relation to a shape of product 
mark than a word or figurative trade mark. But whilst that may explain 
why such a mark is refused registration, it does not mean that it cannot 
acquire distinctive character following the use that has been made of it 
and thus be registered as a trade mark under Article 3(3) of the Direc-
tive.’
‘Independently of Article 3(1)(e) [Trade Mark Directive], Article 3(1)
(c) also has significance for three-dimensional shape of product trade 
marks.
When examining the ground for refusing registration in Article 3(1)(c) 
[Trade Mark Directive] in a concrete case, regard must be had to the 
public interest underlying that provision, which is that all three-dimen-
sional shape of product trade marks which consist exclusively of signs 
or indications which may serve to designate the characteristics of the 
goods or service within the meaning of that provision should be freely 
available to all and, subject always to Article 3(3) of the Directive, can-
not be registered.’ (Operative part in 2).
Linde, Winward and Rado sought 
registration with the German 
Trade Mark Offi  ce for the shape 
of a forklift truck, a fl ashlight and 
a watch respectively. Th ey were all 
refused.
Linde/Winward/Rado
(shape marks, public interest)
CJEU 8 April 2003, joined cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde, 
Winward & Rado/DPMA
Article 3(1)(b)(c) Trade Mark Directive
When assessing distinctiveness no stricter test applies to shape marks 
(three-dimensional marks), but in view of the perception of the public it 
may be harder to prove distinctive character. Th e ‘public interest’ should be 
taken into account.
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‘For three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the packaging of 
goods which are packaged in trade for reasons linked to the very nature 
of the goods, the packing thereof must be assimilated to the shape of 
the goods, so that that packing may constitute the shape of the goods 
within the meaning of Article 3(1)(e) [Trade Mark Directive] and may, 
where appropriate, serve to designate characteristics of the packaged 
goods, including their quality, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) of 
that directive.’ (Operative part in 1).
‘In any event, the perception of the average consumer is not necessarily 
the same in the case of a three-dimensional trade mark, consisting of 
the packaging of a product, as it is in the case of a word or figurative 
mark which consists of a sign that is independent from the appearance 
of the goods it denotes. Average consumers are not in the habit of mak-
ing assumptions about the origin of goods based on the shape of their 
packaging, in the absence of any graphic or word element, and it could 
therefore prove more difficult to establish distinctive character in the 
case of such a three-dimensional trade mark than in the case of a word 
or figurative mark.’ (Para. 52).
‘For three-dimensional trade marks consisting of the packaging of 
goods which are packaged in trade for reasons linked to the very nature 
of the product, their distinctive character within the meaning of Article 
3(1)(b) [Trade Mark Directive] must be assessed by reference to the 
perception of the average consumer of such goods, who is reason-
ably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. Such a 
trade mark must enable such a consumer to distinguish the product 
concerned from those of other undertakings without conducting an 
analytical or comparative examination and without paying particular 
attention.’ (Operative part in 2).
A simple derogation from the norm of what is common in the industry 
in question does not suffice to set aside the ground of refusal of Article 
3(1)(b) of the Directive. On the contrary, a mark which differs signifi-
cantly from the norm of what is common in the industry in question 
and thereby fulfils its essential function as origin indication, does have 
distinctive character.
Henkel objected to the refusal by 
the German Trade Mark Offi  ce to 
register the shape mark reproduced 
above for liquid wool detergent.
Henkel
(shape of packaging)
CJEU 12 February 2004, case C-218/01, Henkel/DPMA; 
liquid wool detergent
Article 3(1)(b), (c) and (e) Trade Mark Directive
In case of goods that do not have a shape themselves, for instance liquids, 
the shape of the packaging of goods must be assimilated with the shape of 
the goods (within the meaning of Article 3(1)(e)). A mark which differs 
signifi cantly from the norm of what is common in the industry in question, 
has distinctive character. Th e perception of the public of a shape mark is dif-
ferent from the perception of a word or fi gurative mark.
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Only a mark which departs significantly from the norm or customs of 
the sector and thereby fulfils its essential function of indicating origin 
is not devoid of any distinctive character for the purposes of Article 
7(1)(b) [Trade Mark Regulation]. ‘Therefore, the Court of First Instance 
rightly took into consideration the shapes and colours of sweets com-
monly used in trade in assessing whether the mark applied for is, or is 
not, devoid of any distinctive character.’ (Para. 27, case C-24/05).
‘A three-dimensional mark may in certain circumstances acquire dis-
tinctive character through use even if it is used in conjunction with a 
word mark or a figurative mark. Such is the case where the mark con-
sists of the shape of the product or its packaging and where they sys-
tematically bear a word mark under which they are marketed.’ (Para. 59, 
case C-24/05).
‘It follows that a mark can be registered under Article 7(3) [Trade Mark 
Regulation] only if evidence is provided that it has acquired, through 
the use which has been made of it, distinctive character in the part of 
the Community in which it did not, ab initio, have such character for 
the purposes of Article 7(1)(b). The part of the Community referred to 
in Article 7(2) may be comprised of a single Member State’(Para. 83, 
case C-25/05).
‘Since, in paragraphs 85 to 87 of the judgment under appeal, following 
an assessment of the facts and evidence, the Court of First Instance 
found, first, that the mark applied for was devoid of any distinctive 
character, ab initio, in all of the Member States of the Community and, 
second, that the appellant did not establish that that mark was the sub-
ject of advertising campaigns in certain Member States during the ref-
erence period, it rightly found that the figures provided in relation to 
the advertising costs incurred by the appellant did not provide proof 
that the mark had acquired distinctive character as a result of the use 
which had been made of it.’(Para. 86, case C-25/05).
Storck tried to obtain a 
Community trade mark 
registration for the shape of its 
Werther’s Original sweets and 
its gold-coloured wrapper with 
twisted ends, reproduced above.
Werther’s Original
(acquired distinctiveness of the shape of a sweet)
CJEU 22 June 2006, cases C-24/05 and C-25/05, Storck/OHIM; 
shape of a sweet
Article 7(1), (2) and (3) Trade Mark Regulation
A three-dimensional mark may in certain circumstances acquire distinctive 
character through use even if it is used in conjunction with a word mark or 
a fi gurative mark. Evidence of acquired distinctive character in the part of 
the Community is required in which the sign did not, ab initio, have such 
character.
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‘In refusing registration of such signs, Article 3(1)(e), second indent, of 
the [Trade Mark Directive]. reflects the legitimate aim of not allowing 
individuals to use registration of a mark in order to acquire or perpetu-
ate exclusive rights relating to technical solutions.’ (Para. 82).
‘A sign which is refused registration under Article 3(1)(e) of the Direc-
tive can never acquire a distinctive character for the purposes of Article 
3(3) by the use made of it.’ (Para. 75).
‘The rationale of the grounds for refusal of registration laid down in 
Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive is to prevent trade mark protection from 
granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or functional 
characteristics of a product which a user is likely to seek in the products 
of competitors. Article 3(1)(e) is thus intended to prevent the protec-
tion conferred by the trade mark right from being extended, beyond 
signs which serve to distinguish a product or service from those offered 
by competitors, so as to form an obstacle preventing competitors from 
freely offering for sale products incorporating such technical solutions 
or functional characteristics in competition with the proprietor of the 
trade mark.’ (Para. 78).
‘Article 3(1)(e), second indent [Trade Mark Directive] must be inter-
preted to mean that a sign consisting exclusively of the shape of a 
product is unregistrable by virtue thereof if it is established that the 
essential functional features of that shape are attributable only to the 
technical result. Moreover, the ground for refusal or invalidity of regis-
tration imposed by that provision cannot be overcome by establishing 
that there are other shapes which allow the same technical result to be 
obtained.’ (Operative part in 4).
‘In order to be capable of distinguishing an article for the purposes of 
Article 2 of the Directive, the shape of the article in respect of which the 
sign is registered does not require any capricious addition, such as an 
embellishment which has no functional purpose.’ (Operative part in 2).
Philips objected to the sale by 
Remington of three-headed 
shaving devices on the basis of 
shape marks.
Philips/Remington
(technically dictated shape)
CJEU 18 June 2002, case C-299/99, Philips/Remington; 
three-headed shaver
Article 3(1)(e) Trade Mark Directive
A shape is unregistrable as a trade mark if its essential functional features 
are attributable only to a technical result. Such a shape can never acquire 
distinctive character by the use made of it.
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That the third indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive is to be inter-
preted as meaning that the shape of a product which gives substantial 
value to that product cannot constitute a trade mark under Article 
3(3) of that directive where, prior to the application for registration, it 
acquired attractiveness as a result of its recognition as a distinctive sign 
following advertising campaigns presenting the specific characteristics 
of the product in question. (Operative part).
G-Star holds that the shape of the 
Elwood-trousers has become 
known as a mark through, 
inter alia, extensive advertising 
campaigns.
Benetton Group/
G-Star International
(substantial value)
CJEU 20 September 2007, case C-371/06, Benetton Group / 
G-Star International; Elwood trousers
Article 3(1)(e) and (3) Trade Mark Directive
Th e shape of a product which gives substantial value to that product, cannot 
constitute a trade mark, nor when it has acquired a distinctive character.
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When the shape of a product merely incorporates the technical solution 
developed by the manufacturer of that product and patented by it, pro-
tection of that shape as a trade mark once the patent has expired would 
considerably and permanently reduce the opportunity for other under-
takings to use that technical solution. In the system of intellectual 
property rights developed in the European Union, technical solutions 
are capable of protection only for a limited period, so that subsequently 
they may be freely used by all economic operators. (Para. 46).
The essential characteristics of the three-dimensional sign at issue be 
properly identified by the authority deciding on the application for 
registration of the sign as a trade mark. The expression ‘essential char-
acteristics’ must be understood as referring to the most important ele-
ments of the sign. The identification of the essential characteristics of 
a three-dimensional sign may, depending on the case, and in particular 
in view of its degree of difficulty, be carried out by means of a simple 
visual analysis of the sign or, on the other hand, be based on a detailed 
examination in which relevant criteria of assessment are taken into 
account, such as surveys or expert opinions, or data relating to intel-
lectual property rights conferred previously in respect of the goods con-
cerned. Once the sign’s essential characteristics have been identified, 
the competent authority still has to ascertain whether they all perform 
the technical function of the goods at issue. (Para. 68-72).
The existence of other shapes which could achieve the same technical 
result is not such as to exclude the ground for refusal of registration. 
(See CJEU Philips/Remington). (Para. 83).
In examining the functionality of a sign consisting of the shape of 
goods, once the essential characteristics of the sign have been identi-
fied, it is only necessary to assess whether those characteristics per-
form the technical function of the product concerned. Clearly, that 
examination must be carried out by analyzing the sign filed with a view 
to its registration as a trade mark, and not signs consisting of other 
shapes of goods. The technical functionality of the characteristics of a 
shape may be assessed, inter alia, by taking account of the documents 
relating to previous patents describing the functional elements of the 
shape concerned. (Para. 84-85).
Th e OHIM refused the application 
of the Lego-toy-brick as a 
fi gurative trade mark.
Lego/OHIM
(technical solution)
CJEU 14 September 2010, case C-48/09 P, Lego/OHIM
Article 7(1)(e) and (ii) Trade Mark Regulation
When the shape of a product merely incorporates a technical solution, it 
cannot be trade mark protected. Th e existence of functionally equivalent 
alternative shapes using the same technical solution is irrelevant. In the 
assessment (earlier) patents can be taken into account.
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Instead of establishing whether the marks for which registration was 
sought varied significantly from the norm or customs of the sector, the 
General Court merely stated in a general manner, that since no bottle 
had been sold without a label or an equivalent, only that word element 
could determine the origin of the sparkling wine in question, so that 
the colour and matting of the glass of the bottle could not ‘function as 
a trade mark’ for sparkling wine for the relevant public when they were 
not used in combination with a word element. (Para. 50).
Such an assessment means that marks consisting of the appearance of 
the packaging of the product itself that do not contain an inscription 
or a word element would be excluded automatically from the protec-
tion that may be conferred by Regulation No 40/94. It follows that the 
General Court infringed Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 . (Para. 
51-52).
Freixenet had fi led applications 
of the relevant pictures as CTM. 
In the applications, Freixenet 
stated that the marks for which 
registration was sought were in 
the category ‘other’ and consisted 
of the shape of presentation of a 
product. In one application 
Freixenet claimed the colour 
‘golden matt’ and described the 
mark as a ‘white polished bottle 
which when fi lled with sparkling 
wine takes on a golden matt 
appearance similar to a frosted 
bottle’. In the other application, 
Freixenet claimed the colour ‘black 
matt’ and described the mark as
 a ‘frosted black matt bottle’. 
Furthermore, a declaration was 
annexed to those applications in 
which Freixenet stated that ‘the 
applicant for the mark [did] not 
want to obtain restrictive and 
exclusive protection for the shape 
of the packaging but for the specifi c 
appearance of its surface’.
Freixenet Bottle
CJEU 14 September 2010, cases C 344/10 P and C 345/10, 
Freixenet/OHIM
Article 7(1)(b) Trade Mark Regulation
The shape of a bottle with certain characteristics, without a name or 
depiction, can be a trademark (provided it deviates significantly from 
the norm).
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OTHER CASES 
CONCERNING 
SHAPE MARKS
Article 7(1)(b) Trade Mark 
Regulation
CJEU 29 April 2004, cases C-456/01 P, 
C-457/01 P and C-468/01 P t/m 
C-472/01 P, Henkel and P&G/OHIM; 
dishwasher tablets
The bicoloured dishwasher tablet of Hen-
kel and the speckled dishwasher tablet of Procter & Gamble (see pic-
tures) do not have any distinctive character.
CJEU 7 October 2004, case C-136/02 P, Maglite/OHIM; flashlight
The five registered Maglite flashlights lack any distinctive character. 
The fact that they can be considered to be ‘high-quality design’ does not 
automatically imply distinctive character.
CJEU 30 June 2005, C-286/04 P, Eurocermex/OHIM; 
Corona beer bottle
The shape of a bottle with a long neck in which a slice of lemon has 
been wedged and for which the colours yellow and green are claimed, 
does not have distinctive character for inter alia beer. (The CJEU does 
not give an opinion on the merits.)
CJEU 12 January 2006, C-173/04 P, SiSi/OHIM; standing pouches
The CJEU confirms the opinion of the Court of First Instance that 
such pouches ‘were devoid of any distinctive character on the ground 
that that form of packaging is already in general use in the Commu-
nity for liquids for human consumption and that, therefore, it is not 
sufficiently unusual for the average consumer to perceive it, per se, as 
an indication of the specific commercial origin of a product within that 
category.’ (Para. 66)
Decisions by the Court of First Instance (CFI) in which the CFI held 
that there was sufficent distinctive character:
CJEU 24 May 2012, case C 98/11 P, Lindt & Sprüngli/OHIM
Three-dimensional sign consisting of the shape of a chocolate rabbit 
with a red ribbon.
The appellant failed to demonstrate that the mark has an inherently 
distinctive character and that this is the case for the entire territory 
of the European Union. For that reason, the Court of Justice cannot 
uphold the appellant’s argument, and the statistics furnished in sup-
port of its argument, that the mark for which registration is sought has 
inherent distinctive character in 15 Member States and that, therefore, 
in those States, the acquisition by it of distinctive character through 
use does not have to be shown. (Para. 61).
Further, the appellant put forward ‘that since the Community trade 
mark has a unitary character, the assessment of acquisition by a mark 
of distinctive character through use cannot be based on individual 
national markets, it should be noted that, even if it is true, that the 
acquisition by a mark of distinctive character through use must be 
proved for the part of the European Union in which that mark did not, 
ab initio, have such character, it would be unreasonable to require proof 
of such acquisition for each individual Member State.’ (Para. 62).
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However, as regards the present case, the General Court did not err in 
law because, in any event, the appellant has not sufficiently proved the 
acquisition, by the mark for which registration is sought, of distinctive 
character through use throughout the European Union. (Para. 63).
CFI 5 March 2003, case T-128/01, DaimlerChrysler/OHIM; 
Jeep-grille
Sufficiently distinctive and not technically dictated:
‘The Court observes that the sign in question comprises a representa-
tion of the front part of a car having an irregular shape and with seven 
wide vertical openings in the centre and a circle representing the head-
lights of the vehicle on each side at the top. At the time when the appli-
cation was filed, this shape was an unusual grille design, conveying the 
impression of an old-fashioned grille, in a simple configuration, which 
cannot be regarded as altogether commonplace in the circumstances at 
the time when the application was filed.
Consequently the sign in question cannot be regarded as the image that 
naturally comes to mind as the typical representation of a contempo-
rary grille. OHIM’s finding that the sign in question is composed of fea-
tures commonly used to represent a grille cannot therefore be upheld.
In those circumstances the sign in question must be considered to be 
capable of leaving an impression on the memory of the target public as 
an indication of commercial origin and thus of distinguishing and set-
ting apart motor vehicles bearing that grille from those of other under-
takings.’ (Paras. 46-48).
CFI 3 December 2003, case T-305/02, Nestlé/OHIM; 
shape of a water bottle
Truly specific and cannot be regarded as altogether commonplace:
‘The elements of presentation, which make up the mark applied for, 
is truly specific and cannot be regarded as altogether commonplace: 
‘the nearly cylindrical main section of the bottle bears oblique grooves 
which, first, completely cover the bobbin-like part of the bottle and 
accentuate the curved, rounded effect of the bottle’s upper part and, 
second, are highlighted by the presence on the lower part of the bot-
tle of grooves running in the opposite direction, the whole forming a 
design which is striking and easy to remember. That combination thus 
gives the bottle at issue a particular appearance which, taking account 
also of the overall aesthetic result, is capable of holding the attention of 
the public concerned and enabling that public, made aware of the shape 
of the packaging of the goods in question, to distinguish the goods cov-
ered by the registration application from those with a different com-
mercial origin.’ (Para. 41).
CFI 24 November 2004, case T-393/02, Henkel/OHIM; 
shape of a white and transparent bottle
A particular and unusual appearance:
The combination of visual aspects confers on the bottle in question ‘a 
particular and unusual appearance which is likely to attract the atten-
tion of the relevant public and enable that public, once familiar with 
the shape of the packaging of the goods in question, to distinguish the 
goods covered by the registration application from those having a dif-
ferent commercial origin.’ (Para. 40).
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ABSOLUTE GROUNDS FOR 
REFUSAL (COLOUR, SMELL 
AND SOUND)
‘A colour per se, not spatially delimited, may, in respect of certain goods 
and services, have a distinctive character within the meaning of Article 
3(1)(b) and Article 3(3) [Trade Mark Directive] […], provided that, inter 
alia, it may be represented graphically in a way that is clear, precise, 
self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective. The 
latter condition cannot be satisfied merely by reproducing on paper 
the colour in question, but may be satisfied by designating that colour 
using an internationally recognised identification code.’ (Operative part 
in 1).
‘In assessing the potential distinctiveness of a given colour as a trade 
mark, regard must be had to the general interest in not unduly restrict-
ing the availability of colours for the other traders who offer for sale 
goods or services of the same type as those in respect of which registra-
tion is sought.’ (Operative part in 2).
‘A colour per se may be found to possess distinctive character within 
the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) and Article 3(3) [Trade Mark Directive], 
provided that, as regards the perception of the relevant public, the 
mark is capable of identifying the product or service for which regis-
tration is sought as originating from a particular undertaking and dis-
tinguishing that product or service from those of other undertakings.’ 
(Operative part in 3).
As a rule acquired distinctiveness is required.
‘In the case of a colour per se, distinctiveness without any prior use is 
inconceivable save in exceptional circumstances, and particularly where 
the number of goods or services for which the mark is claimed is very 
restricted and the relevant market very specific.’ (Para. 66).
Libertel fi led a colour mark 
application for the colour orange 
(PMS 144) for (mobile) 
telecommunication services.
Libertel
(colour marks, general interest)
CJEU 6 May 2003, case C-104/01, Libertel/BMB; colour orange
Articles 2 and 3 Trade Mark Directive
A colour per se can be a mark, but this usually requires acuired distinctive-
ness. Regard must be had to the ‘general interest’ in not unduly restricting 
the availability of colours. For registration of a colour mark reproduction on 
paper and/or description of the colour is not suffi  cient, an internationally 
recognised colour code is required.
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‘The mere juxtaposition of two or more colours, without shape or con-
tours, or a reference to two or more colours ‘in every conceivable form’, 
as is the case with the trade mark which is the subject of the main pro-
ceedings, does not exhibit the qualities of precision and uniformity 
required by Article 2 of the Directive, as construed in paragraphs 25 
to 32 of this judgment. 35 Such representations would allow numer-
ous different combinations, which would not permit the consumer 
to perceive and recall a particular combination, thereby enabling him 
to repeat with certainty the experience of a purchase, any more than 
they would allow the competent authorities and economic operators to 
know the scope of the protection afforded to the proprietor of the trade 
mark.’ (Paras. 34-35).
‘Colours or combinations of colours which are the subject of an applica-
tion for registration as a trade mark, claimed in the abstract, without 
contours, and in shades which are named in words by reference to a 
colour sample and specified according to an internationally recognised 
colour classification system may constitute a trade mark for the pur-
poses of Article 2 [Trade Mark Directive] where:
– it has been established that, in the context in which they are used, 
those colours or combinations of colours in fact represent a sign, 
and
– the application for registration includes a systematic arrangement 
associating the colours concerned in a predetermined and uniform 
way.’ (Operative part in 1).
‘Even if a combination of colours satisfies the requirements for con-
stituting a trade mark for the purposes of Article 2 of the Directive, 
it is still necessary for the competent authority for registering trade 
marks to decide whether the combination claimed fulfils the other 
requirements laid down, particularly in Article 3 of the Directive, for 
registration as a trade mark in relation to the goods or services of the 
undertaking which has applied for its registration. Such an examina-
tion must take account of all the relevant circumstances of the case, 
including any use which has been made of the sign in respect of which 
trade mark registration is sought. That examination must also take 
account of the public interest in not unduly restricting the availability 
of colours for other traders who market goods or services of the same 
type as those in respect of which registration is sought.’ (Operative part 
in 2).
Heidelberger Bauchemie fi led a 
colour mark application for the 
combination of blue and yellow 
(trade mark reproduction: 
a rectangular piece of paper, the 
top half of which is blue and 
the bottom half is yellow) 
provided with colour codes and a 
description: ‘Th e applied for mark 
consists of the company colours of 
the applicant which are used in all 
conceivable forms, in particular for 
packaging and labels’.
Heidelberger Bauchemie
(colour combinations)
CJEU 24 June 2004, case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie; 
blue and yellow
Articles 2 and 3 Trade Mark Directive
A colour combination may be a mark, but registration requires (next to a 
colour example, a description and an internationally recognised colour 
code) a ‘systematic arrangement’.
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From the perspective of register clarity due graphical representation is 
required.
‘Article 2 [Trade Mark Directive] […]must be interpreted as meaning 
that a trade mark may consist of a sign which is not in itself capable of 
being perceived visually, provided that it can be represented graphically, 
particularly by means of images, lines or characters, and that the repre-
sentation is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, 
durable and objective.’ (Operative part in 1).
‘Few people would recognise in such a formula the odour in question. 
Such a formula is not sufficiently intelligible. In addition, […], a chemi-
cal formula does not represent the odour of a substance, but the sub-
stance as such, and nor is it sufficiently clear and precise. It is therefore 
not a representation for the purposes of Article 2 of the Directive. In 
respect of the description of an odour, although it is graphic, it is not 
sufficiently clear, precise and objective. As to the deposit of an odour 
sample, it does not constitute a graphic representation for the purposes 
of Article 2 of the Directive. Moreover, an odour sample is not suffi-
ciently stable or durable.’ (Paras. 69-71).
‘In respect of an olfactory sign, the requirements of graphic represent-
ability are not satisfied by a chemical formula, by a description in writ-
ten words, by the deposit of an odour sample or by a combination of 
those elements.’ (Operative part in 2).
Sieckmann fi led a smell mark 
application consisting of the 
chemically pure substance methyl 
cinnamate (cinnamon acid methyl 
ester), chemical formula: 
C6H5-CH = CHCOOCH3, with a 
container with an odour sample 
and the statement that the colour 
is usually described as balm-like 
fruity with a hint of cinnamon.
Sieckmann
(smell marks)
CJEU 12 December 2002, case C-273/00, Sieckmann/DPM; 
smell mark
Article 2 Trade Mark Directive
A sign which is not in itself capable of being perceived visually, can be reg-
istrerd as a trade mark, provided that it can be represented graphically, 
particularly by means of images, lines or characters, and that the represen-
tation is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable 
and objective. Th is is (probably) not (yet) possible for smells.
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‘Article 2 [Trade Mark Directive] is to be interpreted as meaning that 
sound signs must be capable of being regarded as trade marks provided 
that they are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one 
undertaking from those of other undertakings and are capable of being 
represented graphically.
Article 2 [Trade Mark Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that a 
trade mark may consist of a sign which is not in itself capable of being 
perceived visually, provided that it can be represented graphically, par-
ticularly by means of images, lines or characters, and that its repre-
sentation is clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, 
durable and objective.
In the case of a sound sign, those requirements are not satisfied when 
the sign is represented graphically by means of a description using the 
written language, such as an indication that the sign consists of the 
notes going to make up a musical work, or the indication that it is the 
cry of an animal, or by means of a simple onomatopoeia, without more, 
or by means of a sequence of musical notes, without more.
On the other hand, those requirements are satisfied where the sign is 
represented by a stave divided into measures and showing, in partic-
ular, a clef, musical notes and rests whose form indicates the relative 
value and, where necessary, accidentals.’ (Operative part).
Shield Mark fi led several sound 
mark applications for the fi rst nine 
notes of Für Elise of Ludwig von 
Beethoven and for a cockcrow.
Shield Mark
(sound marks)
CJEU 27 November 2003, case C-283/01, Shield Mark/BMB; 
sound marks
Article 2 Trade Mark Directive
A musical stave meets the requirement of graphical representation of a 
sound mark, a description or an onomatopoeia does not.
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OTHER CASES 
ON REFUSAL 
ON ABSOLUTE 
GROUNDS
CJEU 28 June 2004, case C-445/02, Glaverbel/OHIM; 
surface of glass
Articles 2 and 3 Trade Mark Directive
Glaverbel filed an application for registration as a Community trade 
mark of a sign described as ‘a design applied to the surface of the goods’ 
in respect of sanitary installations.
The Court held that: ‘the design, which consists of countless tiny 
strokes applied to the surface of the sheet, no matter what its area, 
forms part of the appearance of the product itself and embodies obvi-
ous characteristics of the product, with the result that it is perceived 
primarily as a technical means of rendering the glass opaque. Moreover, 
it stated that the complexity and fancifulness of the design in respect of 
which registration was sought is attributable rather to the ornamental 
and decorative nature of the design’s finish. The overall complexity of 
the design and the fact that it is applied to the external surface of the 
product do not allow the design’s individual details to be committed to 
memory or the design to be apprehended without the product’s inher-
ent qualities being perceived simultaneously. Finally, it took the view 
that the impression conveyed by the sign is not fixed and varies accord-
ing to the angle from which the goods are viewed, the brightness of the 
light and the quality of the glass. (Para. 33).
CJEU 21 October 2004, case C-447/02, KWS/Saat/OHIM; 
colour orange
The colour orange (HKS7) is not rare for treatment installations for 
seeds and for agricultural, horticultural and forestry products.
CJEU 7 July 2005, case C-418/02, Praktiker Märkte/DPMA; 
retail trade services
A mark can be registered for ‘retail trade services’.
The German Trade Mark Office refused to register the mark Praktiker 
as mark for ‘retail trade in building, home improvement and gardening 
goods for the do-it-yourself sector’.
‘The concept of ‘services’ referred to by [ the Trade Mark Directive], 
in particular in Article 2, covers services provided in connection with 
retail trade in goods. For the purposes of registration of a trade mark 
for such services, it is not necessary to specify in detail the service(s) in 
question. However, details must be provided with regard to the goods 
or types of goods to which those services relate.’ (Operative part).
38
CJEU 30 March 2006, case C-259/04, Elizabeth Emanuel/
Continental Shelf 128; Elizabeth Emanuel
Registration of a mark (Elizabeth Emanuel) which is identical to the 
name of the designer and first producer of, in this case, clothing on 
which this mark has been affixed ‘may not, by reason of that particu-
lar feature alone, be refused registration on the ground that it would 
deceive the public, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(g) [Trade Mark 
Directive] […], in particular where the goodwill associated with that 
trade mark, previously registered in a different graphic form, has been 
assigned together with the business making the goods to which the 
mark relates.
A trade mark corresponding to the name of the designer and first man-
ufacturer of the goods bearing that mark is not, by reason of that par-
ticular feature alone, liable to revocation on the ground that that mark 
would mislead the public, within the meaning of Article 12(2)(b) [Trade 
Mark Directive], in particular where the goodwill associated with that 
mark has been assigned together with the business making the goods 
to which the mark relates.’(Operative part).
CJEU 5 July 2011, C-263/09 P, Edwin Co. Ltd/
OHIM & Elio Fiorucci
Article 50(1)(c) and article 52(2) Trade Mark Regulation.
Italian Elio Fiorucci challenges, on the basis of his own (well known) 
name, the registration ‘Elio Fiorucci’ by Edwin. His objection is made 
on the ground that it is misleading and conflicts with the right to his 
name.
The application of Article 52(2) of Regulation No 40/94 is not 
restricted ‘merely to situations where the registration of a Community 
trade mark conflicts with a right intended exclusively to protect a name 
as an attribute of the personality of the person concerned.’ (Para. 36).
CJEU 19 June 2012, case C-307/10, The Chartered Institute of 
Patent Attorneys/Registrar of Trade Marks; IP Translator
The Trade Mark Directive ‘must be interpreted as meaning that it 
requires the goods and services for which the protection of the trade 
mark is sought to be identified by the applicant with sufficient clarity 
and precision to enable the competent authorities and economic opera-
tors, on that basis alone, to determine the extent of the protection con-
ferred by the trade mark.’
The Trade Mark Directive ‘must be interpreted as meaning that it does 
not preclude the use of the general indications of the class headings of 
the Classification referred to in Article 1 of the Nice Agreement [...] to 
identify the goods and services for which the protection of the trade 
mark is sought, provided that such identification is sufficiently clear 
and precise.’
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‘An applicant for a national trade mark who uses all the general indica-
tions of a particular class heading of the Classification referred to in 
Article 1 of the Nice Agreement to identify the goods or services for 
which the protection of the trade mark is sought must specify whether 
its application for registration is intended to cover all the goods or ser-
vices included in the alphabetical list of that class or only some of those 
goods or services. If the application concerns only some of those goods 
or services, the applicant is required to specify which of the goods or 
services in that class are intended to be covered.’ (Operative part).
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INFRINGEMENT (RISK OF 
CONFUSION)
‘Article 5(1)(a) [Trade Mark Directive] […] must be interpreted as 
meaning that a sign is identical with the trade mark where it repro-
duces, without any modification or addition, all the elements constitut-
ing the trade mark or where, viewed as a whole, it contains differences 
so insignificant that they may go unnoticed by an average consumer.’ 
(Operative part).
‘The criterion of identity of the sign and the trade mark must be inter-
preted strictly. The very definition of identity implies that the two 
elements compared should be the same in all respects. Indeed, the 
absolute protection in the case of a sign which is identical with the 
trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with 
those for which the trade mark is registered, which is guaranteed by 
Article 5(1)(a) of the directive, cannot be extended beyond the situa-
tions for which it was envisaged, in particular, to those situations which 
are more specifically protected by Article 5(1)(b) of the directive. (Para. 
5.)
There is therefore identity between the sign and the trade mark where 
the former reproduces, without any modification or addition, all the 
elements constituting the latter. (Para. 51).
However, the perception of identity between the sign and the trade 
mark must be assessed globally with respect to an average consumer 
who is deemed to be reasonably well informed, reasonably observant 
and circumspect. The sign produces an overall impression on such a 
consumer. That consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct 
comparison between signs and trade marks and must place his trust in 
the imperfect picture of them that he has kept in his mind. Moreover, 
his level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods 
or services in question.’ (Para. 52).
LTJ Diff usion objected on the basis 
of its word and fi gurative mark 
Arthur for inter alia clothing to the 
use of the mark Arthur & Félice 
by Sadas, also for clothing.
Compare: CFI 24 November 
2005, case T-346/04:
Arthur & Felicie does infringe 
earlier mark Arthur under ‘(b)’.
Arthur & Félicie
(sign identical to mark)
CJEU 20 March 2003, case C-291/00, LTJ Diff usion/Sadas; 
Arthur (& Félicie)
Article 5(1)(a) Trade Mark Directive
A sign is identical to a trade mark if it represents all elements of that trade 
mark without any change or addition.
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Where a trade mark is registered both for motor vehicles – in respect of 
which it is well known – and for toys, the affixing by a third party, with-
out authorization from the trade mark proprietor, of a sign identical to 
that trade mark on scale models of vehicles bearing that trade mark, in 
order faithfully to reproduce those vehicles, and the marketing of those 
scale models:
– constitute, for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of the [Trade Mark 
Directive], a use which the proprietor of the trade mark is entitled 
to prevent if that use aff ects or is liable to aff ect the functions of the 
trade mark as a trade mark registered for toys;
– constitute, within the meaning of Article 5(2) of that directive, a 
use which the proprietor of the trade mark is entitled to prevent – 
where the protection defi ned in that provision has been introduced 
into national law – if, without due cause, use of that sign takes 
unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character 
or the repute of the trade mark as a trade mark registered for motor 
vehicles. (Operative part in 1).
Where a trade mark is registered, inter alia, in respect of motor vehi-
cles, the affixing by a third party, without the authorization of the 
proprietor of the trade mark, of a sign identical to that mark to scale 
models of that make of vehicle, in order faithfully to reproduce those 
vehicles, and the marketing of those scale models, do not constitute 
use of an indication concerning a characteristic of those scale models, 
within the meaning of Article 6(1)(b) of Directive 89/104. (Operative 
part in 2).
Car manufacturer Opel obtains 
objection against the use of the 
Opel-logo on scale models.
Adam Opel/Autec
(scale model)
CJEU 25 January 2007, case C-48/05, Adam Opel/Autec
Article 5(1)(c) and (2); article 6(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive
Th e use of a trade mark for scale models is no trademark use.
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‘The criterion of ‘likelihood of confusion which includes the likelihood 
of association with the earlier mark’ contained in Article 4(1)(b) [Trade 
Mark Directive] […] is to be interpreted as meaning that the mere asso-
ciation which the public might make between two trade marks as a 
result of their analogous semantic content is not in itself a sufficient 
ground for concluding that there is a likelihood of confusion within the 
meaning of that provision.’ (Operative part).
‘The likelihood of confusion must therefore be appreciated globally, 
taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case.
That global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of 
the marks in question, must be based on the overall impression given 
by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and domi-
nant components.
[…]the perception of marks in the mind of the average consumer of the 
type of goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global 
appreciation of the likelihood of confusion. The average consumer nor-
mally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its 
various details.
[…]the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likeli-
hood of confusion. It is therefore not impossible that the conceptual 
similarity resulting from the fact that two marks use images with 
analogous semantic content may give rise to a likelihood of confusion 
where the earlier mark has a particularly distinctive character, either 
per se or because of the reputation it enjoys with the public.
However, in circumstances such as those in point in the main proceed-
ings, where the earlier mark is not especially well known to the public 
and consists of an image with little imaginative content, the mere fact 
that the two marks are conceptually similar is not sufficient to give rise 
to a likelihood of confusion. ‘ (Paras. 22-25).
Puma objected on the basis of 
its fi gurative mark representing 
a puma to the trade mark 
registration of Sabel of a ‘bounding 
feline’, for inter alia leather goods.
Puma/Sabel
(confusion and association)
CJEU 11 November 1997, case C-251/95, Puma/Sabel; 
bounding feline
Article 4 and 5(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive
Th e only relevant criterion in art. 4 and 5(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive is 
likelihood of confusion. Th e addition ‘which includes likelihood of associa-
tion’ has little signifi cance.
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‘On a proper construction of Article 4(1)(b) [Trade Mark Directive] […], 
the distinctive character of the earlier trade mark, and in particular its 
reputation, must be taken into account when determining whether 
the similarity between the goods or services covered by the two trade 
marks is sufficient to give rise to the likelihood of confusion.’ (Opera-
tive part).
‘A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some inter-
dependence between the relevant factors, and in particular a similarity 
between the trade marks and between these goods or services. Accord-
ingly, a lesser degree of similarity between these goods or services may 
be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice 
versa. The interdependence of these factors is expressly mentioned in 
the tenth recital of the preamble to the Directive, which states that it 
is indispensable to give an interpretation of the concept of similarity 
in relation to the likelihood of confusion, the appreciation of which 
depends, in particular, on the recognition of the trade mark on the 
market and the degree of similarity between the mark and the sign and 
between the goods or services identified.’ (Para. 17).
‘There may be a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 
4(1)(b) [Trade Mark Directive] even where the public perception is that 
the goods or services have different places of production. By contrast, 
there can be no such likelihood where it does not appear that the pub-
lic could believe that the goods or services come from the same under-
taking or, as the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings.’ 
(Operative part).
Canon objected to the trade mark 
registration by Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer of the word mark Cannon 
for inter alia video tape cassettes.
Canon/Cannon
(similarity and reputation)
CJEU 29 September 1998, case C-39/97, Canon/
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer; Canon/Cannon
Article 4 and 5(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive
Similarity of goods also depends on the reputation of the earlier mark.
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‘It is possible that mere aural similarity between trade marks may create 
a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 5(1)(b) [Trade 
Mark Directive] […]. The more similar the goods or services covered 
and the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likeli-
hood of confusion. In determining the distinctive character of a mark 
and, accordingly, in assessing whether it is highly distinctive, it is neces-
sary to make a global assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the 
mark to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered 
as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those 
goods or services from those of other undertakings.’ (Operative part).
‘For the purposes of that global appreciation, the average consumer 
of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably 
well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect (see, to 
that effect, Case C-210/96 Gut Springenheide and Tusky [1998] ECR 
I -4657, paragraph 31). However, account should be taken of the fact 
that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct 
comparison between the different marks but must place his trust in 
the imperfect picture of them that he has kept in his mind. It should 
also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is 
likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.’ 
(Para. 26).
‘In making that assessment, account should be taken of all relevant 
factors and, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, 
including the fact that it does or does not contain an element descrip-
tive of the goods or services for which it has been registered. It is not 
possible to state in general terms, for example by referring to given 
percentages relating to the degree of recognition attained by the mark 
within the relevant section of the public, when a mark has a strong dis-
tinctive character.’ (Operative part).
Lloyd Schuhfabrik objected on the 
basis of its word mark Lloyd, for 
shoes, to the registration by Klijsen 
of the word mark Loint’s, also for 
shoes.
Lloyd/Loint’s
(confusion and aural similarity)
CJEU 22 June 1999, case C-342/97, Lloyd/Klijsen; Lloyd/Loint’s
Article 5(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive
Likelihood of confusion by the average consumer is to be assessed globally, 
but mere aural similarity may suffice to assume likelihood of confusion. 
‘For the purposes of that global appreciation, the average consumer of the 
 category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well-informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect’.
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The marks Picasso and Picaro are visually and phonetically similar. 
‘From the conceptual point of view, the word Picasso is particularly well 
known to the relevant public as being the name of the famous painter 
Pablo Picasso. The word Picaro may be understood by Spanish-speak-
ing persons as referring inter alia to a character in Spanish literature, 
whereas it has no semantic content for the (majority) non-Spanish-
speaking section of the relevant public.
Such conceptual differences can in certain circumstances counteract 
the visual and phonetic similarities between the signs concerned. For 
there to be such a counteraction, at least one of the signs at issue must 
have, from the point of view of the relevant public, a clear and specific 
meaning so that the public is capable of grasping it immediately.’ (Para. 
55- 56).
‘Where it is established in fact that the objective characteristics of 
a given product mean that the average consumer purchases it only 
after a particularly careful examination, it is important in law to take 
into account that such a fact may reduce the likelihood of confusion 
between marks relating to such goods at the crucial moment when the 
choice between those goods and marks is made.’ (Para. 40).
‘In doing so, the Court did not in any way express a general rule from 
which it could be inferred that, for the purposes of an assessment of 
the likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 5(1)(b) [Trade 
Mark Directive] or Article 8(1)(b) [Trade Mark Regulation], there is 
no need to refer specifically to the particularly high level of attention 
displayed by consumers when purchasing a certain category of goods.’ 
(Para. 47).
Th e Picasso heirs objected on the 
basis of the word mark Picasso for 
inter alia cars to the registration 
of the word mark Picaro by 
DaimlerChrysler, also for cars.
Picasso/Picaro
(likelihood of confusion)
CJEU 12 January 2006, case C-361/04, Th e Picasso estate/
DaimlerChrysler; Picasso/Picaro
Article 8(1)(b) Trade Mark Regulation
Visual and phonetic similarity may be counteracted by an explicit concep-
tual diff erence.
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The Court has stated, in a factual assessment, that the ‘OBELIX’ sign 
conveys a reference to a famous character from a comic strip and, as a 
result, is conceptually different from the ‘MOBELIX’ sign; it did not thus 
rule on the well known nature of the OBELIX trade mark. (Para. 96).
Case-law shows that the global assessment of the likelihood of confu-
sion implies that conceptual differences between two signs may coun-
teract aural and visual similarities between them, provided that at least 
one of those signs has, from the point of view of the relevant public, a 
clear and specific meaning, so that the public is capable of grasping it 
immediately. (Para. 98).
As regards the appellant’s argument derived from the fact that it is 
the proprietor of a family of marks characterised by the ‘-ix’ suffix, the 
Court notes that, although the appellant has invoked a number of ear-
lier marks which, it submits, are part of that family, it based its opposi-
tion solely on the earlier mark OBELIX. (Para. 100).
Strip publisher and proprietor 
of the trade mark Obelix, Les 
Editions Albert René, objects 
to the registration of the trade 
mark Mobilix.
Obelix/Mobilix
(confusion and aural similarity)
CJEU 18 December 2008, case C-16/06 P, Les Éditions Albert 
René/Orange A/S; OBELIX/MOBILIX
Article 8 and 63 Trade Mark Directive
Th e fact that the word mark ‘OBELIX’, from the point of view of the rel-
evant public, has a clear and specifi c meaning, so that the public is capable 
of grasping it immediately, implies that conceptual diff erences between two 
signs may counteract aural and visual similarities between them.
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No consumer can be expected, in the absence of use of a sufficient 
number of trade marks capable of constituting a family or a series, to 
detect a common element in such a family or series and/or to associ-
ate with that family or series another trade mark containing the same 
common element. Accordingly, in order for there to be a likelihood that 
the public may be mistaken as to whether the trade mark applied for 
be-longs to a ‘family’ or ‘series’, the earlier trade marks which are part of 
that ‘family’ or ‘series’ must be present on the market. (Para. 64).
In any event, while it is possible, to consider a registered trade mark as 
used where proof is provided of use of that mark in a slightly different 
form from that in which it was registered, it is not possible to extend, 
by means of proof of use, the protection enjoyed by a registered trade 
mark to another registered mark, the use of which has not been estab-
lished, on the ground that the latter is merely a slight variation on the 
former. (Para. 86).
A proprietor of a national registration who opposes a Community trade 
mark application cannot, in order to avoid the burden of proof which 
rests upon him, rely on a national provision which allows the regis-
tration, as trade marks, of signs not intended to be used in trade on 
account of their purely defensive function in relation to another sign 
which is being commercially exploited. (Para. 101).
The concept of ‘proper reasons’ mentioned in that article refers essen-
tially to circumstances unconnected with the proprietor of a trade mark 
which prevent him from using the mark, rather than to national legisla-
tion which makes an exception to the rule that a trade mark that has 
not been used for a period of five years must be revoked, even where 
such lack of use is intentional on the part of the proprietor of the trade 
mark. (Para. 102).
The argument that the holder of a national registration who opposes 
a Community trade mark application can rely on an earlier trade mark 
the use of which has not been established on the ground that, un-der 
national legislation, that earlier mark constitutes a ‘defensive trade 
mark’ is therefore incompatible with Article 43(2) and (3) of Regulation 
No 40/94. (Para. 103).
Opposition by the proprietor of 
earlier national trade marks all 
having the component ‘Bridge’ 
in common.
Il Ponte Finanziaria/
F.M.G. Textiles
(series of trade marks)
CJEU 13 September 2007, case C-234/06, Il Ponte Finanziaria/
F.M.G. Textiles
Article 8(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive
Series of trade marks must be present on the market to be of infl uence as 
to risk of confusion. ‘Defensive trademarks’ are not compatible with the 
 Community trade mark system.
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According to settled case-law, the global assessment of the likelihood 
of confusion, in relation to the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of 
the marks in question, must be based on the overall impression given 
by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and domi-
nant components. The perception of the marks by the average con-
sumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the 
global appreciation of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the 
average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not 
proceed to analyze its various details. (Para. 35).
It should be added that in order to assess the degree of similarity 
between the marks concerned, it is necessary to determine the degree 
of visual, aural or conceptual similarity between them and, where 
appropriate, to assess the importance to be attached to those various 
factors, taking account of the category of goods or services in question 
and the circumstances in which they are marketed. (Para. 36).
However, the Court stated in the judgment under appeal that, if the 
trade mark claimed was a complex mark which was visual in nature, 
the assessment of the overall impression created by that mark and the 
determination as to whether there was a dominant element had to be 
carried out on the basis of a visual analysis. It added that, in such a 
case, it was only to the extent to which a potentially dominant element 
included non-visual semantic aspects that it might become necessary 
to compare that element with the earlier mark, also taking into account 
those other semantic aspects, such as for example phonetic factors or 
relevant abstract concepts. (Para. 38).
On the basis of those considerations, the Court of First Instance, in the 
context of the analysis of the signs at issue, firstly held that the mark 
for which registration was sought contained a dominant element com-
prising the representation of a round dish decorated with lemons. It 
then inferred that it was not necessary to examine the phonetic or con-
ceptual features of the other elements of that mark. It finally concluded 
that the dominance of the figurative representation of a round dish 
decorated with lemons in comparison with the other components of 
the mark prevented any likelihood of confusion arising from the visual, 
phonetic or conceptual similarities between the words ‘limonchelo’ and 
‘limoncello’ which appear in the marks at issue. (Para. 39).
Th e proprietor of the earlier 
Spanish word mark ‘Limonchelo’ 
objects to the registration of the 
word- and fi gurative mark of 
the word limoncello and a sign 
consisting a round dish decorated 
with lemons on a blue background.
OHIM/Shaker; 
Limoncello
CJEU 12 June 2007, case C-334/05 P, OHIM/Shaker; Limoncello
Article 8(1)(b) Trade Mark Regulation
Various dominant components of the graphic element do not preclude the 
likelihood of confusion between the word- and figurative mark and an 
 earlier trade mark.
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According to the case law of the Court, in the context of consideration 
of the likelihood of confusion, assessment of the similarity between 
two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite 
trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the 
comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question 
as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed 
to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain cir-
cumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components. (Para. 41).
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The Court of First Instance thus attributed to the figurative element of 
the marks at issue the character of a dominant element in relation to 
the other elements comprising those marks, in particular the word ele-
ment. That enabled it correctly to base its assessment on the similarity 
of the signs and on the existence of a likelihood of confusion between 
the marks La Española and Carbonell by giving the visual comparison 
of those signs an essential character. (Para. 66).
Thus, having made a detailed comparative assessment of the marks at 
issue from a visual point of view, the Court then held that the elements 
common to the two marks, seen as a whole, produced an overall visual 
impression of great similarity, since the La Española mark reproduced 
very precisely the essence of the message and the visual impression 
given by the Carbonell mark, thus inescapably giving rise to a likeli-
hood of confusion on the part of the consumer between those marks. 
(Para. 68).
The Court of First Instance lastly held that such a likelihood of confu-
sion is not diminished by the existence of the different word element, 
in view of the latter’s very weak distinctive character in relation to the 
mark in respect of which registration was sought, which refers to the 
geographical origin of the goods. (Para. 69).
Whilst considering the figurative element of those marks as a domi-
nant element in relation to the other elements of which they are com-
prised, the Court of First Instance did not fail to take the word element 
into account. On the contrary, it is precisely in the context of the 
assessment of that element that the Court of First Instance described 
it essentially as negligible, on the ground, in particular, that the differ-
ences between the word signs of the marks at issue do not invalidate 
the conclusion it reached after the comparative examination of those 
marks from the visual point of view. (Para 70).
The Court of First Instance correctly applied the rule that a global 
assessment should be undertaken when determining whether a likeli-
hood of confusion exists between the marks at issue. (Para. 71).
Aceites del Sur is proprietor of a 
fi gurative trademark of an olive 
oil label and objects to the 
registration by Koipe of the 
fi gurative trademark of another 
olive oil label (see pictures).
Carbonell/La Española
(likelihood of confusion of figurative trademarks)
CJEU 3 September 2009, case C-498/07 P, Aceites del Sur/Koipe; 
Carbobell/La Española
Article 8(1)(b) Trade Mark Regulation
For fi gurative trademarks the visual element can be very dominant and if 
there is similarity this can cause confusion, despite diff ering word elements.
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The Court has judged that the fact that the word ‘kinder’ is present in 
both of the signs at issue, there were a number of visual and phonetic 
features which precluded the signs from being perceived as similar. 
(Para. 26).
In order for Article 8(1)(b) or (5) of [Trade Mark Regulation] to be 
applicable, the marks at issue must be identical or similar. Conse-
quently, those provisions are manifestly inapplicable where the General 
Court has ruled out any similarity between the marks at issue. It is only 
if there is some similarity, even faint, between the marks at issue that 
the General Court must carry out a global assessment in order to ascer-
tain whether, notwithstanding the low degree of similarity between 
them, there is, on account of the presence of other relevant factors such 
as the reputation or recognition enjoyed by the earlier mark, a likeli-
hood of confusion or a link made between those marks by the relevant 
public. (Para. 66).
The existence of a ‘family’ or a ‘series’ of trademarks is an element 
which must be taken into account for the purposes of assessing the 
likelihood of confusion. In those circumstances, the likelihood of con-
fusion results from the possibility that the consumer may be mistaken 
as to the provenance or origin of goods or services covered by the trade 
mark applied for and may consider, erroneously, that that trade mark is 
part of that family or series of marks (see Il Ponte Finanziaria/OHIM). 
(Para. 97).
In so far as the General Court found, in the judgment under appeal, 
that a certain number of visual and phonetic features of the signs at 
issue precluded them from being perceived as similar, it could, without 
erring in law, that that finding is not called into question by the exis-
tence of a ‘family’ or ‘series’ of trademarks. (Para. 100).
Ferrero fi led a notice of opposition 
to the registration of the trade 
mark “TiMi KiNDERJOGHURT” 
fi led by Tirol Milch, based on its 
earlier word mark KINDER.
Ferrero/OHIM; Kinder
(similarity)
CJEU 24 March 2011, case C-552/09 P, Ferrero/OHIM; Kinder
Article 8(1)(b) and (5) Trade Mark Directive
Without any similarity between the marks, the likelihood of confusion 
needs not to be assessed.
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The General Court found that the overall impression created by the 
mark applied for is dominated by the element ‘creaciones kennya’, on 
which the consumer concerned will to a very great extent focus his 
attention and, second, that the element ‘ck’ occupies only an ancillary 
position in relation to that element, which, in essence, amounts to a 
conclusion that the element ‘ck’ in the mark applied for is negligible. 
(Para. 57).
Thus, having ruled out, on the basis of a properly conducted analysis, 
any similarity between the marks at issue, the General Court correctly 
concluded, at paragraphs 53 to 57 of the judgment under appeal, that, 
notwithstanding the reputation of the earlier marks and the fact that 
the goods covered by the marks at issue are identical, there is no likeli-
hood of confusion between the marks. (Para. 58).
It should be noted in that connection that the similarity of the marks at 
issue must be assessed from the point of view of the average consumer 
by referring to the intrinsic qualities of the marks and not to circum-
stances relating to the conduct of the person applying for a Community 
trade mark. (Para. 46).
It must therefore be held that, contrary to the appellant’s submissions 
in the first part of its first ground of appeal, the General Court’s anal-
ysis is not vitiated by an error of law due to the fact that it failed to 
take account of alleged wrongful conduct on the part of the trade mark 
applicant. While such conduct is a particularly significant factor in pro-
ceedings brought under Article 51(1)(b) [in the meantime article 52(1)
(b)] of [the Trade Marks Regulation]– which is not at issue in the pres-
ent appeal – it is not, on the other hand, a factor that must be taken 
into account in opposition proceedings brought under Article 8 of that 
regulation. (Para. 47).
Based on its CK fi gurative trade 
marks, Calvin Klein objects to the 
trade mark application of CK 
CREACIONES KENNYA
Calvin Klein
CJEU 2 September 2010, case C-254/09 P, Calvin Klein 
Trademark Trust/OHIM
Article 8(1)(b) and (5) Trade Mark Regulation 40/94
Wrongful conduct is not a factor for the assessment of similarity in opposi-
tion proceedings.
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The public’s perception that a sign is a decoration cannot constitute a 
restriction on the protection conferred by Article 5(1)(b) of the Direc-
tive when, despite its decorative nature, that sign is so similar to the 
registered trade mark that the relevant public is likely to perceive that 
the goods come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, 
from economically-linked undertakings. (Para. 34).
In the present case, it must therefore be determined whether the aver-
age consumer, when he sees sports or leisure garments featuring stripe 
motifs in the same places and with the same characteristics as the 
stripes logo registered by Adidas, except for the fact that they consist of 
two rather than three stripes, may be mistaken as to the origin of those 
goods, believing that they are marketed by Adidas or an undertaking 
linked economically to those undertakings. (Para. 35).
As is clear from the 10th recital in the Directive, that appreciation 
depends not solely on the degree of similarity between the trade mark 
and the sign, but also on the ease with which the sign may be associ-
ated with the mark having regard, in particular, to the recognition of 
the latter on the market. The more the mark is well known, the greater 
the number of operators who will want to use similar signs. The pres-
ence on the market of a large quantity of goods covered by similar signs 
might adversely affect the trade mark in so far as it could reduce the 
distinctive character of the mark and jeopardise its essential function, 
which is to ensure that consumers know where the goods concerned 
come from. (Para. 36).
The requirement of availability cannot be taken into account in the 
assessment of the scope of the exclusive rights of the proprietor of a 
trade mark, except in so far as the limitation of the effects of the trade 
mark defined in Article 6(1)(b) of the Directive applies.
[The Trade Mark Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the 
requirement of availability cannot be taken into account in the assess-
ment of the scope of the exclusive rights of the proprietor of a trade 
mark, except in so far as the limitation of the effects of the trade mark 
defined in Article 6(1)(b) of the Directive applies. (Operative Part).
Adidas objects to the use of two 
stripes, Marca en H&M invoked 
on the requirement of availability 
in relation to the use of two 
stripes.
Adidas/Marca II
(infringementquestion)
CJEU 10 April 2008, case C-102/07, Adidas/Marca II
Article 5(1)(b) and 6 Trade Mark Directive
In the assessment of infringement the requirement of availability cannot 
be taken into account except for the situation dealt with in article 6 Direc-
tive.
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The purpose of a company, trade or shop name is not, of itself, to dis-
tinguish goods or services. The purpose of a company name is to iden-
tify a company, whereas the purpose of a trade name or a shop name is 
to designate a business which is being carried on. Accordingly, where 
the use of a company name, trade name or shop name is limited to 
identifying a company or designating a business which is being carried 
on, such use cannot be considered as being ‘in relation to goods or ser-
vices’ within the meaning of Article 5(1) of the directive. (Para. 21).
Conversely, there is use ‘in relation to goods’ within the meaning of 
Article 5(1) of the directive where a third party affixes the sign consti-
tuting his company name, trade name or shop name to the goods which 
he markets. (Para. 22).
In addition, even where the sign is not affixed, there is use ‘in rela-
tion to goods or services’ within the meaning of that provision where 
the third party uses that sign in such a way that a link is established 
between the sign which constitutes the company, trade or shop name 
of the third party and the goods marketed or the services provided by 
the third party. (Para. 23).
The unauthorized use by a third party of a sign which is identical to 
a registered mark in relation to goods or services which are identical 
to those for which that mark is registered cannot be prevented under 
Article 5(1)(a) of the directive unless it affects or is liable to affect the 
functions of the mark, in particular its essential function of guarantee-
ing to consumers the origin of the goods or services. (Para. 26).
That is the situation where the sign is used by the third party in rela-
tion to his goods or services in such a way that consumers are liable to 
interpret it as designating the origin of the goods or services in ques-
tion. In such a case, the use of the sign is liable to imperil the essential 
function of the mark, since, for the trade mark to be able to fulfill its 
essential role in the system of un-distorted competition which the EC 
Treaty seeks to establish and maintain, it must offer a guarantee that 
all the goods or services bearing it have been manufactured or supplied 
under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their 
quality. (Para. 27).
Th e earlier French trade mark 
Céline (fi led in 1948) objects to 
the use of the younger/earlier 
company name/trade name/
shop name Céline (1950).
Céline
(the use of a trade name as a trade mark)
CJEU 11 September 2007, case C-17/06, Céline SARL/Céline SA
Article 5(1)(a) and 6 (1)(a) Trade Mark Directive
Use of a company name, trade name or shop name which is identical to an 
earlier mark in connection with the marketing of goods which are identi-
cal to those in relation to which that mark was registered, constitutes use 
which the proprietor of that mark is entitled to prevent in accordance with 
Article 5(1)(a) of the directive, where the use is in relation to goods in such 
a way as to aff ect or be liable to aff ect the functions of the mark.
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In the light of all of the above considerations, the answer to the ques-
tion referred must be that the unauthorized use by a third party of a 
company name, trade name or shop name which is identical to an ear-
lier mark in connection with the marketing of goods which are identi-
cal to those in relation to which that mark was registered constitutes 
use which the proprietor of that mark is entitled to prevent in accor-
dance with Article 5(1)(a) of the directive, where the use is in relation 
to goods in such a way as to affect or be liable to affect the functions of 
the mark.
Should that be the case, Article 6(1)(a) of the directive can operate as a 
bar to such use being prevented only if the use by the third party of his 
company name or trade name is in accordance with honest practices in 
industrial or commercial matters. (Para. 36).
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Article 5(1) and (3) of [the Trade Mark Directive] is to be interpreted 
as meaning that the proprietor of a trade mark can prohibit the transit 
through a Member State in which that mark is protected (the Federal 
Republic of Germany in the present case) of goods bearing the trade 
mark and placed under the external transit procedure, whose destina-
tion is another Member State where the mark is not so protected (Ire-
land in the present case), only if those goods are subject to the act of a 
third party while they are placed under the external transit procedure 
which necessarily entails their being put on the market in that Member 
State of transit. (Operative part in 1).
It is in that regard, in principle, irrelevant whether goods whose des-
tination is a Member State come from an associated State or a third 
country, or whether those goods have been manufactured in the coun-
try of origin lawfully or in infringement of the existing trade mark 
rights of the proprietor in that country. (Operative part in 2).
Montex manufactures jeans in 
Poland [at the time not a Member 
State of the European Union] and 
returns the jeans to Ireland via 
Germany.
Montex/Diesel
(transit)
CJEU 9 November 2006, case C-281/05, Montex/Diesel
Article 5(1) and (3) Trade Mark Directive
Th e mere risk that goods will not reach their destination, a Member State 
where is no form of protection for the trade mark Diesel, and that the goods 
theoretically can unlawfully enter the market in the Member State of tran-
sit, does not imply that the transit aff ects the substantial functions of the 
trade mark in the Member State of transit.
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OTHER CASES 
CONCERNING 
CONFUSION
Article 8(1)(b) Trade Mark 
Regulation
Article 5(1)(b) Trade Mark 
Directive
See also: CJEU 23 October 
2003, case C-408/01, Adidas/
Fitnessworld Trading.
See also: CJEU 9 March 2006, 
C-421/04, Matratzen Concord/
Hukla.
CJEU 22 June 2000, case C-425/98, Marca/Adidas; 
three versus two stripes
Marca sold clothing with two stripes, Adidas objected to this on the 
basis of its well-known three-stripe mark.
‘Article 5(1)(b) [Trade Mark Directive] [...] cannot be interpreted as 
meaning that where:
– a trade mark has a particularly distinctive character, either per se or 
because of the reputation it enjoys with the public, and
– a third party, without the consent of the proprietor of the mark, 
uses, in the course of trade in goods or services which are identical 
with, or similar to, those for which the trade mark is registered, a 
sign which so closely corresponds to the mark as to give rise to the 
possibility of its being associated with that mark, 
the exclusive right enjoyed by the proprietor entitles him to prevent the 
use of the sign by that third party if the distinctive character of the 
mark is such that the possibility of such association giving rise to con
fusion cannot be ruled out.’ (Operative part).
‘The Court [in Puma/Sabel] did not excuse the national court from the 
necessary positive finding of the existence of a likelihood of confusion 
which constitutes the matter to be proved.’ (Para. 39).
CJEU 28 April 2004, case C-3/03 P, Matratzen Concord/
OHIM-Hukla; Matratzen
Hukla opposed the registration of a word and visual mark as a Com-
munity trade mark (see picture) for mattresses by Matratzen Concord 
on the basis of its Spanish word mark ‘Matratzen’. (‘Matratzen’ is the 
German word for mattresses, but it is unknown in Spanish).
The Court of First Instance concluded that the word ‘Matratzen’ was 
the dominant element of the trade mark applied for. It therefore held 
that, from the point of view of the relevant (Spanish) public, there 
existed a visual and aural similarity between the two trade marks.
Finally, the Court held that, ‘considered cumulatively, the degree of 
similarity between the trade marks in question and the degree of sim-
ilarity between the goods covered by them was sufficiently high and 
that the Board of Appeal was therefore entitled to hold that there was 
a likelihood of confusion between the trade marks in question. ‘The 
Court rightly pointed out, […], that the assessment of the similarity 
between two marks does not amount to taking into consideration only 
one component of a complex trade mark and comparing it with another 
mark. On the contrary, such a comparison must be made by examin-
ing the marks in question, each considered as a whole. It also held that 
that does not mean that the overall impression created in the mind of 
the relevant public by a complex trade mark may not, in certain circum-
stances, be dominated by one or more of its components.’ (Para 32).
CJEU 12 October 2004, case C-106/03 P, Verdial/OHIM; 
Saint-Hubert 41/Hubert
Word and figurative mark Hubert (see picture) is insufficiently simi-
lar to the earlier French word mark ‘Saint-Hubert 41’ to assume like-
lihood ‘whatever the reputation of the earlier mark and regardless of 
the degree of identity or similarity of the goods or services concerned.’ 
(Para. 54)
58
CJEU 6 October 2005, case C-120/04, Medion/ Thomson; 
Life/Thomson Life
Earlier mark ‘Life’ versus later mark ‘Thomson Life’. Rejection of so-
called German ‘Präge theory’. (According to this theory upon compari-
son of overall impressions the most ‘geprägte’ (‘impressive’) element, 
i.e. ‘Thomson’, would mainly put the ‘only co-defining’ element ‘Life’ in 
the background).
There may be confusion amongst the public between identical goods 
and services ‘where the contested sign is composed by juxtaposing the 
company name of another party and a registered mark which has nor-
mal distinctiveness and which, without alone determining the overall 
impression conveyed by the composite sign, still has an independent 
distinctive role therein.’
CJEU 1 December 2005, case C-512/04 P, Vitakraft/
OHIM-Krafft; Krafft/Vitakraft
The Spanish company Krafft opposes the registration of the word mark 
‘Vitakraft’ on the basis of its Spanish word and figurative marks con-
taining the word ‘Krafft’ (see pictures).
According to the Court of First Instance there is a risk of confusion, 
because to a Spanish audience the element ‘Kraft’ is the most distinc-
tive part, because this word does not have a meaning in Spanish. This is 
an assessment of the facts which is not for the CJEU to decide.
CJEU 23 March 2006, case C-206/04 P, Mülhens/OHIM en Zirh; 
Sir/Zirh
The word mark Zihr does not infringe the word and figurative mark Sir.
Aural similarity in this case is insufficient to assume infringement.
‘That global assessment means that conceptual and visual differences 
between two signs may counteract aural similarities between them, pro-
vided that at least one of those signs has, from the point of view of the 
relevant public, a clear and specific meaning, so that the public is capa-
ble of grasping it immediately.’ (Para. 35, reference to Picasso/Picaro).
CJEU 27 April 2006, case C-235/05 P, L’Oréal v OHIM – Revlon; 
Flex/Flexi Air
Revlon opposed the registration of the word mark ‘Flexi Air’ by L’Oreal, 
for hair-care products, on the basis of its word mark ‘Flex’.
The Court of First Instance held that, notwithstanding the weak distinc-
tive character of the earlier mark, there was a likelihood of confusion 
between the signs and, accordingly, between the marks covered by them.
‘In that regard, the Court of First Instance cannot be criticised for not 
having disregarded, in its examination of the similarity of the signs in 
question, the element ‘FLEX’, which is common to the marks, on the 
ground that the earlier mark is only of weak distinctive character. In 
the first place, it is settled case-law that in order to assess the degree of 
similarity between the marks concerned, it is necessary to determine 
the degree of visual, aural or conceptual similarity between them and, 
where appropriate, to determine the importance to be attached to those 
different elements, taking account of the category of goods or services 
in question and the circumstances in which they are marketed […].
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In addition, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, 
as regards the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in 
question, be based on the overall impression created by them, bearing 
in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components. The 
perception of the marks in the mind of the average consumer of the 
goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assess-
ment of the likelihood of confusion.’ (Paras. 39-41).
CJEU 16 July 2011, C-317/10 P, Union Investment Privatfonds 
GmbH/UniCredito Italiano SpA & OHIM
On the ground of, inter alia, the trademark UNIFONDS and UNIRAK, 
Union Investment Privatfonds filed an opposition against the registra-
tion of the word signs ‘UNIWEB’ and ‘UniCredit Wealth Management’ 
by UniCredito. Having found the existence of a “series” of trade marks, 
the Board of Appeal concluded from this, almost automatically, that the 
relevant public associates the prefix “UNI” with [the appellant] where 
it is used in relation to fund investments and that there is, therefore, 
a likelihood of confusion between the trade marks at issue. (Para. 48).
The General Court annulled that judgment because it opined that, 
despite the ‘series element’, no risk of confusions exists. Hereupon, this 
decision was then annulled by the ECJ.
In this case, the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion 
implies complex assessments of fact in order to verify whether there is, 
as the Board of Appeal of OHIM found, a risk that the relevant public 
might believe that the trade marks applied for are part of the series of 
trade marks cited by the appellant. It is appropriate, therefore, to refer 
the case back to the General Court to rule again on the actions brought 
before it by UniCredito and on the applications for partial annulment 
of the contested decisions presented by the appellant and to reserve 
the costs of the appeal. (Para. 64).
CJEU 24 May 2012, zaak C-196/11 P, Formula One Licensing/
OHIM & Global Sports Media; F1 word/device marks
Comparison of two word/device marks containing the element ‘F1’.
The General Court held ‘that consumers regard the ‘F1’ element in an 
ordinary typography as being the abbreviation of ‘formula 1’, that is to 
say, a description, and that the public attributes a generic meaning to 
the sign ‘F1’. Finally, it added, in paragraph 67 of the judgment, that 
the presence of the letter ‘f ’ and the numeral ‘1’ in the mark applied for 
has no distinctive character.’ (Para. 50).
Although the findings of the judgment under appeal are made with 
regard to the sign in the earlier trade mark or with regard to the ‘F1’ 
element in the trade mark applied for, given that the General Court 
considered, in paragraph 54 of the judgment, that that sign and that 
element are the same, by doing so the General Court thus held that 
the sign is generic, descriptive and devoid of any distinctive character. 
Hence, the General Court called into question the validity of those ear-
lier trade marks in proceedings for registration of a Community trade 
mark and therefore infringed Article 8(1)(b) of the Trade Mark Regula-
tion. (Para. 51-52).
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INFRINGEMENT
(WELL-KNOWN MARKS)
‘Article 5(2) [Trade Mark Directive] […] is to be interpreted as meaning 
that, in order to enjoy protection extending to non-similar products or 
services, a registered trade mark must be known by a significant part 
of the public concerned by the products or services which it covers. In 
the Benelux territory, it is sufficient for the registered trade mark to 
be known by a significant part of the public concerned in a substantial 
part of that territory, which part may consist of a part of one of the 
countries composing that territory.’ (Operative part).
‘If, at the end of its examination, the national court decides that the 
condition as to the existence of a reputation is fulfilled, as regards both 
the public concerned and the territory in question, it must then go on 
to examine the second condition laid down in Article 5(2) of the Direc-
tive, which is that the earlier trade mark must be detrimentally affected 
without due cause. Here it should be observed that the stronger the 
earlier mark’s distinctive character and reputation the easier it will be to 
accept that detriment has been caused to it.’ (Para. 30).
General Motors objected on the 
basis of its Benelux word mark 
Chevy for cars to the use of the 
Benelux word mark Chevy for 
cleaning products by Yplon.
Chevy
(reputation)
CJEU 14 September 1999, case C-375/97, General Motors/Yplon; 
Chevy
Article 5(2) Trade Mark Directive
In the Benelux territory, reputation in a signifi cant part (of one country of) 
the Benelux is suffi  cient.
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The concept of ‘reputation’ assumes a certain degree of knowledge 
amongst the relevant public. The relevant public is that concerned by 
the Community trade mark, that is to say, depending on the product or 
service marketed, either the public at large or a more specialized public, 
for example traders in a specific sector. It cannot be required that the 
Community trade mark be known by a given percentage of the public 
so defined. The degree of knowledge required must be considered to 
be reached when the Community trade mark is known by a significant 
part of the public concerned by the products or services covered by that 
trade mark. (Para. 21-24).
In examining this condition, the national court must take into consid-
eration all the relevant facts of the case, in particular the market share 
held by the trade mark, the intensity, geographical extent and duration 
of its use, and the size of the investment made by the undertaking in 
promoting it. In view of the elements of the main proceedings, it is 
thus for the national court to determine whether the Community trade 
mark at issue is known by a significant part of the public concerned by 
the goods which that trade mark covers. (Para. 26-27).
Territorially, the condition as to reputation must be considered to be 
fulfilled when the Community trade mark has a reputation in a sub-
stantial part of the territory of the Community. It should be noted that 
the Court has already ruled that, with regard to a Benelux trade mark, 
it is sufficient, for the purposes of Article 5(2) of the directive, that it 
has a reputation in a substantial part of the Benelux territory, which 
part may consist of a part of one of the Benelux countries. As the pres-
ent case concerns a Community trade mark with a reputation through-
out the territory of a Member State, namely Austria, the view may be 
taken, regard being had to the circumstances of the main proceedings, 
that the territorial requirement imposed by Article 9(1)(c) of the regu-
lation is satisfied. (Para. 27-29).
Article 9(1)(c) of [the Trade Marks Regulation] must be interpreted as 
meaning that, in order to benefit from the protection afforded in that 
provision, a Community trade mark must be known by a significant 
part of the public concerned by the products or services covered by that 
trade mark, in a substantial part of the territory of the European Com-
munity, and that, in view of the facts of the main proceedings, the ter-
ritory of the Member State in question may be considered to constitute 
a substantial part of the territory of the Community. (Operative part).
PAGO has a fi gurative trademark 
for fruit drinks and fruit juices, 
consisting an image of a green 
glass bottle with a distinctive label 
and cap. PAGO markets in Austria 
a fruit juice called ‘Pago’ in such 
bottles. Th e Community trade 
mark held by PAGO is widely 
known in that Member State. 
Tirolmilch markets, also in 
Austria, a fruit and whey drink 
called ‘Lattella’. Th at drink was 
initially sold in cartons. 
Subsequently, it has also been 
packaged in glass bottles. Two 
bottle designs resemble in several 
respects the Community trade 
mark held by PAGO. In its 
advertising, Tirolmilch uses a 
representation which, like the 
Community trade mark held by 
PAGO, shows a bottle next to a full 
glass. PAGO objects to Tirolmilch.
PAGO
(reputation in the EU)
CJEU 6 October 2009, case C-301/07, PAGO/Tirolmilch
Article 9(1)(c) Trade Mark Regulation
A Community trade mark can have a ‘reputation’, if it is known throughout 
the territory of one Member State.
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‘Articles 4(4)(a) and 5(2) [Trade Mark Directive] […]are to be inter-
preted as entitling the Member States to provide specific protection for 
registered trade marks with a reputation in cases where a later mark 
or sign, which is identical with or similar to the registered mark, is 
intended to be used or is used for goods or services identical with or 
similar to those covered by the registered mark.’ (Operative part).
When interpreting Article 5(2) of the Directive one should not exclu-
sively start form the wording, but also the general set-up and purposes 
of the regulation which this provision is part of should be taken into 
account. The article cannot be interpreted in such sense that known 
trade marks would enjoy lesser protection if a sign is used for identical 
or similar goods or services, than if a sign is used for dissimilar goods 
or services.
‘On this point, it has not been seriously disputed before the Court that, 
where a sign is used for identical or similar goods or services, a mark 
with a reputation must enjoy protection which is at least as extensive as 
where a sign is used for non-similar goods and services.’ (Paras. 24-26).
Davdidoff  objected on the basis 
of its word and fi gurative mark 
Davidoff  inter alia smoking 
articles to the use of the word and 
fi gurative mark Durff ee by Gofkid, 
for inter alia accessoiries for 
smokers.
See also: Adidas/Fitnessworld
Davidoff/Gofkid
(dilution and similar goods)
CJEU 9 January 2003, case C-292/00, Davidoff /Gofkid; 
Davidoff /Durff ee
Article 4(4)(a) and 5(2)Trade Mark Directive
Article 5(2) Trade Mark Directive (relating to dilution) also applies to use 
for identical or similar goods or services.
63
‘A Member State, where it exercises the option provided by Article 5(2) 
[Trade Mark Directive] […], is bound to grant the specific protection in 
question in cases of use by a third party of a later mark or sign which is 
identical with or similar to the registered mark with a reputation, both 
in relation to goods or services which are not similar and in relation to 
goods or services which are identical with or similar to those covered by 
that mark. (Operative part).
The protection conferred by Article 5(2) [Trade Mark Directive] is not 
conditional on a finding of a degree of similarity between the mark 
with a reputation and the sign such that there exists a likelihood of 
confusion between them on the part of the relevant section of the pub-
lic. It is sufficient for the degree of similarity between the mark with a 
reputation and the sign to have the effect that the relevant section of 
the public establishes a link between the sign and the mark. (Operative 
part).
The fact that a sign is viewed as an embellishment by the relevant sec-
tion of the public is not, in itself, an obstacle to the protection con-
ferred by Article 5(2) [Trade Mark Directive] where the degree of 
similarity is none the less such that the relevant section of the public 
establishes a link between the sign and the mark. By contrast, where, 
according to a finding of fact by the national court, the relevant section 
of the public views the sign purely as an embellishment, it necessarily 
does not establish any link with a registered mark, with the result that 
one of the conditions of the protection conferred by Article 5(2) [Trade 
Mark Directive] is then not satisfied.’ (Operative part).
Adidas objected on the basis of 
its 3-stripe fi gurative mark for 
sportswear to the use of two 
stripes on sportswear by 
Fitnessworld.
See also: Davidoff/Gofkid & 
CJEU 22 June 2000, case 
C-425/98, Marca/Adidas.
Adidas/Fitnessworld
(dilution and embellishment)
CJEU 23 October 2003, case C-408/01, Adidas/Fitnessworld 
Trading; three stripes versus two stripes
Article 5(2) Trade Mark Directive
Article 5(2) Trade Mark Directive (relating to dilution) also applies to 
identical or similar goods or services. confusion is not required, it suffi  ces 
that the public establishes a link. If the public perceives the sign purely as 
an embellishment there is no trade mark infringement.
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The fact that for the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect, the later mark calls the ear-
lier mark with a reputation to mind is tantamount to the existence of 
such a link, within the meaning of Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Bene-
lux, between the conflicting marks. (Para. 63).
The fact that:
– the earlier mark has a huge reputation for certain specifi c types of 
goods or services, and
– those goods or services and the goods or services for which the 
later mark is registered are dissimilar or dissimilar to a substantial 
degree, and
– the earlier mark is unique in respect of any goods or services,
does not necessarily imply that there is a link, within the meaning of 
Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux, between the conflicting marks. 
(Para. 64).
The more immediately and strongly the earlier mark is brought to mind 
by the later mark, the greater the likelihood that the current or future 
use of the later mark is taking unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, 
the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark. (Para. 67).
Proof that the use of the later mark is or would be detrimental to the 
distinctive character of the earlier mark requires evidence of a change in 
the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods or ser-
vices for which the earlier mark was registered consequent on the use 
of the later mark, or a serious likelihood that such a change will occur in 
the future. (Para. 77).
It is immaterial, however, for the purposes of assessing whether the use 
of the later mark is or would be detrimental to the distinctive charac-
ter of the earlier mark, whether or not the proprietor of the later mark 
draws real commercial benefit from the distinctive character of the ear-
lier mark. (Para. 78).
INTEL is a trade mark with a 
huge reputation for inter alia 
microprocessors. Th e proprietor 
of the trade mark fi led an 
application for a declaration of 
invalidity against the registration 
of the word mark INTELMARK 
for marketing and telemarketing 
services, claiming that the use of 
that mark would dilute the earlier 
trade mark INTEL.
Intel
(reputation and dilution)
CJEU 27 November 2008, case C-252/07, Intel Corporation/
CPM United Kingdom
Article 5(2) Trade Mark Directive
The fact that the later mark calls the earlier mark with a reputation to 
mind is tantamount to the existence of ‘a link’ between the conflicting 
marks.
Proof that the use of the later mark is or would be detrimental to the dis-
tinctive character of the earlier mark requires evidence of a change in the 
economic behaviour of the average consumer or a serious likelihood that 
such a change will occur in the future.
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The fact that:
– the earlier mark has a huge reputation for certain specifi c types of 
goods or services, and
– those goods or services and the goods or services for which the 
later mark is registered are dissimilar or dissimilar to a substantial 
degree, and
– the earlier mark is unique in respect of any goods or services, and
– for the average consumer, who is reasonably well informed and rea-
sonably observant and circumspect, the later mark calls the earlier 
mark to mind, is not suffi  cient to establish that the use of the later 
mark takes or would take unfair advantage of, or is or would be detri-
mental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark, 
within the meaning of Article 4(4)(a) of the Directive. (Para. 80).
Article 4(4)(a) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that:
– the use of the later mark may be detrimental to the distinctive char-
acter of the earlier mark with a reputation even if that mark is not 
unique;
– a fi rst use of the later mark may suffi  ce to be detrimental to the dis-
tinctive character of the earlier mark;
– proof that the use of the later mark is or would be detrimental to 
the distinctive character of the earlier mark requires evidence of a 
change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the 
goods or services for which the earlier mark was registered conse-
quent on the use of the later mark, or a serious likelihood that such 
a change will occur in the future. (Para. 81).
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The Court has already held that the exclusive right under Article 5(1)
(a) of the [Trade Marks Directive] was conferred in order to enable the 
trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, 
that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions and that, 
therefore, the exercise of that right must be reserved to cases in which 
a third party’s use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions 
of the trade mark. These functions include not only the essential func-
tion of the trade mark, which is to guarantee to consumers the origin of 
the goods or services, but also its other functions, in particular that of 
guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and those 
of communication, investment or advertising. (Para. 58).
Article 5(2) of [the Trade Marks Directive] must be interpreted as 
meaning that the taking of unfair advantage of the distinctive char-
acter or the repute of a mark, within the meaning of that provision, 
does not require that there be a likelihood of confusion or a likelihood 
of detriment to the distinctive character or the repute of the mark or, 
more generally, to its proprietor. The advantage arising from the use by 
a third party of a sign similar to a mark with a reputation is an advan-
tage taken unfairly by that third party of the distinctive character or 
the repute of that mark where that party seeks by that use to ride on 
the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation in order to benefit from the 
power of attraction, the reputation and the prestige of that mark and 
to exploit, without paying any financial compensation, the marketing 
effort expended by the proprietor of the mark in order to create and 
maintain the mark’s image. (Operative part in 1).
Article 5(1)(a) of [the Trade Marks Directive] must be interpreted as 
meaning that the proprietor of a registered trade mark is entitled to 
prevent the use by a third party, in a comparative advertisement which 
does not satisfy all the conditions, laid down in Article 3a(1) of [the 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive], under which com-
parative advertising is permitted, of a sign identical with that mark in 
relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which 
Bellure markets perfumes 
which are similar in name and 
appearance and are copies of 
well-known perfume trade marks, 
including perfumes of L’Oréal.
L’Oréal/Bellure
(taking unfair advantage of a well-known mark)
CJEU 18 June 2009, case C-487/07, L’Oréal/Bellure
Article 5(2) Trade Mark Directive
Protection of the communication, investment and advertising function.
Taking unfair advantage of the distinctive character or the reputation of a 
mark does not require that there be a likelihood of confusion or a likelihood 
of detriment to the distinctive character or the repute of the mark.
It is suffi  cient that the third party “rides on the coat-tails of the mark with 
a reputation” in order to benefi t from the power of attraction, the reputa-
tion and the prestige of that mark and to exploit, without paying any fi nan-
cial compensation, the marketing eff ort expended by the proprietor of the 
mark in order to create and maintain the mark’s image.
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that mark was registered, even where such use is not capable of jeopar-
dizing the essential function of the mark, which is to indicate the origin 
of the goods or services, provided that such use affects or is liable to 
affect one of the other functions of the mark. (Operative part in 2).
Article 3a(1) of [the Misleading and Comparative Advertising Direc-
tive], must be interpreted as meaning that an advertiser who states 
explicitly or implicitly in comparative advertising that the product mar-
keted by him is an imitation of a product bearing a well-known trade 
mark presents ‘goods or services as imitations or replicas’ within the 
meaning of Article 3a(1)(h). The advantage gained by the advertiser as 
a result of such unlawful comparative advertising must be considered 
to be an advantage taken unfairly of the reputation of that mark within 
the meaning of Article 3a(1)(g). (Operative part in 3).
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OTHER CASES
Article 8(5) Trade Mark 
Regulation
Article 8(5) Trade Mark 
Directive 
See also: Intel
ECJ 10 May 2012, case C 100/11 P, Helena Rubinstein & L’Oréal/
OHIM & Allergan
Opposition based on earlier trade mark BOTOX against the trade 
marks BOTOLIST en BOTOCYL was rightly upheld by the OHIM.
The General Court found ‘that ‘the size of the market share of BOTOX 
in the United Kingdom, 74.3% in 2003, like the degree of awareness 
of the trade mark of 75% among the specialised public accustomed to 
pharmaceutical treatments against wrinkles, is sufficient to substanti-
ate the existence of a considerable degree of recognition on the mar-
ket’.’ (Para. 34).
The ‘General Court referred to Allergan’s argument that the disputed 
marks were actually intended to take advantage of the distinctive char-
acter and repute acquired by BOTOX for the treatment of wrinkles, 
which would have the effect of decreasing the value of that mark. 
According to the General Court, those risks were sufficiently seri-
ous and real to justify the application of Article 8(5) of Regulation No 
40/94. The General Court observed that Helena Rubinstein and L’Oréal 
had acknowledged at the hearing that, even though their products 
did not contain the botulinum toxin, they nevertheless intended to 
take advantage of the image which was associated with that product, 
which was to be found in the trade mark BOTOX, a trade mark which is 
unique in that regard.’ (Para. 39).
CJEU 14 November 2013, case C-383/12 P, Environmental 
Manufacturing/ OHIM & Société Elmar Wolf
The General Court lowered the standard of proof in order to find detri-
ment or the risk of detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier 
mark, and, consequently, erred in law.
‘The concept of ‘change in the economic behaviour of the average 
consumer’ lays down an objective condition. That change cannot be 
deduced solely from subjective elements such as consumers’ percep-
tions. The mere fact that consumers note the presence of a new sign 
similar to an earlier sign is not sufficient of itself to establish the exis-
tence of a detriment or a risk of detriment to the distinctive character 
of the earlier mark within the meaning of the Regulation, in as much as 
that similarity does not cause any confusion in their minds.’ (Para. 37)
‘Admittedly, the Regulation and the Court’s case-law do not require evi-
dence to be adduced of actual detriment, but also admit the serious risk 
of such detriment, allowing the use of logical deductions.’ (Para. 42).
‘None the less, such deductions must not be the result of mere supposi-
tions but must be founded on ‘an analysis of the probabilities and by 
taking account of the normal practice in the relevant commercial sector 
as well as all the other circumstances of the case’.’ (Para. 43).
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INFRINGEMENT
(INTERNET)
In the case where the ad, while not suggesting the existence of an eco-
nomic link, is vague to such an ex-tent on the origin of the goods or 
services at issue that normally informed and reasonably attentive inter-
net users are unable to determine, on the basis of the advertising link 
and the commercial message attached thereto, whether the advertiser 
is a third party vis-à-vis the proprietor of the trade mark or, on the con-
trary, economically linked to that proprietor, the conclusion must also 
be that there is an adverse effect on that function of the trade mark. 
(Para. 90).
When internet users enter the name of a trade mark as a search term, 
the home and advertising page of the proprietor of that mark will 
appear in the list of the natural results, usually in one of the highest 
positions on that list. That display, which is, moreover, free of charge, 
means that the visibility to internet users of the goods or services of 
the proprietor of the trade mark is guaranteed, irrespective of whether 
or not that proprietor is successful in also securing the display, in one 
of the highest positions, of an ad under the heading ‘sponsored links’. 
Having regard to those facts, it must be concluded that use of a sign 
identical with another person’s trade mark in a referencing service such 
as that at issue in the cases in the main proceedings is not liable to have 
an adverse effect on the advertising function of the trade mark. (Para. 
97-98).
Article 5(1)(a) of [the Trade Marks Directive] and Article 9(1)(a) of [the 
Trade Marks Regulation] must be interpreted as meaning that the pro-
prietor of a trade mark is entitled to prohibit an advertiser from adver-
tising, on the basis of a keyword identical with that trade mark which 
that advertiser has, without the consent of the proprietor, selected 
in connection with an internet referencing service, goods or services 
identical with those for which that mark is registered, in the case where 
that advertisement does not enable an average internet user, or enables 
that user only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or services 
referred to therein originate from the proprietor of the trade mark or 
an undertaking economically connected to it or, on the contrary, origi-
nate from a third party. (Operative part in 1).
Google markets keywords for an 
internet referencing service, which 
are identical or similar to those 
covered by trade mark registration 
for sites off ering identical or 
similar products. Th e trade mark 
proprietors object.
Google France
(adwords)
CJEU 23 March 2010, cases C-236/08, C-237/08 en C-238/08 
Google France
Article 5(1) and (2) Trade Mark Directive, Article 9(1) Trade Mark 
Regulation
Adwords similar to trademarks are not allowed if there is a likelihood of 
confusion to the average internet user.
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An internet referencing service provider which stores, as a keyword, 
a sign identical with a trade mark and organizes the display of adver-
tisements on the basis of that keyword does not use that sign within 
the meaning of Article 5(1) and (2) of [the Trade Marks Directive] or 
of Article 9(1) of [the Trade Marks Regulation]. (Operative part in 2).
Article 14 of the Directive on electronic commerce must be interpreted 
as meaning that the rule laid down therein applies to an internet ref-
erencing service provider in the case where that service provider has 
not played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or 
control over, the data stored. If it has not played such a role, that ser-
vice provider cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at 
the request of an advertiser, unless, having obtained knowledge of the 
unlawful nature of those data or of that advertiser’s activities, it failed 
to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the data con-
cerned. (Operative part in 3).
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When an individual sells a product bearing a trade mark through an 
online marketplace and the transaction does not take place in the con-
text of a commercial activity, the proprietor of the trade mark cannot 
rely on his exclusive right. If, however, owing to their volume, their fre-
quency or other characteristics, the sales made on such a marketplace 
go beyond the realms of a private activity, the seller will be acting ‘in 
the course of trade’ within the meaning of those provisions. (Para. 55).
Where goods located in a third State, which bear a trade mark regis-
tered in a Member State of the European Union or a Community trade 
mark and have not previously been put on the market in the European 
Economic Area or, in the case of a Community trade mark, in the Euro-
pean Union, (i) are sold by an economic operator on an online market-
place without the consent of the trade mark proprietor to a consumer 
located in the territory covered by the trade mark or (ii) are offered for 
sale or advertised on such a marketplace targeted at consumers located 
in that territory, the trade mark proprietor may prevent that sale, offer 
for sale or advertising by virtue of the rules set out in Article 5 of the 
Community trade mark. (Operative part in 1).
Where the proprietor of a trade mark supplies to its authorized dis-
tributors items bearing that mark, intended for demonstration to con-
sumers in authorized retail outlets, and bottles bearing the mark from 
which small quantities can be taken for supply to consumers as free 
samples, those goods, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
are not “put on the market”. (Operative part in 2).
The proprietor of a trade mark may oppose the resale of goods when 
their packaging has been removed, where the consequence of that 
removal is that essential information, such as information relating to 
the identity of the manufacturer or the person responsible for market-
ing the cosmetic product, is missing, or when the removal of the pack-
aging has damaged the image of the product and, hence, the reputation 
of the trade mark. (Operative part in 3).
On eBay pirated second-hand 
trade mark products are sold 
inside and outside the EU.
L’Oréal/eBay
(the use of a trade mark on an online marketplace)
CJEU 12 July 2011, case C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay
Article 5 Trade Mark Directive and Article 9 Trade Mark Regulation
When an individual sells a product it does not constitute use in the course 
of trade. Th e operator of an online marketplace does not ‘use’ a trade mark.
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The proprietor of a trade mark is entitled to prevent an online market-
place operator from advertising – on the basis of a keyword which is 
identical to his trade mark and which has been selected in an internet 
referencing service by that operator – goods bearing that trade mark 
which are offered for sale on the marketplace, where the advertis-
ing does not enable reasonably well-informed and reasonably obser-
vant internet users, or enables them only with difficulty, to ascertain 
whether the goods concerned originate from the proprietor of the trade 
mark or from an undertaking economically linked to that proprietor or, 
on the contrary, originate from a third party. (Operative part in 4).
The operator of an online marketplace does not ‘use’ – for the purposes 
of Article 5 of Directive 89/104 or Article 9 of Regulation No 40/94 – 
signs identical with or similar to trade marks which appear in offers for 
sale displayed on its site. (Operative part in 5).
Article 14(1) of [the Directive on electronic commerce], must be inter-
preted as applying to the operator of an online marketplace where that 
operator has not played an active role allowing it to have knowledge 
or control of the data stored. The operator plays such a role when it 
provides assistance which entails, in particular, optimizing the presen-
tation of the offers for sale in question or promoting them. Where the 
operator of the online marketplace has not played an active role within 
the meaning of the preceding paragraph and the service provided falls, 
as a consequence, within the scope of Article 14(1) of [the Directive], 
the operator none the less cannot, in a case which may result in an 
order to pay damages, rely on the exemption from liability provided for 
in that provision if it was aware of facts or circumstances on the basis 
of which a diligent economic operator should have realized that the 
offers for sale in question were unlawful and, in the event of it being so 
aware, failed to act expeditiously in accordance with Article 14(1)(b) of 
[the Directive]. (Operative part in 6).
Article 11 of [the Enforcement Directive] must be interpreted as requir-
ing the Member States to ensure that the national courts with jurisdic-
tion in relation to the protection of intellectual property rights are able 
to order the operator of an online marketplace to take measures which 
contribute, not only to bringing to an end infringements of those 
rights by users of that marketplace, but also to preventing further 
infringements of that kind. Those injunctions must be effective, pro-
portionate, and dissuasive and must not create barriers to legitimate 
trade. (Operative part in 7).
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The proprietor of a trade mark is entitled to prevent a competitor from 
advertising with an Adword which is identical with the trade mark, 
where that use is liable to have an adverse effect on one of the func-
tions of the trade mark. Such use:
– adversely affects the trade mark’s function of indicating origin 
where the advertising displayed on the basis of that keyword does 
not enable reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant 
inter-net users, or enables them only with difficulty, to ascertain 
whether the goods or services concerned by the advertisement 
originate from the proprietor of the trade mark or an undertaking 
economically linked to that proprietor or, on the contrary, originate 
from a third party;
– does not adversely aff ect, in the context of an internet referencing 
service having the characteristics of the service at issue in the main 
proceedings, the trade mark’s advertising function, and
– adversely affects the trade mark’s investment function if it sub-
stantially interferes with the proprietor’s use of its trade mark to 
acquire or pre-serve a reputation capable of attracting consumers 
and retaining their loyalty. (Operative part in 1).
The proprietor of a trade mark with a reputation is entitled to prevent a 
competitor from advertising on the basis of a key-word corresponding 
to that trade mark, which the competitor has, without the proprietor’s 
consent, selected in an internet referencing service, where the competi-
tor thereby takes unfair advantage of the distinctive character or repute 
of the trade mark (free-riding) or where the advertising is detrimental 
to that distinctive character (dilution) or to that repute (tarnishment).
Advertising on the basis of such a keyword is detrimental to the dis-
tinctive character of a trade mark with a reputation (dilution) if, for 
example, it contributes to turning that trade mark into a generic term.
The proprietor of a trade mark with a reputation is not entitled to pre-
vent, inter alia, advertisements displayed by competitors on the basis 
of keywords corresponding to that trade mark, which put forward – 
without offering a mere imitation of the goods or services of the pro-
prietor of that trade mark, without causing dilution or tarnishment and 
without, moreover, adversely affecting the functions of the trade mark 
with a reputation – an alternative to the goods or services of the propri-
etor of that mark. (Operative part in 2).
Interfl ora objects to the use of the 
word Interfl ora as an Adword by 
Marks & Spencer.
Interflora/
Marks & Spencer
(adwords)
CJEU 22 September 2011, case C-323/09, Interfl ora/Marks & 
Spencer
Article 5(1)(a) and (2) Trade Mark Directive
Non-misleading use of a trade mark as an Adword, does not have an 
adverse eff ect on the functions of that trade mark.
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Such use falls, as a rule, within the ambit of fair competition in the sec-
tor for the goods or services concerned and is thus not without ‘due 
cause’ for the purposes of Article 5(2) of the Directive. (Para. 91).
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INFRINGEMENT
(OTHER)
A service provider who, merely fills, under an order from, and under 
the instructions of another person, cans already bearing signs similar 
to trade marks and therefore merely executes a technical part of the 
production process of the final product without having any interest in 
the external presentation of those cans and in particular in the signs 
thereon, does not itself ‘use’ those signs which can be prohibited on 
basis of the Directive. He only creates the technical conditions neces-
sary for the other person to use them. (Para. 30).
Moreover, a service provider in Winters’ situation does not, on any 
view, use those signs ‘for goods or services’ which are identical with, 
or similar to, those for which the trade mark was registered, within the 
meaning of that article. It is established that in the main action the ser-
vice provided by Winters consists of the filling of cans and that this ser-
vice does not have any similarity with the product for which Red Bull’s 
trade marks were registered. (Para. 31).
It is true that the Court has also held that that expression may, under 
certain conditions, include goods and services of another person on 
whose behalf the third party acts. Thus, the Court considered that a 
situation in which the service provider uses a sign corresponding to the 
trade mark of another person in order to promote goods which one of 
its customers is marketing with the assistance of that service is covered 
by that same expression when that use is carried out in such a way that 
it establishes a link between that sign and that service. (Para. 32).
Under an order of a party from 
outside the EU, Winters fi lls cans 
which infringe the trade marks of 
Red Bull, with energy drink.
Winters/Red Bull
(filling in order)
CJEU 15 December 2011, case C-119/10, Winters/Red Bull
Article 5(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive
Filling infringing cans under an order from another person, which are des-
tined for outside the EU does not constitute use of trade mark.
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‘Where a Community trade mark is not registered in colour, but the 
proprietor has used it extensively in a particular colour or combination 
of colours with the result that it has become associated in the mind of 
a significant portion of the public with that colour or combination of 
colours, the colour or colours which a third party uses in order to repre-
sent a sign alleged to infringe that trade mark are relevant in the global 
assessment of the likelihood of confusion or unfair advantage under 
that provision. (Operative part 2).
On the other hand it is relevant ‘that the third party making use of a 
sign which allegedly infringes the registered trade mark is itself associ-
ated, in the mind of a significant portion of the public, with the colour 
or particular combination of colours which it uses for the representa-
tion.’ (Operative part 3).
‘the fact that the third party making use of a sign which is alleged to 
infringe the registered trade mark is itself associated, in the mind of a 
significant portion of the public, with the colour or particular combina-
tion of colours which it uses for the representation of that sign can be 
relevant to determining whether the use of that sign has a ‘due cause’’. 
(Para. 49).
Supermarket chain Asda launched 
an advertising campaign for 
spectacles. As a part of this 
campaign it used logos and a 
colour green similar to those of 
Specsavers. Th e colour green was 
already the colour associated with 
Asda. Furthermore, Asda used the 
slogans: “Be a real spec saver at 
Asda” and “Spec savings at ASDA”.
Specsavers/Asda
(trade mark as used)
CJEU 18 July 2013, case C-252/12, Specsavers/Asda
Article 9(1)(b) and (c) Trade Mark Regulation
The form in which a trade mark is used (e.g., the colour) is relevant in 
the assessment of the risk of confusion or unfair advantage.
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TRADE MARK 
LIMITATIONS
‘On a proper interpretation of Articles 5 and 7 [Trade Mark Directive], 
when trade-marked goods have been put on the Community market by 
the proprietor of the trade mark or with his consent, a reseller, besides 
being free to resell those goods, is also free to make use of the trade 
mark in order to bring to the public’s attention the further commercial-
ization of those goods.
The proprietor of a trade mark may not rely on Article 7(2) [Trade Mark 
Directive] to oppose the use of the trade mark, by a reseller who habitu-
ally markets articles of the same kind, but not necessarily of the same 
quality, as the trade-marked goods, in ways customary in the reseller’s 
sector of trade, for the purpose of bringing to the public’s attention the 
further commercialization of those goods, unless it is established that, 
given the specific circumstances of the case, the use of the trade mark 
for this purpose seriously damages the reputation of the trade mark.
On a proper interpretation of Articles 30 and 36 of the EC Treaty, the 
proprietor of a trade mark or holder of copyright may not oppose their 
use by a reseller who habitually markets articles of the same kind, but 
not necessarily of the same quality, as the protected goods, in ways cus-
tomary in the reseller’s sector of trade, for the purpose of bringing to 
the public’s attention the further commercialization of those goods, 
unless it is established that, having regard to the specific circumstances 
of the case, the use of those goods for that purpose seriously damages 
their reputation.’ (Operative part).
Evora operated a chain of 
chemistshops called Kruidvat, 
which used in an advertising 
leafl et reproductions of (lawfully 
parallel imported) trade-marked 
perfumes (Eau sauvage, Poison, 
Fahrenheit and Dune) of Dior. 
Dior objected to this under 
copyright law and trade mark law.
Dior/Evora
(advertising by reseller)
CJEU 4 November 1997, case C-337/95, Dior/Evora
Article 5 and 7 Trade Mark Directive
Th e reseller of a branded product is allowed to use the trade mark in his 
advertising for resale of this product.
78
‘The use of a trade mark, without the proprietor’s authorisation, for the 
purpose of informing the public that another undertaking carries out 
the repair and maintenance of goods covered by that mark or that it has 
specialised or is a specialist in such goods constitutes, in circumstances 
such as those described in the judgment making the reference, use of 
the mark within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) [Trade Mark Directive].
Articles 5 to 7 [Trade Mark Directive] do not entitle the proprietor of 
a trade mark to prohibit a third party from using the mark for the pur-
pose of informing the public that he carries out the repair and main-
tenance of goods covered by that trade mark and put on the market 
under that mark by the proprietor or with his consent, or that he has 
specialised or is a specialist in the sale or the repair and maintenance 
of such goods, unless the mark is used in a way that may create to the 
impression that there is a commercial connection between the other 
undertaking and the trade mark proprietor, and in particular that the 
reseller’s business is affiliated to the trade mark proprietor’s distribu-
tion network or that there is a special relationship between the two 
undertakings.’ (Operative part).
‘Lastly, the condition requiring use of the trade mark to be made in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters 
must be regarded as constituting in substance the expression of a duty 
to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark 
owner, similar to that imposed on the reseller where he uses another’s 
trade mark to advertise the resale of products covered by that mark.’ 
(Para. 61).
Deenik was a garage owner 
specialized in the sale of second-
hand cars of the trade mark 
BMW, as well as in repair and 
maintenance of cars of the same 
trade mark. He was not a member 
of BMW’s dealer network. BMW 
objected to his way of advertsing.
BMW/Deenik
(non-official dealer)
CJEU 23 February 1999, case C-63/97, BMW/Ronald Deenik
Article 5 and 7 Trade Mark Directive
A non-offi  cial dealer is allowed to use a car brand to show that he is special-
ized in a particular brand of cars, as long as he does not give the impression 
that he has a commercial relationship with the trade mark owner.
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‘Having regard to the presentation of the word Arsenal on the goods 
at issue in the main proceedings and the other secondary markings on 
them (see paragraph 39 above), the use of that sign is such as to cre-
ate the impression that there is a material link in the course of trade 
between the goods concerned and the trade mark proprietor. (Para. 56).
That conclusion is not affected by the presence on Mr Reed’s stall of 
the notice stating that the goods at issue in the main proceedings are 
not official Arsenal FC products (see paragraph 17 above). Even on the 
assumption that such a notice may be relied on by a third party as a 
defence to an action for trade mark infringement, there is a clear pos-
sibility in the present case that some consumers, in particular if they 
come across the goods after they have been sold by Mr Reed and taken 
away from the stall where the notice appears, may interpret the sign 
as designating Arsenal FC as the undertaking of origin of the goods.’ 
(Para. 57).
‘In a situation which is not covered by Article 6(1) [Trade Mark Direc-
tive] […], where a third party uses in the course of trade a sign which is 
identical to a validly registered trade mark on goods which are identi-
cal to those for which it is registered, the trade mark proprietor of the 
mark is entitled, in circumstances such as those in the present case, to 
rely on Article 5(1)(a) of that directive to prevent that use. It is imma-
terial that, in the context of that use, the sign is perceived as a badge 
of support for or loyalty or affiliation to the trade mark proprietor.’ 
(Operative part).
The English court of reference refused to apply the decision, because 
the CJEU had proceeded to establish itself the facts in a different way 
(High Court 12 December 2002). The Court of Appeal did however fol-
low (the establishment of facts of) the CJEU (Court of Appeal 21 May 
2003).
Reed sold shawls provided with 
Arsenal marks. In his stall a notice 
stated: ‘Th e word or logo(s) on the 
goods off ered for sale, are used 
solely to adorn the product and 
does not imply or indicate any 
affi  liation or relationship with the 
manufacturers or distributors of 
any other product, only goods with 
offi  cial Arsenal merchandise tags 
are offi  cial Arsenal merchandise’.
Arsenal/Reed
(badge of support)
CJEU 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, Arsenal/
Matthew Reed
Article 5(1)(a) and 6 Trade Mark Directive
Affi  xing trade marks of soccer clubs on shawls and the like is trade mark 
use in the sense of art. 5(1)(a) trade mark directive. A disclaimer at the 
point of sale is no remedy.
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‘The mere fact that there exists a likelihood of aural confusion between 
a word mark registered in one Member State and an indication of geo-
graphical origin from another Member State is therefore insufficient to 
conclude that the use of that indication in the course of trade is not 
in accordance with honest practices. In a Community of 15 Member 
States, with great linguistic diversity, the chance that there exists some 
phonetic similarity between a trade mark registered in one Member 
State and an indication of geographical origin from another Member 
State is already substantial and will be even greater after the impending 
enlargement.’(Para. 25).
‘Article 6(1)(b) [Trade Mark Directive] […] is to be interpreted as mean-
ing that, where there exists a likelihood of aural confusion between a 
word mark registered in one Member State and an indication, in the 
course of trade, of the geographical origin of a product originating in 
another Member State, the proprietor of the trade mark may, pursuant 
to Article 5 [Trade Mark Directive], prevent the use of the indication 
of geographical origin only if that use is not in accordance with hon-
est practices in industrial or commercial matters. It is for the national 
court to carry out an overall assessment of all the circumstances of the 
particular case in that regard.’ (Operative part).
‘It follows that, in a case such as that in the main proceedings, it is for 
the national court to carry out an overall assessment of all the relevant 
circumstances. Since the case concerns bottled drinks, the circum-
stances to be taken into account by that court would include in par-
ticular the shape and labelling of the bottle in order to assess, more 
particularly, whether the producer of the drink bearing the indication 
of geographical origin might be regarded as unfairly competing with 
the proprietor of the trade mark.’ (Para. 26).
Gerolsteiner Brunnen objects by 
reason of its word mark Gerri for 
mineral water to the fact that 
Putsch markets soft drinks in 
Germany with labels containing 
the words ‘Kerry Spring’. Th ese 
drinks are produced by the Irish 
company Kerry Spring Water with 
water from the Kerry Spring and 
bottled in Ballyferriter, in the 
county of Kerry in Ireland.
Gerri/Kerry Spring
(indication of geographical origin)
CJEU 7 January 2004, case C-100/02, Gerolsteiner Brunnen/
Putsch; Gerry/Kerry
Article 6(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive
Likelihood of aural confusion between an indication of geographical origin 
and a word mark is not decisive, the point is whether the use is in accor-
dance with honest trade practices.
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‘Use of the trade mark by a third party who is not its owner is necessary 
in order to indicate the intended purpose of a product marketed by that 
third party where such use in practice constitutes the only means of 
providing the public with comprehensible and complete information on 
that intended purpose in order to preserve the undistorted system of 
competition in the market for that product.
The condition of ‘honest use’ within the meaning of Article 6(1)(c) 
[Trade Mark Directive], constitutes in substance the expression of a 
duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark 
owner.
The use of the trade mark will not be in accordance with honest prac-
tices in industrial and commercial matters if, for example:
– it is done in such a manner as to give the impression that there is a 
commercial connection between the third party and the trade mark 
owner;
– it aff ects the value of the trade mark by taking unfair advantage of 
its distinctive character or repute;
– it entails the discrediting or denigration of that mark;
– or where the third party presents its product as an imitation or 
replica of the product bearing the trade mark of which it is not the 
owner.
The fact that a third party uses a trade mark of which it is not the owner 
in order to indicate the intended purpose of the product which it mar-
kets does not necessarily mean that it is presenting it as being of the 
same quality as, or having equivalent properties to, those of the prod-
uct bearing the trade mark.
Where a third party that uses a trade mark of which it is not the owner 
markets not only a spare part or an accessory but also the product itself 
with which the spare part or accessory is intended to be used, such use 
falls within the scope of Article 6(1)(c[Trade Mark Directive] in so far 
as it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of the product mar-
keted by the latter and is made in accordance with honest practices in 
industrial and commercial matters.’ (Operative part).
Th e packaging of the razorblades 
of LA-laboratories contained the 
following text: ‘All handles of 
Parason Flexor and of Gillette 
Sensor are compatible with this 
blade’.
Gillette/LA-Laboratories
(indication of the intended purpose)
CJEU 17 March 2005, C-228/03, Gillette/LA-Laboratories
Article 6(1)(c) Trade Mark Directive
Use of a trade mark to indicate the intended use of a good is allowed if it is 
necessary.
Tähän terään SOPIVATkaikki parasonFLEXOR ja kaikki GilletteSENSOR VARRET!
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‘Article 5(1) [Trade Mark Directive] is to be interpreted as meaning that 
the proprietor of a trade mark cannot rely on his exclusive right where a 
third party, in the course of commercial negotiations, reveals the origin 
of goods which he has produced himself and uses the sign in question 
solely to denote the particular characteristics of the goods he is offering 
for sale so that there can be no question of the trade mark used being 
perceived as a sign indicative of the undertaking of origin.’ (Operative 
part).
Spirit Sun and Context Cut are 
word marks of Freiesleben for 
gems of two special cutting shapes. 
Hölterhoff  used these marks as 
reference to cutting shapes of his 
own products in a transaction with 
a jeweller.
Hölterhoff/Freiesleben
(use to indicate characteristics)
CJEU 14 May 2002, case C- 2/00, Hölterhoff /Freiesleben; 
Spirit Sun & Context Cut
Article 5(1) Trade Mark Directive
If someone uses a sign solely to denote the particular characteristics of the 
goods he is off ering for sale so that there can be no question of the trade 
mark used being perceived as a sign indicative of the undertaking of origin, 
article 5(1) of the directive does not apply.
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A trade mark proprietor is entitled to prohibit an advertiser from 
advertising, on the basis of a keyword identical with, or similar to, that 
mark, in relation to goods or services identical to those in respect of 
which the mark is registered, where that advertising does not enable 
average internet users, or enables them only with difficulty, to ascer-
tain whether the goods or services referred to by the ad originate from 
the proprietor of the trade mark or from an undertaking economically 
linked to it or, on the contrary, originate from a third party. (Operative 
part in 1).
Advertisers cannot, in general, rely on the exception provided for in 
Article 6(1) in order to avoid such a prohibition. It is, however, for 
the national court to determine, in the light of the particular circum-
stances of the case, whether or not there was, in fact, a use, within the 
terms of Article 6(1), which could be regarded as having been made in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. 
(Operative part in 2).
Article 7 of [the Trade Marks Directive] must be interpreted as mean-
ing that a trade mark proprietor is not entitled to prohibit an adver-
tiser from advertising the resale of goods manufactured and placed on 
the market in the European Economic Area by that proprietor or with 
his consent, unless there is a legitimate reason, within the meaning of 
Article 7(2), which justifies him opposing that advertising, such as use 
of that sign which gives the impression that the reseller and the trade 
mark proprietor are economically linked or use which is seriously detri-
mental to the reputation of the mark. 
The national court, which must assess whether or not there is such a 
legitimate reason in the case before it:
– cannot fi nd that the ad gives the impression that the reseller and 
the trade mark proprietor are economically linked, or that the ad 
is seriously detrimental to the reputation of that mark, merely on 
the basis that an advertiser uses another person’s trade mark with 
additional wording indicating that the goods in question are being 
resold, such as ‘used’ or ‘second-hand’;
– is obliged to find that there is such a legitimate reason where the 
reseller, without the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark 
which it uses in the context of advertising for its resale activities, 
Primakabin uses the trade mark 
Portakabin as Adword for the 
resell of second-hand Portakabin 
cabins.
Portakabin/Primakabin
(adwords and exhaustion)
CJEU 8 July 2010, case C-558/08, Portakabin/Primakabin
Article 6 and 7 Trade Mark Directive
Confusing use of a trade mark as an Adword in principle is not allowed. 
Exhaustion or descriptive use or other legitimate reasons can be a justifi ca-
tion.
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has removed reference to that trade mark from the goods, manufac-
tured and placed on the market by that proprietor, and replaced it 
with a label bearing the reseller’s name, thereby concealing the trade 
mark; and
– is obliged to find that a specialist reseller of second-hand goods 
under another person’s trade mark cannot be prohibited from 
using that mark to advertise to the public its resale activities which 
include, in addition to the sale of secondhand goods under that 
mark, the sale of other second-hand goods, unless the sale of those 
other goods, in the light of their volume, their presentation or their 
poor quality, risks seriously damaging the image which the propri-
etor has succeeded in creating for its mark. (Operative part in 3).
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Composite bottles, which are intended for reuse a number of times, 
do not constitute mere packaging of the original product, but have an 
independent economic value and must be regarded as goods in them-
selves. (Para. 30).
A balance must be struck between, on the one hand, the legitimate 
interest on the part of the licensee of the right to the trade mark con-
stituted by the shape of the composite bottle and the proprietor of the 
marks affixed to that bottle in profiting from the rights attached to 
those marks and, on the other, the legitimate interests of purchasers of 
those bottles, in particular the interest in fully enjoying their property 
rights in those bottles, and the general interest in maintaining undis-
torted competition. (Para. 31).
As regards the interest of that licensee and proprietor in profiting from 
the rights attached to those marks, it must be pointed out that the 
sale of composite bottles allows it to realise the economic value of the 
marks relating to those bottles. (Para. 32).
The bottles from being refilled would unduly reduce competition on 
the downstream market for the refilling of gas bottles, and would even 
create the risk of that market’s being closed off if the licensee and pro-
prietor were to succeed in imposing its bottle because of its specific 
technical characteristics, the protection of which is not the purpose 
of trade mark law. That risk is, moreover, increased by virtue of the 
fact that the cost of the composite bottle is much more than the gas 
and that the purchaser, in order to regain a free choice of gas supplier, 
would have to forgo the initial outlay made in purchasing the bottle, 
the recouping of which requires the bottle to be reused a sufficient 
number of times. (Para. 34).
The holder of an exclusive licence for the use of composite gas bottles 
intended for re-use, the shape of which is protected as a three-dimen-
sional mark and to which the holder has affixed its own name and logo 
that are registered as word and figurative marks, may not prevent those 
bottles, after consumers have purchased them and consumed the gas 
initially contained in them, from being ex-changed by a third party, on 
payment, for composite bottles filled with gas which does not come 
from the holder of that licence, unless that holder is able to rely on 
a proper reason for the purposes of Article 7(2) of Directive 89/104. 
(Operative part).
Kosan Gas markets LPG in 
‘composite bottles’ (light weight 
bottles). Th e special shape of 
these bottles is protected as a 
three-dimensional trade mark. 
Kosan Gas objects to the refi lling 
of these bottles by Viking gas.
Viking Gas/Kosan Gas
(refilling)
CJEU 14 July 2011, case C-46/10, Viking Gas/Kosan Gas
Article 5 and 7 Trade Mark Directive
Refi lling of gas bottles of which the shape is protected as a three-dimen-
sional mark is allowed.
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PARALLEL TRADE
‘In the light of those recitals, Articles 5 to 7 of the Directive must be 
construed as embodying a complete harmonisation of the rules relating 
to the rights conferred by a trade mark. (Para. 25).
That interpretation, it may be added, is borne out by the fact that 
Article 5 expressly leaves it open to the Member States to maintain or 
introduce certain rules specifically defined by the Community legisla-
ture. Thus, in accordance with Article 5(2), to which the ninth recital 
refers, the Member States have the option to grant more extensive pro-
tection to trade marks with a reputation.’ (Para. 26).
‘Moreover this interpretation is the only one which is fully in line with 
the purpose of the Directive, i.e. to ensure the operation of the inter-
nal market. A situation in which some Member States may provide in 
international exhaustion and others only in Community exhaustion, 
would after all inevitably result into restrictions of the free movement 
of goods and services.’ (Paras. 27).
‘Article 7(1) [Trade Mark Directive] cannot be interpreted as meaning 
that the proprietor of a trade mark is entitled, on the basis of that pro-
vision alone, to obtain an order restraining a third party from using his 
trade mark for products which have been put on the market outside the 
European Economic Area under that mark by the proprietor or with his 
consent.’ (Operative part).
Hartlauer imported original, 
obsolete spectacle frames of the 
trade mark Silhouette from 
Bulgaria (i.e. ‘parallel’ trade 
from outside the EU and EEA). 
Trade mark owner Silhouette 
opposed to the import.
See also: Sebago/G-B Unic
Silhouette/Hartlauer
(european exhaustion)
CJEU 16 July 1998, case C-355/96, Silhouette/Hartlauer; 
Silhouette spectacles
Article 7(1)Trade Mark Directive
Only if a product bearing a trade mark is put on the market within the EU 
(or EEA) with the consent of the trade mark owner the right to enforce the 
trade mark right is exhausted.
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‘A rule of evidence according to which exhaustion of the trade mark 
right constitutes a plea in defence for a third party against whom the 
trade mark proprietor brings an action, so that the existence of the con-
ditions for such exhaustion must, as a rule, be proved by the third party 
who relies on it, is consistent with Community law and, in particular, 
with Articles 5 and 7 [Trade Mark Directive] […], as amended by the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992.
However, the requirements deriving from the protection of the free 
movement of goods enshrined, inter alia, in Articles 28 EC and 30 EC 
may mean that this rule of evidence needs to be qualified. Accordingly, 
where a third party succeeds in establishing that there is a real risk of 
partitioning of national markets if he himself bears that burden of 
proof, particularly where the trade mark proprietor markets his prod-
ucts in the European Economic Area using an exclusive distribution 
system, it is for the proprietor of the trade mark to establish that the 
products were initially placed on the market outside the European Eco-
nomic Area by him or with his consent. If such evidence is adduced, it is 
for the third party to prove the consent of the trade mark proprietor to 
subsequent marketing of the products in the European Economic Area.’ 
(Operative part).
Lifestyle parallel imported clothing 
of the trade mark Stüssy into the 
EEA. Van Doorne was exclusive 
importer and objected to this.
Van Doren + Q/Listyle ; 
Stüssy
(burden of proof)
CJEU 8 April 2003, case C-244/00, Van Doren + Q/Lifestyle; 
Stüssy
Article 7(1) Trade Mark Directive
Th e parallel importer has to prove that the goods originate from inside the 
EU. If there is a real risk that national markets will be partitioned, the bur-
den of proof may, however, rest upon the trade mark owner.
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The trade mark owner cannot oppose ‘the mere entry into the Commu-
nity, under the external transit procedure or the customs warehousing 
procedure, of original goods bearing that mark which had not already 
been put on the market in the Community previously by that propri-
etor or with his consent. The trade mark proprietor cannot make the 
placing of the goods at issue under the external transit procedure or the 
customs warehousing procedure conditional on the existence, at the 
time of the introduction of those goods into the Community, of a final 
destination already specified in a third country, possibly pursuant to a 
sale agreement.’ (Operative part in 1).
‘Offering’ and ‘putting on the market’ the goods, within the meaning 
of Article 5(3)(b) [Trade Mark Directive] and Article 9(2)(b) [Trade 
Mark Regulation], may include, respectively, the offering and sale of 
original goods bearing a trade mark and having the customs status of 
non-Community goods, when the offering is done and/or the sale is 
effected while the goods are placed under the external transit procedure 
or the customs warehousing procedure. The trade mark proprietor may 
oppose the offering or the sale of such goods when it necessarily entails 
the putting of those goods on the market in the Community.’ (Opera-
tive part in 2).
‘In a situation such as the one at issue in the main proceedings, it is for 
the trade mark proprietor to prove the facts which would give grounds 
for exercising the right of prohibition provided for in Article 5(3)(b) 
and (c) [Trade Mark Directive] and Article 9(2)(b) and (c) [Trade Mark 
Regulation], by proving either release for free circulation of the non-
Community goods bearing his mark or an offering or sale of the goods 
which necessarily entails their being put on the market in the Commu-
nity.’ (Operative part in 3).
Under the Piracy Regulation, seizure of imitation goods ‘in transit’ is, 
possible, also if these goods are in transit to outside the EU. See: CJEU 
6 April 2000, case C-383/98 (Polo/Dwidua) (not included).
Class International brought a 
container with toothpaste bearing 
the mark Aquafresh from South 
Africa into the Community in 
Rotterdam. Trade mark owner 
Beecham seized the goods when 
they were ‘in transit’.
Class International
(in transit)
CJEU 18 October 2005, case C-405/03, Class/SmithKline 
Beecham; Aquafresh toothpaste
Article 5(1) and (3)(c) Trade Mark Directive
Article 9(1) and (2)(c) Trade Mark Regulation
As long as ‘parallel’ imported goods are ‘in transit’ and no final destina-
tion within the Community has been established, there is no trade mark 
infringement.
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Article 5 of the directive confers on the trade mark proprietor exclu-
sive rights which entitle him, inter alia, to prevent any third party 
from importing goods bearing the mark, offering the goods, or putting 
them on the market or stocking them for these purposes. Article 7(1) 
of the directive contains an exception to that rule, in that it provides 
that the trade mark proprietor’s rights are exhausted where the goods 
have been put on the market in the EEA by him or with his consent It 
is therefore apparent that consent, which is tantamount to the propri-
etor’s renunciation of his exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 
5, constitutes the decisive factor in the extinction of those rights and 
must, therefore, be so expressed that an intention to renounce those 
rights is unequivocally demonstrated. Such an intention will normally 
be gathered from an express statement of that consent. (Para. 21-23).
The requirements deriving from the protection of the free movement 
of goods, enshrined, inter alia, in Articles 28 EC and 30 EC, have led 
the Court to hold that such a rule can be qualified. Thus, the Court 
has held that exhaustion of the exclusive rights can occur, inter alia, 
when the goods are put on the market by an operator with economic 
links to the proprietor of the trade mark, for example a licensee. When 
the goods in question were first placed on the market in the EEA by 
a person having no economic link to the proprietor of the trade mark 
and without his express consent, the intention to renounce the exclu-
sive rights provided for in Article 5 may result from that proprietor’s 
implied consent. (Para. 23-25).
Article 7(1) of First Council Directive 89/104/EEC must be interpreted 
as meaning that the consent of the proprietor of a trade mark to the 
marketing of goods bearing that mark carried out directly in the Euro-
pean Economic Area by a third party who has no economic link to that 
proprietor may be implied, in so far as such consent is to be inferred 
from facts and circumstances prior to, simultaneous with or subse-
quent to the placing of the goods on the market in that area which, in 
the view of the national court, unequivocally demonstrate that the pro-
prietor has renounced his exclusive rights. (Para. 35).
Diesel objects to the marketing of 
Diesel-shoes by Makro. Marko 
states that these shoes were placed 
on the EEA market by a licensee, 
and consequently with implied 
consent, of Diesel.
Makro/Diesel
(consent)
CJEU, 15 October 2009, case C-324/08, Makro/Diesel
Article 7(1) Trade Mark Directive
Consent of placing of goods on the market can be implicit, providing that 
in the view of the national court it is unequivocally demonstrated that the 
proprietor has renounced his exclusive rights.
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Article 8(2) of [the Trade Marks Directive] is to be interpreted as mean-
ing that the proprietor of a trade mark can invoke the rights conferred 
by that trade mark against a licensee who contravenes a provision in a 
license agreement prohibiting, on grounds of the trade mark’s prestige, 
sales to discount stores of goods such as the ones at issue in the main 
proceedings, provided it has been established that that contravention, 
by reason of the situation prevailing in the case in the main proceed-
ings, damages the allure and prestigious image which bestows on those 
goods an aura of luxury. (Operative part in 1). 
Article 7(1) of [the Trade Marks Directive] is to be interpreted as mean-
ing that a licensee who puts goods bearing a trade mark on the market 
in disregard of a provision in a license agreement does so without the 
consent of the proprietor of the trade mark where it is established that 
the provision in question is included in those listed in Article 8(2) of 
that Directive. (Operative part in 2).
Where a licensee puts luxury goods on the market in contravention of 
a provision in a license agreement but must nevertheless be considered 
to have done so with the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark, 
the proprietor of the trade mark can rely on such a provision to oppose 
a resale of those goods on the basis of Article 7(2) of [the Trade Marks 
Directive], only if it can be established that, taking into account the 
particular circumstances of the case, such resale damages the reputa-
tion of the trade mark. (Operative part in 3).
Despite of a refusal and in breach 
of its contractual obligations, 
SIL sold to Copad, a company 
operating a discount store 
business, prestigious corsets 
bearing the Christian Dior 
trade mark.
Copad/Dior
(damage to the aura of luxury goods)
CJEU 23 April 2009, case C-59/08, Copad/Dior
Article 7 and 8 Trade Mark Directive
A trade mark proprietor can invoke the sale of goods by a licensee if that 
sale does impair the stature and the prestigious image of the luxurious 
goods.
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The rights conferred by the trade mark are exhausted only if, according 
to an assessment which it is for the national court to make, it may be 
concluded that the proprietor of the mark expressly or impliedly con-
sented to a putting on the market, either in the European Community 
or in the European Economic Area, of the goods in respect of which 
that exhaustion is claimed to exist. (Operative part in 1).
In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, where ‘per-
fume testers’ are made available, without transfer of ownership and 
with a prohibition on sale, to intermediaries who are contractually 
bound to the trade mark proprietor for the purpose of allowing their 
customers to test the contents, where the trade mark proprietor may 
at any time recall those goods and where the presentation of the goods 
is clearly distinguishable from that of the bottles of perfume normally 
made available to the intermediaries by the trade mark proprietor, the 
fact that those testers are bottles of perfume which bear not only the 
word ‘Demonstration’ but also the statement ‘Not for Sale’ precludes, in 
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, which it is for the national 
court to assess, a finding that the trade mark proprietor impliedly con-
sented to putting them on the market. (Operative part in 2).
Simex Trading markets “perfume 
testers” of trade marks such as 
Coty Prestige. According to the 
conditions of the contract, the 
testers remain the property of the 
trade mark proprietor, only their 
contents being made available for 
use, and not for sale and have been 
putted on the market outside of 
the European Union.
Coty/Simex
(no exhaustion on perfume testers)
CJEU 3 June 2010, case C-127/09, Coty/Simex
Article 7 Trade Mark Directive and Article 13 Trade Mark Regulation
Exhaustion does not apply to “perfume testers” which are not for sale.
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OTHER CASES ON 
PARALLEL TRADE
Article 7(1) Trade Mark Directive
CJEU 1 July 1999, case C-173/98, Sebago/G-B Unic; Docksides
For there to be consent within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the direc-
tive, ‘such consent must relate to each individual item of the product in 
respect of which exhaustion is pleaded’.
CJEU 20 November 2001, cases C-414/99 and C-415/99, 
Zino Davidoff/A & G Imports, Levi Strauss/Tesco and Costco; 
Cool water & Levi’s
The consent of the trade mark owner for import within the EEA may 
be implied. However, an ‘implied consent cannot be inferred:
– from the fact that the proprietor of the trade mark has not com-
municated to all subsequent purchasers of the goods placed on the 
market outside the European Economic Area his opposition to mar-
keting within the European Economic Area;
– from the fact that the goods carry no warning of a prohibition of their 
being placed on the market within the European Economic Area;
– from the fact that the trade mark proprietor has transferred the 
ownership of the products bearing the trade mark without impos-
ing any contractual reservations and that, according to the law 
governing the contract, the property right transferred includes, in 
the absence of such reservations, an unlimited right of resale or, at 
the very least, a right to market the goods subsequently within the 
European Economic Area.’
‘With regard to exhaustion of the trade mark proprietor’s exclusive 
right, it is not relevant:
– that the importer of goods bearing the trade mark is not aware that 
the proprietor objects to their being placed on the market in the 
European Economic Area or sold there by traders other than autho-
rised retailers, or
– that the authorised retailers and wholesalers have not imposed 
on their own purchasers contractual reservations setting out such 
opposition, even though they have been informed of it by the trade 
mark proprietor.’ (Operative part).
CJEU 30 November 2004, case C-16/03, Peak Holding/
Axolin-Elinor; Peak Performance
‘Article 7(1) [Trade Mark Directive], as amended by the Agreement on 
the European Economic Area of 2 May 1992, must be interpreted as 
meaning that goods bearing a trade mark cannot be regarded as hav-
ing been put on the market in the European Economic Area where the 
proprietor of the trade mark has imported them into the European Eco-
nomic Area with a view to selling them there or where he has offered 
them for sale to consumers in the European Economic Area, in his own 
shops or those of an associated company, without actually selling them.
In circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, the stipula-
tion, in a contract of sale concluded between the proprietor of the trade 
mark and an operator established in the European Economic Area, of a 
prohibition on reselling in the European Economic Area does not mean 
that there is no putting on the market in the European Economic Area 
within the meaning of Article 7(1) [Trade Mark Directive], as amended 
by the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and thus does not 
preclude the exhaustion of the proprietor’s exclusive rights in the event 
of resale in the European Economic Area in breach of the prohibition.’ 
(Operative part).
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The trade mark owner may oppose the repackaging of a pharmaceutical 
product under Article 7(2) Trade Mark Directive, unless:
1. this would contribute to the artifi cial partitioning of the markets 
between Member States; such is the case, in particular, where the 
trade mark owner sells an identical pharmaceutical product in dif-
ferent packaging in several Member States and the repackaging is 
necessary in order to market the product in the Member State of 
importation, and also carried out in such conditions that the origi-
nal condition of the product cannot be aff ected by it;
2. it is shown that the repackaging cannot aff ect the original condition 
of the product inside the packaging. In particular if only a new outer 
packaging is applied or a label is adhered;
3. the new packaging clearly states who repackaged the product and 
the name of the manufacturer;
4. the presentation of the repackaged product is not such as to be lia-
ble to damage the reputation of the trade mark and of its owner; 
thus, the packaging must not be defective, of poor quality, or 
untidy; and
5. the importer gives notice to the trade mark owner before the 
repackaged product is put on sale, and, on demand, supplies him 
with a specimen of the repackaged product.’ (abbreviated version of 
Operative part).
Paranova parallel imported 
medicine of Bristol-Myers Squibb 
from Greece and other EU 
countries where the prices were 
low and sold them with profi t in 
Denmark. Th e medicines were 
provided with other outer 
packaging and/or labels.
Paranova
(repackaging)
CJEU 11 July 1996, cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93, 
Bristol-Myers Squibb and Boehringer/Paranova
Article 7(2)Trade Mark Directive
Repackaging of medicines for parallel import is allowed, if this is necessary, 
if the product and the reputation are not prejudiced and the trade mark 
owner has been informed.
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The trade mark owner may legitimately oppose further commercializa-
tion of a pharmaceutical product imported from another Member State 
in its original internal and external packaging with an additional exter-
nal label applied by the importer, unless:
– it is established that reliance on trade mark rights by the propri-
etor in order to oppose the marketing of the over stickered product 
under that trade mark would contribute to the artifi cial partitioning 
of the markets between Member States;
– it is shown that the new label cannot aff ect the original condition of 
the product inside the packaging;
– the packaging clearly states who over stickered the product and the 
name of the manufacturer;
– the presentation of the over stickered product is not such as to be 
liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark and of its pro-
prietor; thus, the label must not be defective, of poor quality, or 
untidy; and
– the importer gives notice to the trade mark proprietor before the 
over stickered product is put on sale, and, on demand, supplies him 
with a specimen of that product. (Operative part in 1).
The condition that the repackaging of the pharmaceutical product, 
either by re-boxing the product and re-applying the trade mark or by 
applying a label to the packaging containing the product, be necessary 
for its further commercialization in the importing Member State, as 
one of the conditions which, if fulfilled, prevent the proprietor under 
Article 7(2) of [the Trade Marks Directive], from opposing such com-
mercialization, is directed solely at the fact of repackaging and not at 
the manner and style of the repackaging. (Operative part in 2).
The condition that the presentation of the pharmaceutical product 
must not be such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trade 
mark and of its proprietor – as a necessary condition for preventing 
the proprietor, pursuant to Article 7(2) of [the Trade Marks Directive], 
from legitimately opposing further commercialization of a pharmaceu-
tical product where the parallel importer has either re-boxed the prod-
uct and re-applied the trade mark or applied a label to the packaging 
containing the product – is not limited to cases where the repackaging 
is defective, of poor quality, or untidy. (Operative part in 3).
Boehringer Ingelheim objects to 
the repacking and relabeling of 
parallel imported medicines by 
Swingward.
Boehringer Ingelheim/
Swingward
(additional external label and repacking)
CJEU 26 April 2007, case C-348/04, Boehringer Ingelheim/
Swingward
Article 7(2) Trade Mark Directive
For repacking and relabelling of parallel imported medicines, various 
detailed conditions apply.
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The question whether the fact that a parallel importer:
– fails to affi  x the trade mark to the new exterior carton (‘de-brand-
ing’), or
– applies either his own logo or house-style or getup or a get-up used 
for a number of diff erent products (‘co-branding’), or
– positions the additional label so as wholly or partially to obscure the 
proprietor’s trade mark, or
– fails to state on the additional label that the trade mark in question 
belongs to the proprietor, or
– prints the name of the parallel importer in capital letters, 
is liable to damage the trade mark’s reputation is a question of fact for
the national court to decide in the light of the circumstances of each 
case. (Operative part in 4).
In situations such as those in the main proceedings, it is for the parallel 
importers to prove the existence of the conditions that:
– reliance on trade mark rights by the proprietor in order to oppose 
the marketing of repackaged products under that trade mark would 
contribute to the artificial partitioning of the markets between 
Member States;
– the repackaging cannot aff ect the original condition of the product 
inside the packaging;
– the new packaging clearly states who repackaged the product and 
the name of the manufacturer;
– the presentation of the repackaged product is not such as to be 
liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark and of its propri-
etor; thus, the repackaging must not be defective, of poor quality, or 
untidy; and
– the importer must give notice to the trade mark proprietor before 
the repackaged product is put on sale and, on demand, supply him 
with a specimen of the repackaged product, and which, if fulfi lled, 
would prevent the proprietor from lawfully opposing the further 
commercialization of a repackaged pharmaceutical product.
As regards the condition that it must be shown that the repackaging 
cannot affect the original condition of the product inside the packag-
ing, it is sufficient, however, that the parallel importer furnishes evi-
dence that leads to the reasonable presumption that that condition has 
been fulfilled. This applies a fortiori also to the condition that the pre-
sentation of the repackaged product must not be such as to be liable to 
damage the reputation of the trade mark and of its proprietor. Where 
the importer furnishes such initial evidence that the latter condition 
has been fulfilled, it will then be for the proprietor of the trade mark, 
who is best placed to assess whether the repackaging is liable to damage 
his reputation and that of the trade mark, to prove that they have been 
damaged. (Operative part in 5).
Where a parallel importer has failed to give prior notice to the trade 
mark proprietor concerning a repackaged pharmaceutical product, he 
infringes that proprietor’s rights on the occasion of any subsequent 
importation of that product, so long as he has not given the propri-
etor such notice. The sanction for that infringement must be not only 
proportionate, but also sufficiently effective and a sufficient deterrent 
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to ensure that Directive 89/104, as amended by the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area, is fully effective. A national measure under 
which, in the case of such an infringement, the trade mark proprietor 
is entitled to claim financial remedies on the same basis as if the goods 
had been spurious, is not in itself contrary to the principle of propor-
tionality. It is for the national court, however, to determine the amount 
of the financial remedies according to the circumstances of each case, in 
the light in particular of the extent of damage to the trade mark propri-
etor caused by the parallel importer’s infringement and in accordance 
with the principle of proportionality. (Operative part in 6).
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Since the presentation of the new packaging of the product does not 
fall to be assessed against the condition of necessity for the further 
marketing of the product, it must also not be assessed against the cri-
terion that the adverse effect on the trade mark rights should be the 
minimum possible. (Para. 27).
It would be inconsistent to accept that there is no need to ascertain 
whether the presentation of the new packaging of the product in 
question, chosen by the parallel importer, is necessary for the further 
marketing of the product and, at the same time, to demand that the 
importer satisfy the criterion of the minimum possible adverse effect 
on trade mark rights. (Para. 28).
Therefore, the reply to question 1(b) must be that Article 7(2) of Direc-
tive 89/104 is to be interpreted as meaning that, where it is established 
that repackaging of the pharmaceutical product is necessary for further 
marketing in the Member State of importation, the presentation of the 
packaging should be assessed only against the condition that it should 
not be such as to be liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark 
or that of its proprietor. (Para. 30).
Taking account of the foregoing, and having regard to the fact that ade-
quate functioning of the notice system presupposes that the interested 
parties make sincere efforts to respect each other’s legitimate interests, 
it is for the parallel importer to furnish the proprietor of the trade mark 
with the information which is necessary and sufficient to enable the 
latter to determine whether the repackaging of the product under that 
trade mark is necessary in order to market it in the Member State of 
importation. (Para. 34).
The kind of information to be furnished depends, moreover, on the 
facts of each case. It cannot, prima facie, be excluded that it may, in 
exceptional cases, involve disclosing the Member State of export, where 
the absence of that information would prevent the proprietor of the 
trade mark from evaluating the need to repackage. (Para. 35).
Th e parallel importer repacks a 
pharmaceutical product in a 
packaging with a new design, 
to prevent that the proprietor of 
the trade mark to enable him to 
detect weaknesses in his sales 
organisation and thus combat 
parallel trade in his products.
The Wellcome 
Foundation/Paranova
(repackaging)
CJEU 22 December 2008, case C-276/05, Th e Wellcome 
Foundation/Paranova
Article 7(2) Trade Mark Directive
In case of parallel import the (new) packaging should be assessed only 
against the condition that it should not be such as to be liable to damage 
the reputation of the trade mark or that of its proprietor. It is for the par-
allel importer to furnish the proprietor of the trade mark with the infor-
mation which is necessary and suffi  cient to enable the latter to determine 
whether the repackaging of the product under that trade mark is necessary 
in order to market it in the member state of importation.
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In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in a situation where it is 
established that the details furnished are used by the proprietor of the 
trade mark to enable him to detect weaknesses in his sales organisation 
and thus combat parallel trade in his products, it is under the provi-
sions of the EC Treaty on competition that those engaged in parallel 
trade should seek protection against action of the latter type. (Para. 36).
It is for the parallel importer to furnish to the proprietor of the trade 
mark the information which is necessary and sufficient to enable the 
latter to determine whether the repackaging of the product under that 
trade mark is necessary in order to market it in the Member State of 
importation. (Para. 37).
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OTHER 
REPACKAGING 
DECISIONS
Article 7(2)Trade Mark Directive
CJEU 11 November 1997, case C-349/95, Frits Loendersloot/
Ballentine
‘The owner of trade mark rights may, even if that constitutes a barrier 
to intra-Community trade, rely on those rights to prevent a third party 
from removing and then reaffixing or replacing labels bearing the mark 
which the owner has himself affixed to products he has put on the 
Community market, unless:
– it is established that the use of the trade mark rights by the owner 
to oppose the marketing of the relabelled products under that trade 
mark would contribute to artificial partitioning of the markets 
between Member States;
– it is shown that the relabelling cannot aff ect the original condition 
of the product;
– the presentation of the relabelled product is not such as to be liable 
to damage the reputation of the trade mark and its owner; and
– the person who relabels the products informs the trade mark owner 
of the relabelling before the relabelled products are put on sale.’ 
(Para. 50).
CJEU 12 October 1999, case C-379/97, Upjohn/Paranova; 
Dalacin
Upjohn put the antibiotic clindamycine in various forms on the market 
in the Community. In Denmark, Germany and Spain under the mark 
Dalacin, in France under the mark Dalacine and in the other Member 
States under the mark Dalacin C. Paranova bought the medicines in 
one country, repacked them and sold them in another country under 
the mark used there.
Such repackaging is only allowed if it is ‘objectively necessary’ for the 
parallel importer to be able to put the product on the market in another 
country.
CJEU 23 April 2002, case C-443/99, MSD/Paranova
‘Replacement packaging of pharmaceutical products is objectively 
necessary within the meaning of the Court’s case-law if, without such 
repackaging, effective access to the market concerned, or to a substan-
tial part of that market, must be considered to be hindered as the result 
of strong resistance from a significant proportion of consumers to rela-
belled pharmaceutical products.’ (Operative part).
CJEU 23 April 2002, case C-143/00, Boehringer/Swingward
The trade mark owner is allowed to oppose repackaging, unless this 
‘contributes to artificial partitioning of the markets of the Member 
States’.
‘A parallel importer must, in any event, in order to be entitled to repack-
age trade-marked pharmaceutical products, fulfil the requirement of 
prior notice. If the parallel importer does not satisfy that requirement, 
the trade mark proprietor may oppose the marketing of the repackaged 
pharmaceutical product. It is incumbent on the parallel importer him-
self to give notice to the trade mark proprietor of the intended repack-
aging. In the event of dispute, it is for the national court to assess, in 
the light of all the relevant circumstances, whether the proprietor had 
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PARALLEL TRADE WITHIN THE 
EEA
Articles 28-30 and 81 EC
a reasonable time to react to the intended repackaging.’ (Operative part 
in 3).
CJEU 13 July 1966, cases 56-58/64, Grundig, Consten/EC; Gint
Grundig had transferred the trade mark ‘Gint’ (acronym of Grundig 
International) to Consten, its exclusive distributor in France. Consten 
could thus counter parallel import from outside France. The agree-
ment by which the trade mark Gint was transferred (and thus also the 
intended exercise of the trade mark right) was not considered lawful by 
the CJEU under Art. 85 (old) EC, at present Art. 81 EC.
CJEU 31 October 1974, case 16/74, Centrafarm/Winthrop; 
Negram
Trade mark owner Winthrop could not successfully oppose the import 
into the Netherlands by Centrafarm of the medicine Negram which was 
put on the market in England by (the parent company of) Winthrop 
itself.
‘In relation to trade marks, the specific subject-matter of the indus-
trial property is the guarantee that the owner of the trade mark has 
the exclusive right to use that trade mark, for the purpose of putting 
products protected by the trade mark into circulation for the first time, 
and is therefore intended to protect him against competitors wishing to 
take advantage of the status and reputation of the trade mark by selling 
products illegally bearing that trade mark.’ (Para. 8).
CJEU 22 June 1976, case 119/75, Terrapin/Terranova
The German company Terranova opposed the registration in Germany 
of the trade mark Terrapin by the English company Terrapin on the 
basis of its own trade mark rights in the word Terranova.
‘It is compatible with the provisions of the EEC Treaty relating to the 
free movement of goods for an undertaking established in a Member 
State, by virtue of a right to a trade mark and a right to a commercial 
name which are protected by the legislation of that state, to prevent 
the importation of products of an undertaking established in another 
Member State and bearing by virtue of the legislation of that State a 
name giving rise to confusion with the trade mark and commercial 
name of the first undertaking, provided that there are no agreements 
restricting competition and no legal or economic ties between the 
undertakings and that their respective rights have arisen indepen-
dently of one another.’ (Operative part).
NB: Since the Ideal Standard decision (see below) an independent ori-
gin of the rights is no longer required.
CJEU 22 June 1994, case C-9/93, IHT Danziger/Ideal Standard
After a (voluntary) full split-up of trade mark rights, a consent of the 
trade mark owner leading to exhaustion of rights does no longer exist.
American Standard was owner of the trade mark ‘Ideal Standard’ 
through its German and French subsidiary (Ideal-Standard GmbH 
and Ideal-Standard SA) in Germany and France. The French subsidiary 
sold this trade mark to SGF which transferred it in its turn to CICh. 
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A subsidiary of the latter (IHT) sold in Germany products which were 
produced by CICh in France under the trade mark ‘Ideal Standard’. 
Ideal-Standard GmbH could oppose this:
‘The consent inherent in any transfer is not the same consent as the 
one required for the exhaustion principle to be effective. This requires 
that the right owner is authorized in the State of import to decide – 
directly or not – which products can be provided with the trade mark 
in the State of import, and to check the quality of such products. This 
authority will, however, end if he loses control over the trade mark by 
reason of transfer to a third party which does not have any economic 
relationship with him.’ (Para 43).
As to involuntary full split-up the same was already decided in CJEU 17 
October 1990, case C-10/89, HAG II (not included).
CJEU 23 October 2003, case C-115/02, Administration des 
douanes/Rioglass
Rioglass sold to Jann, a company registered in Poland (at that time not 
an EU member state), a consignment of windscreens, lawfully produced 
in Spain, intended for various types of cars. Some of the windscreens, 
intended for use in Peugeot, Citroën or Renault models, bore the logo 
or trade mark of those manufacturers alongside the Rioglass’s trade 
mark. These windscreens where transported through France and seized 
there for trade mark infringement.
‘Article 28 EC is to be interpreted as precluding the implementation, 
pursuant to a legislative measure of a Member State concerning intel-
lectual property, of procedures for detention by the customs authori-
ties of goods lawfully manufactured in another Member State and 
intended, following their transit through the territory of the first Mem-
ber State, to be placed on the market in a non-member country. (Opera-
tive part).
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GENUINE USE
‘Article 12(1) [Trade Mark Directive] […] must be interpreted as mean-
ing that there is genuine use of a trade mark where the mark is used in 
accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the iden-
tity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in 
order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genu-
ine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving 
the rights conferred by the mark.
When assessing whether use of the trade mark is genuine, regard 
must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant to establish-
ing whether the commercial exploitation of the mark is real, particu-
larly whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic sector 
concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods or 
services protected by the mark, the nature of the goods or services at 
issue, the characteristics of the market and the scale and frequency of 
use of the mark.
The fact that a mark that is not used for goods newly available on the 
market but for goods that were sold in the past does not mean that its 
use is not genuine, if the proprietor makes actual use of the same mark 
for component parts that are integral to the make-up or structure of 
such goods, or for goods or services directly connected with the goods 
previously sold and intended to meet the needs of customers of those 
goods.’ (Operative part).
Ajax, a producer of fi re 
extinguishers, applied for the 
revocation of the trade mark 
Minimax for fi re extinguishers of 
its competitor Ansul owing due to 
non use. Ansul had ceased the use 
of the trade mark for sale of new 
fi re extinguishers, but still had 
used it for the sale of components 
and extinguishing substances, for 
repair and maintenance, as well 
as on stickers bearing the text 
‘Ready to use Minimax’.
Ansul/Ajax
(real commercial exploitaion)
CJEU 11 March 2003, case C-40/01, Ansul/Ajax; Minimax
Article 12(1)Trade Mark Directive
Genuine use is use to fi nd a real commercial exploitation for the goods or 
services, excluding symbolic use.
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The High Court of Justice (England & Wales) held that while the sale 
of the products had during that period generated a very low turnover 
of some hundreds of pounds sterling, that situation reflected the com-
mercial failure of the company which owned the trade mark rather than 
use of the trade mark solely for the purpose of maintaining its registra-
tion. In addition, the High Court observed that Laboratoires Goemar 
had, shortly following that same period, recruited a new sales agent in 
the United Kingdom in order to boost their sales. (Para. 12).
‘[…] there is genuine use of a trade mark where it is used in accordance 
with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the ori-
gin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create 
or preserve an outlet for those goods or services; genuine use does not 
include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights con-
ferred by that mark. When assessing whether use of the trade mark is 
genuine, regard must be had to all the facts and circumstances relevant 
to establishing whether the commercial use of the mark is real in the 
course of trade, particularly whether such use is viewed as warranted 
in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the 
market for the goods or services protected by the mark, the nature of 
those goods or services, the characteristics of the market and the scale 
and frequency of use of the mark. When it serves a real commercial 
purpose, in the circumstances cited above, even minimal use of the 
mark or use by only a single importer in the Member State concerned 
can be sufficient to establish genuine use within the meaning of the 
Directive.
While [the Trade Mark Directive] makes the classification of use of 
the trade mark as genuine use consequential only on consideration 
of the circumstances which pertain in respect of the relevant period 
and which predate the filing of the application for revocation, it does 
not preclude, in assessing the genuineness of use during the relevant 
period, account being taken, where appropriate, of any circumstances 
subsequent to that filing. It is for the national court to determine 
whether such circumstances confirm that the use of the mark during 
the relevant period was genuine or whether, conversely, they reflect an 
intention on the part of the proprietor to defeat that claim.’ (Operative 
part).
La Mer applied for the revocation 
of the trade mark ‘Laboratoire de 
la mer’ owned by Goemar, claiming 
that Laboratoires Goemar had not 
put it to genuine use during the 
fi ve years preceding.
La Mer
(a real commercial purpose)
CJEU 27 January 2004, case C-259/02, La Mer Technology/
Laboratoires Goemar; Laboratoire de la mer
Article 12(1)Trade Mark Directive
When it serves a real commercial purpose, even minimal use of the mark 
or use by only a single importer in the Member State concerned can be suf-
fi cient to establish genuine use within the meaning of the Directive.
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The sale of around 300 [cases] of 12 items each of concentrated juices 
of various fruits, representing sales of approximately EUR 4 800 to 
a single Spanish customer during the period from May 1996 to May 
1997 can be regarded as genuine use.
Although the scale of the use to which the earlier trade mark was put 
is limited and although it might be preferable to have more evidence 
relating to the nature of the use during the relevant period, the facts 
and evidence put forward by the other party to the proceedings are suf-
ficient for a finding of genuine use.
‘[…] it is not possible to determine a priori, and in the abstract, what 
quantitative threshold should be chosen in order to determine whether 
use is genuine or not. A de minimis rule, which would not allow OHIM 
or, on appeal, the Court of First Instance, to appraise all the circum-
stances of the dispute before it, cannot therefore be laid down.’ (Para. 
72).
The CJEU also confirmed the ruling by the CFI that ‘herbal and vitamin 
beverages’ and ‘concentrated fruit juices’ are similar goods. (Para. 86).
Espadafor Caba opposed the 
registration of a Community trade 
mark Vitafruit by Th e Sunrider on 
the basis of its national (Spanish) 
word mark Vitafrut. Th e Sunrider 
argued that Espadafor Caba had 
not put its trade mark to genuine 
use.
Vitafruit
(no de minimis rule)
CJEU 11 May 2006, case C-416/04 P, Th e Sunrider/OHIM; 
Vitafruit
Article 15 Trade Mark Regulation
An de minimis rule, which would not allow the OHIM or, on appeal, the 
Court of First Instance, to appraise all the circumstances of the dispute 
before it, cannot be laid down.
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It should be noted that the eighth recital in the preamble to the Direc-
tive states that ‘in order to reduce the total number of trademarks 
registered […] in the Community […] it is essential to require that reg-
istered trademarks must actually be used or, if not used, be subject to 
revocation’. It appears in the light of that recital that it would be con-
trary to the scheme of Article 12(1) of the [Trade Marks Directive] to 
confer too broad a scope on the concept of proper reasons for non-use 
of a mark. Achievement of the objective set out in that recital would be 
jeopardized if any obstacle, however minimal yet none the less arising 
independently of the will of the owner of the trade mark, were suffi-
cient to justify its non-use. (Para. 51).
The ‘date of the completion of the registration procedure’ within the 
meaning of Article 10(1) of [the Trade Marks Directive] must be deter-
mined in each Member State in accordance with the procedural rules 
on registration in force in that State. (Operative part in 1).
Article 12(1) of [the Trade Marks Directive] must be interpreted as 
meaning that obstacles having a direct relationship with a trade mark 
which make its use impossible or unreasonable
and which are independent of the will of the proprietor of that mark 
constitute proper reasons for non-use’ of the mark. It is for the national 
court or tribunal to assess the facts in the main proceedings in the light 
of that guidance. (Operative part in 2).
A revocation action against the 
international trade mark Le Chef 
De Cuisine based on the fact of 
non-use of the mark in Austria. 
Dispute about the start of the 
period of protection and a proper 
reason of non-use.
Armin Häupl/Lidl Stiftung
(normal use)
CJEU 14 June 2007, case C-246/05, Armin Häupl/Lidl Stiftung
Article 10(1) Trade Mark Directive
Proper reasons for non-use of a trade mark are constituted if the obstacles 
which make its use impossible or unreasonable, have a direct relationship 
with a trade mark and are independent of the will of the proprietor of that 
mark.
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The fact that a charitable association does not seek to make profit does 
not mean that its objective cannot be to create and, later, to preserve an 
outlet for its goods or services. (Para. 17).
In addition, paid welfare services exist. In modern society, various 
types of non-profit-making association have sprung up which, at first 
sight, offer their services free but which, in reality, are financed through 
subsidies or receive payment in various. (Para. 18).
It cannot be ruled out, therefore, that trademarks registered by a non-
profit-making association may have a raison d’être, in that they protect 
the association against the possible use in business of identical or simi-
lar signs by third persons. (Para. 19).
Use of a trade mark by a non-profit-making association during purely 
private ceremonies or events, or for the advertisement or announce-
ment of such ceremonies or events, constitutes an internal use of the 
trade mark and not ‘genuine use’ for the purposes of Article 12(1) of 
the directive. (Para. 22).
Article 12(1) of the Directive is to be construed as meaning that a trade 
mark is put to genuine use where a non-profit-making association uses 
the trade mark, in its relations with the public, in announcements of 
forthcoming events, on business papers and on advertising material 
and where the association’s members wear badges featuring that trade 
mark when collecting and distributing donations. (Operative part).
Bundesvereinigung Kameradschaft 
‘Feldmarschall Radetzky’ is the 
proprietor of fi gurative- 
and word marks representing 
essentially badges of honor. 
Several members wear those 
badges at meetings and when they 
are collecting and distributing 
donations. Th e trade mark is also 
used on announcements and 
business papers.
Radetzky-Orden
(genuine use)
CJEU 9 December 2008, case C-442/07, Verein Radetzky-Orden/ 
Bundesvereinigung Kameradschaft Feldmarschall Radetzky
Article 12(1) Trade Mark Directive
A trade mark is put to genuine use where a non-profi t-making association 
uses the trade mark not merely for internal use, but also, for example, in 
its relations with the public, in announcements of forthcoming events, on 
business papers and on advertising material and where the association’s 
members wear badges featuring that trade mark when collecting and dis-
tributing donations.
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As the Commission submitted in its observations to the Court and as 
the Advocate General stated in points 45 and 55 of his Opinion, it is 
essential, in the light of the number of marks that are registered and 
the conflicts that are likely to arise between them, to maintain the 
rights conferred by a mark for a given class of goods or services only 
where that mark has been used on the market for goods or services 
belonging to that class. (Para. 19).
For the reasons set out in points 48 and 56 of that Opinion, that con-
dition is not fulfilled where promotional items are handed out as a 
reward for the purchase of other goods and to encourage the sale of the 
latter. (Para. 20).
In such a situation, those items are not distributed in any way with the 
aim of penetrating the market for goods in the same class. In those cir-
cumstances, affixing the mark to those items does not contribute to 
creating an outlet for those items or to distinguishing, in the interest of 
the customer, those items from the goods of other undertakings. (Para. 
21).
In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the question 
referred is that Articles 10(1) and 12(1) of the directive must be inter-
preted as meaning that, where the proprietor of a mark affixes that 
mark to items that it gives, free of charge, to purchasers of its goods, it 
does not make genuine use of that mark in respect of the class covering 
those items. (Para. 22).
In the context of the sale of its 
clothing, Maselli used its mark to 
designate an alcohol-free drink 
which was handed out as a gift 
in bottles marked ‘WELLNESS-
DRINK’.
Silberquelle/Maselli-
Strickmode
(genuine use)
CJEU 15 January 2009, case C-495/07, Silberquelle/
Maselli-Strickmode GmbH
Articles 10 and 12 Trade Mark Directive
Where the proprietor of a mark affi  xes that mark to items that it hands out 
as a gift, to purchasers of its goods, it does not make genuine use of that 
mark in respect of the class covering those items.
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The ’territorial borders of the Member States should be disregarded in 
the assessment of whether a trade mark has been put to ‘genuine use in 
the Community’. (Operative part 1).
‘Whilst there is admittedly some justification for thinking that a Com-
munity trade mark should – because it enjoys more extensive territo-
rial protection than a national trade mark – be used in a larger area 
than the territory of a single Member State in order for the use to be 
regarded as ‘genuine use’, it cannot be ruled out that, in certain circum-
stances, the market for the goods or services for which a Community 
trade mark has been registered is in fact restricted to the territory of a 
single Member State. In such a case, use of the Community trade mark 
on that territory might satisfy the conditions both for genuine use of a 
Community trade mark and for genuine use of a national trade mark.’ 
(Para. 50).
‘A Community trade mark is put to ‘genuine use’ when it is used in 
accordance with its essential function and for the purpose of main-
taining or creating market share within the European Community 
for the goods or services covered by it. It is for the referring court to 
assess whether the conditions are met in the main proceedings, taking 
account of all the relevant facts and circumstances, including the char-
acteristics of the market concerned, the nature of the goods or services 
protected by the trade mark and the territorial extent and the scale of 
the use as well as its frequency and regularity. (Operative part 2).
Leno opposes the registration 
of the trade mark OMEL by 
Hagelkruis on the basis of its 
earlier trade mark ONEL. 
Hagelkruis disputes that the 
trade mark ONEL has been put 
to genuine use in the European 
Union for classes 35, 41 and 42. 
Hagelkruis acknowledges that 
Leno has genuinely used the trade 
mark in the Netherlands.
Onel/Omel
(territorial scope of use)
CJEU 19 December 2012, case C-149/11, Leno/Hagelkruis; 
Onel/Omel
Article 15 Trade Mark Regulation
In the assessment of whether a trade mark has been put to ‘genuine use’, 
territorial borders should be disregarded. Under circumstances it is not 
excluded that use in a single country can constitute genuine use of a Com-
munity trade mark.
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OTHER CASES ON 
GENUINE USE
CJEU 25 October 2012, case C-553/11, Bernhard Rintisch/
Klaus Eder; Proti
Rintisch is the proprietor of the word marks PROTIPLUS and PROTI 
en the word/figurative mark Proti Power for protein based goods. He 
opposes the use of the later word mark Protifit by Eder. Eder claims 
that Rintisch has not put the word mark PROTI to genuine use. He 
only uses the trade marks PROTIPLUS and Proti Power. The ECJ holds:
Article 10(2)(a) Trade Mark Directive ‘must be interpreted as meaning 
that the proprietor of a registered trade mark is not precluded from 
relying, in order to establish use of the trade mark for the purposes of 
that provision, on the fact that it is used in a form which differs from 
the form in which it was registered, without the differences between 
the two forms altering the distinctive character of that trade mark, 
even though that different form is itself registered as a trade mark.’ 
(Operative part 1).
Article 10(2)(a) Trade Mark Directive ‘be interpreted as precluding an 
interpretation of the national provision intended to transpose it into 
domestic law whereby Article 10(2)(a) does not apply to a ‘defensive’ 
trade mark which is registered only in order to secure or expand the 
protection of another registered trade mark that is registered in the 
form in which it is used.’ (Operative part 2).
CJEU 18 April 2013, case C-12/12, Colloseum/Levi Strauss
Levi Strauss is proprietor of the trade mark which is a position mark 
and consists of a rectangular red label, made of textile, sewn into and 
protruding from the upper part of the left-hand seam of the rear pocket 
of trousers, shorts or skirts. The question is if the trade mark had been 
put to genuine use.
‘The condition of genuine use of a trade mark […] may be satisfied 
where a registered trade mark, which has become distinctive as a result 
of the use of another composite mark of which it constitutes one of the 
elements, is used only through that other composite mark, or where it 
is used only in conjunction with another mark, and the combination 
of those two marks is, furthermore, itself registered as a trade mark.’ 
(Operative part).
CJEU 18 July 2013, case C-252/12, Specsavers/Asda
The condition of ‘genuine use’, within the meaning of those provisions, 
may be fulfilled where a Community figurative mark is used only in 
conjunction with a Community word mark which is superimposed over 
it, and the combination of those two marks is, furthermore, itself reg-
istered as a Community trade mark, to the extent that the differences 
between the form in which that trade mark is used and that in which 
it was registered do not change the distinctive character of that trade 
mark as registered. (Operative part 1).
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BAD FAITH
The intention to prevent a third party from marketing a product may, 
in certain circumstances, be an element of bad faith on the part of the 
applicant. That is in particular the case when it becomes apparent, 
subsequently, that the applicant applied for registration of a sign as a 
Community trade mark without intending to use it, his sole objective 
being to prevent a third party from entering the market. In such a case, 
the mark does not fulfill its essential function, namely that of ensur-
ing that the consumer or end-user can identify the origin of the prod-
uct or service concerned by allowing him to distinguish that product 
or service from those of different origin, without any confusion. (Para. 
42-45).
Equally, the fact that a third party has long used a sign for an identical 
or similar product capable of being confused with the mark applied for 
and that that sign enjoys some degree of legal protection is one of the 
factors relevant to the determination of whether the applicant was act-
ing in bad faith. In such a case, the applicant’s sole aim in taking advan-
tage of the rights conferred by the Community trade mark might be to 
compete unfairly with a competitor who is using a sign which, because 
of characteristics of its own, has by that time obtained some degree of 
legal protection. (Para. 46-47).
In order to determine whether the applicant is acting in bad faith 
within the meaning of Article 51(1)(b) of [the Trade Marks Regulation], 
the national court must take into consideration all the relevant factors 
specific to the particular case which pertained at the time of filing the 
application for registration of the sign as a Community trade mark, in 
particular:
– the fact that the applicant knows or must know that a third party is 
using, in at least one Member State, an identical or similar sign for 
an identical or similar product capable of being confused with the 
sign for which registration is sought;
– the applicant’s intention to prevent that third party from continu-
ing to use such a sign; and
– the degree of legal protection enjoyed by the third party’s sign and 
by the sign for which registration is sought. (Para. 53).
Lindt & Sprüngli is proprietor of 
a fi gurative mark consisting a 
sitting golden chocolate bunny, 
with a red ribbon, a little bell 
and brown lettered words „Lindt 
GOLDHASE”. Based on the 
foregoing, Lindt & Sprüngli object 
to another chocolate bunny of 
Frans Hauswirth (see picture).
Lindt & Sprüngli/
Frans Hauswirth
CJEU 11 June 2009, case C-529/07, Lindt & Sprüngli/Frans 
Hauswirth
Article 51(1)(b) (old, now article 52 (1)(b) ) Trade Mark Regulation
For the assessment of bad faith of a trademark application, the knowledge 
that a third party is using an identical or similar sign, with the intention to 
prevent that third party from continuing to use such a sign and the degree 
of legal protection enjoyed by the sign, must be taken into consideration.
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The concept of ‘bad faith’, within the meaning of that provision, is an 
autonomous concept of European Union law which must be given a 
uniform interpretation in the European Union. (Operative part 1).
‘In order to permit the conclusion that the person making the applica-
tion for registration of a trade mark is acting in bad faith within the 
meaning of that provision, it is necessary to take into consideration all 
the relevant factors specific to the particular case which pertained at 
the time of filing the application for registration. The fact that the per-
son making that application knows or should know that a third party is 
using a mark abroad at the time of filing his application which is liable 
to be confused with the mark whose registration has been applied for is 
not sufficient, in itself, to permit the conclusion that the person mak-
ing that application is acting in bad faith within the meaning of that 
provision.’ (Operative part 2).
‘Article 4(4)(g) of the Trade Mark Directive must be interpreted as 
meaning that it does not allow Member States to introduce a system 
of specific protection of foreign marks which differs from the system 
established by that provision and which is based on the fact that the 
person making the application for registration of a mark knew or 
should have known of a foreign mark.’ (Operative part 3).
Since 1965 Yakult owns the design 
and trade mark rights on a plastic 
bottle for a milk drink in Japan 
and several other countries. Since 
1977 Malaysia Dairy produced 
and marketed a milk drink in a 
plastic bottle. In 1980 Malaysia 
Dairy obtained a registration on 
het similar plastic bottle, i.a. in 
Malaysia. Yakult claims that 
Malaysia Dairy acted in bad faith 
when applying for registration of a 
trade mark for the plastic bottle in 
Denmark.
Malaysia Dairy
(bad faith)
CJEU 27 June 2013, case C-320/12, Malaysia Dairy/Ankenævnet 
for Patenter og Varemærker; Yakult
Article 4(4)(g) Trade Mark Directive
Knowledge of a foreign mark in use is insuffi  cient to establish ‘bad faith’.
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LOSS OF DISTINCTIVE 
CHARACTER
‘In general, the perception of consumers or end users will play a deci-
sive role. The whole aim of the commercialisation process is the pur-
chase of the product by those persons and the role of the intermediary 
consists as much in detecting and anticipating the demand for that 
product as in increasing or directing it. (Para. 24).
Accordingly, the relevant classes of persons comprise principally con-
sumers and end users. However, depending on the features of the prod-
uct market concerned, the influence of intermediaries on decisions to 
purchase, and thus their perception of the trade mark, must also be 
taken into consideration.’ (Para. 25).
‘Article 12(2)(a) of the First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 
to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks 
should be interpreted as meaning that in cases where intermediaries 
participate in the distribution to the consumer or the end user of a 
product which is the subject of a registered trade mark, the relevant 
classes of persons whose views fall to be taken into account in deter-
mining whether that trade mark has become the common name in the 
trade for the product in question comprise all consumers and end users 
and, depending on the features of the market concerned, all those in 
the trade who deal with that product commercially.’ (Operative part).
Björnekulla sought revocation in 
Sweden of the trade mark 
Bostongurka of Procordia, because 
it had become a generic name in 
Swedish for chopped pickled 
gherkins.
Bostongurka
(perception of the end user)
CJEU 29 April 2004, case C-371/02, Björnekulla/Procordia; 
Bostongurka
Article 12(2) Trade Mark Directive
In determining whether a mark has become generic, the perception of the 
end user is of primary importance, but the perception of all those in the 
trade who deal with that product commercially may also be relevant.
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‘Article 5(1) [Trade Mark Directive] […] must be interpreted as mean-
ing that, in order to determine the scope of protection of a trade mark 
which has been lawfully acquired on the basis of its distinctive char-
acter, the national court must take into account the perception of the 
public concerned at the time when the sign, the use of which infringes 
that trade mark, began to be used.
Where the competent national court finds that the sign in question 
constituted an infringement of the mark at the time when the sign 
began to be used, it is for that court to take such measures as prove to 
be the most appropriate in the light of the circumstances of the case 
in order to safeguard the proprietor’s rights deriving from Article 5(1) 
[Trade Mark Directive]; such measures may include, in particular, an 
order to cease us of that sign.
It is not appropriate to order cessation of the use of the sign in ques-
tion if it has been established that the trade mark has lost its distinctive 
character, in consequence of acts or inactivity of the proprietor, so that 
it has become a common name within the meaning of Article 12(2) 
[Trade Mark Directive], and the trade mark has therefore been revoked.’ 
(Operative part).
Levi Strauss is the proprietor of a 
graphic mark known as ‘mouette’ 
(seagull), a design represented 
by a double row of overstitching 
curving downwards in the middle, 
placed in the centre of a pentago-
nal pocket and objected to jeans 
put on the market by Casucci 
bearing a sign comprising a double 
row of overstitching, curving 
upwards in the centre of the back 
pockets. Th e lower courts were of 
the opinion that this kind of 
stitching had become generic.
Levi Strauss/Casucci
(loss of distinctiveness)
CJEU 27 April 2006, case C-145/05, Levi Strauss/Casucci; 
overstitching
Article 5(1)(b) Trade Mark Directive
Article 12(2) Trade Mark Directive
Likelihood of confusion must be assessed at the time when the use of the 
allegedly infringing sign started. If a sign is found to be infringing, it is 
appropriate to order cessation of the use of the sign, unless the trade mark 
has lost its distinctive character in consequence of acts or inactivity of the 
proprietor.
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OTHER USE OF A 
TRADE MARK
‘Article 5(5) of [Trade Mark Directive] […]must be interpreted as mean-
ing that a Member State may, if it sees fit, and subject to such condi-
tions as it may determine, protect a trade mark against use of a sign 
other than for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, where 
use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is det-
rimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark..’ 
(Operative part).
‘Accordingly, where, as in the main proceedings, the sign is not used for 
the purposes of distinguishing goods or services, it is necessary to refer 
to the legal orders of the Member States to determine the extent and 
nature, if any, of the protection afforded to owners of trade marks who 
claim to be suffering damage as a result of use of that sign as a trade 
name or company name. (Para. 34).
The Member States may adopt no legislation in this area or they may, 
subject to such conditions as they may determine, require that the sign 
and the trade mark be either identical or similar, or that there be some 
other connection between them.’ (Para. 35).
Trade mark owner Robeco objected 
in Belgium to the use of the trade 
name Robelco.
Robelco/Robeco
(use as trade name)
CJEU 21 November 2002, case C-23/01, Robelco/Robeco
Article 5(5) Trade Mark Directive
A Member State may, if it sees fi t, and subject to such conditions as it may 
determine, protect a trade mark against use of a sign other than for the 
purpose of distinguishing goods or services.
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TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF 
PROHIBITIONS
In order to ensure that uniform protection, a prohibition against fur-
ther infringement or threatened infringement issued by a competent 
Community trade mark court must therefore, as a rule, extend to the 
entire area of the European Union. (Para. 44, Operative part in 1).
However, the territorial scope of the prohibition may, in certain circum-
stances, be restricted. The exclusive right of a Community trade mark 
proprietor is conferred in order to enable that proprietor to protect 
his specific interests as such, that is, to ensure that the trade mark is 
able to fulfill its functions. The exercise of that right must therefore 
be reserved to cases in which a third party’s use of the sign affects or 
is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark. It follows that the 
exclusive right of a Community trade mark proprietor and, hence, the 
territorial scope of that right, may not extend beyond what that right 
allows its proprietor to do in order to protect his trade mark, that is, to 
prohibit only uses which are liable to affect the functions of the trade 
mark. The acts or future acts of a defendant which do not affect the 
functions of the Community trade mark, cannot therefore be prohib-
ited. (Para. 46 and 47).
If a Community trade mark court hearing a case in circumstances such 
as those of the main proceedings finds that the acts of infringement or 
threatened infringement of a Community trade mark are limited to a 
single Member State or to part of the territory of the European Union, 
in particular because the applicant for a prohibition order has restricted 
the territorial scope of its action in exercising its freedom to determine 
the extent of that action or because the defendant proves that the use 
of the sign at issue does not affect or is not liable to affect the functions 
of the trade mark, for example on linguistic grounds, that court must 
limit the territorial scope of the prohibition which it issues. (Para. 48).
Based on their Community Trade 
Mark “WEBSHIPPING”, 
Chronopost objects to the use of 
the description ‘web shipping’ by 
DHL in order to designate an 
express mail management service 
accessible on the Internet.
DHL/Chronopost
(territorial scope)
CJEU 12 April 2011, case C-235/09, DHL/Chronopost
Articles 1, 9 and 14 Trade Mark Regulation
A prohibition against further infringement must be ensured in the entire 
area of the European Union, except if there is evidence that the sign at 
issue does not affect or is not liable to affect the functions of the trade 
mark, especially on linguistic grounds.
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COMPARATIVE 
ADVERTISING
‘1.  On a proper construction of Articles 2(2a) and 3a(1)(c) [Compara-
tive Advertising Directive], the indication, in the catalogue of a sup-
plier of spare parts and consumable items suitable for the products 
of an equipment manufacturer, of product numbers (OEM num-
bers) by which the equipment manufacturer designates the spare 
parts and consumable items which he himself sells may constitute 
comparative advertising which objectively compares one or more 
material, relevant, verifi able and representative features of goods.
2.  On a proper construction of Article 3a(1)(g) [Comparative Advertis-
ing Directive], where product numbers (OEM numbers) of an equip-
ment manufacturer are, as such, distinguishing marks within the 
meaning of that provision, their use in the catalogues of a compet-
ing supplier enables him to take unfair advantage of the reputation 
attached to those marks only if the eff ect of the reference to them 
is to create, in the mind of the persons at whom the advertising is 
directed, an association between the manufacturer whose products 
are identified and the competing supplier, in that those persons 
associate the reputation of the manufacturer’s products with the 
products of the competing supplier. In order to determine whether 
that condition is satisfied, account should be taken of the overall 
presentation of the advertising at issue and the type of persons for 
whom the advertising is intended.’ (Operative part).
1
1 Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984 concerning misleading and 
comparative advertising, as amended by Directive 97/55/EC of the European 
 Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997.
Katun sells spare parts (i.a.) for 
Toshiba photocopiers. In its 
catalogues it states its products 
next to OEM (Original Equipment 
Manufacturer) – numbers of 
Toshiba. Toshiba objects to this.
Toshiba/Katun
(reference to product numbers)
CJEU 25 October 2001, case C-112/99, Toshiba/Katun; 
OEM-numbers
Articles 3a and 7 Comparative Advertising Directive1
Use of product numbers of competitor in a catalogue of spare parts is 
allowed.
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‘1.  Article 7(2) [Comparative Advertising Directive], precludes the 
application to comparative advertising of stricter national provi-
sions on protection against misleading advertising as far as the form 
and content of the comparison is concerned, without there being 
any need to establish distinctions between the various elements 
of the comparison, that is to say statements concerning the adver-
tiser’s off er, statements concerning the competitor’s off er and the 
relationship between those off ers.
2.  Article 3a(1)(a) [Comparative Advertising Directive], must be inter-
preted as meaning that, whereas the advertiser is in principle free 
to state or not to state the brand name of rival products in com-
parative advertising, it is for the national court to verify whether, 
in particular circumstances, characterised by the importance of the 
brand in the buyer’s choice and by a major diff erence between the 
respective brand names of the compared products in terms of how 
well known they are, omission of the better-known brand name is 
capable of being misleading.
3.  Article 3a(1) [Comparative Advertising Directive], as amended, does 
not preclude compared products from being purchased through dif-
ferent distribution channels.
4.  Article 3a(1) [Comparative Advertising Directive], as amended, does 
not preclude an advertiser from carrying out a test purchase with 
a competitor before his own off er has even commenced, where the 
conditions for the lawfulness of comparative advertising set out 
therein are complied with.
5.  A price comparison does not entail the discrediting of a competi-
tor, within the meaning of Article 3a(1)(e) [Comparative Advertis-
ing Directive], either on the grounds that the difference in price 
between the products compared is greater than the average price 
diff erence or by reason of the number of comparisons made. Article 
3a(1)(e) [Comparative Advertising Directive], does not prevent com-
parative advertising, in addition to citing the competitor’s name, 
from reproducing its logo and a picture of its shop front, if that 
advertising complies with the conditions for lawfulness laid down 
by Community law.’ (Operative part).
Th e optician chain Hartlauer 
compared in a leafl et and in a 
television commercial the prices of 
traditional opticians, including 
Pippig, with its own prices. In the 
television commercial the shop-
front with logo of Pippig was 
visible.
Pippig/Hartlauer
(use of a competitor’s logo)
CJEU 8 April 2003, case C-44/01, Pippig/Hartlauer
Articles 3a and 7 Comparative Advertising Directive
Comparative advertising by showing the logo or shop-front of a competitor 
is allowed in principle.
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VIPA sells components which are compatible with the ‘Simatic’ control 
systems of Siemens, for which it uses an identification system which is 
almost identical to the one of Siemens. The first part of the character 
combination in the order numbers of Siemens is replaced by the word 
‘VIPA’ followed by the core element of the order number of the original 
product of Siemens. This order number refers to characteristics of the 
product of Siemens in question and to the use thereof in the computer 
platform; this number must be entered into this platform to activate 
the control.
Comparative advertising intends to allow consumers to take as much 
advantage of the internal market as possible, since advertising is an 
important tool to create real outlets everywhere in the Community for 
all goods and services. Comparative advertising also has the purpose 
to create an incentive for competition between suppliers of goods and 
services in the interest of consumers.
‘In the present case, if a different core element were to be used for the 
order numbers of goods distributed by VIPA and intended for use with 
Siemens controllers as add-on components, the users concerned would 
be required to look in comparative listings for the order numbers cor-
responding with the goods sold by Siemens. That would be disadvanta-
geous, as the national court pointed out, to consumers and to VIPA. 
The possibility that there would be restrictive effects on competition in 
the market for add-on components to the controllers manufactured by 
Siemens cannot therefore be excluded.’ (Para. 26).
‘Article 3a(1)(g) [Comparative Advertising Directive], must be inter-
preted as meaning that, in circumstances such as those in the main 
proceedings, by using in its catalogues the core element of a manufac-
turer’s distinguishing mark which is known in specialist circles, a com-
peting supplier does not take unfair advantage of the reputation of that 
distinguishing mark.’ (Operative part).
VIPA uses order numbers which 
are partly identical to the order 
numbers of the products of 
Siemens which they are compatible 
with. Siemens objects to this.
Siemens/Vipa
(use of identical order numbers)
CJEU 23 February 2006, case C-59/05, Siemens/VIPA
Article 3a(1)(g) Comparative Advertising Directive
In this case, the competing supplier does not take unfair advantage of 
the reputation of that distinguishing mark by using partly identical order 
 numbers.
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The condition under which comparative advertising is permissible that 
is laid down by Article 3a(1)(b) of the [Comparative Advertising Direc-
tive] must be interpreted as not precluding comparative advertising 
from relating collectively to selections of basic consumables sold by two 
competing chains of stores in so far as those selections each consist of 
individual products which, when viewed in pairs, individually satisfy 
the requirement of comparability laid down by that provision. (Opera-
tive part in 1).
The requirement, laid down by Article 3a(1)(c) of the Directive, that 
the advertising ‘objectively compares’ the features of the goods at issue 
must be interpreted as not signifying, in the event of comparison of 
the prices of a selection of comparable basic consumables sold by com-
peting chains of stores or of the general level of the prices charged by 
them in respect of the range of comparable products which they sell, 
that the products and prices compared, that is to say both those of the 
advertiser and those of all of his competitors involved in the compari-
son, must be expressly and exhaustively listed in the advertisement. 
(Operative part in 2).
Article 3a(1)(c) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that 
the following constitute, for the purposes of that provision, ‘verifiable’ 
features of goods sold by two competing chains of stores:
– the prices of those goods;
– the general level of the respective prices charged by such chains of 
stores in respect of their selection of comparable products and the 
amount liable to be saved by consumers who purchase such prod-
ucts from one rather than the other of those chains, in so far as the 
goods in question do in fact form part of the selection of compara-
ble products on whose basis that general price level has been deter-
mined. (Operative part in 3).
Article 3a(1)(c) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a 
feature mentioned in comparative advertising satisfies the requirement 
of verifiability laid down by that provision, in cases where the details of 
the comparison which form the basis for the mention of that feature 
are not set out in the advertising, only if the advertiser indicates, in 
particular for the attention of the persons to whom the advertisement 
is addressed, where and how they may readily examine those details 
Colruyt had a comparative 
advertisement relating to the 
prices of a products selection. 
According to Lidl this 
advertisement was not objective, 
not verifi able and misleading.
Lidl/Colruyt
(comparative advertising relating to the prices of a products selection)
CJEU 19 September 2006, case C-356/04, Lidl/Colruyt
Article 3a(1)(c) Comparative Advertising Directive
Comparative advertising relating to the prices of a products selection is 
allowed, as long as it is not misleading.
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with a view to verifying, or, if they do not possess the skill required for 
that purpose, to having verified, the details and the feature in question 
as to their accuracy. (Operative part in 4).
Article 3a(1)(a) of Directive 84/450, as amended by Directive 97/55, 
must be interpreted as meaning that comparative advertising claiming 
that the advertiser’s general price level is lower than his main competi-
tors’, where the comparison has related to a sample of products, may be 
misleading when the advertisement:
– does not reveal that the comparison related only to such a sample 
and not to all the advertiser’s products,
– does not identify the details of the comparison made or inform the 
persons to whom it is addressed of the information source where 
such identifi cation is possible, or
– contains a collective reference to a range of amounts that may be 
saved by consumers who make their purchases from the advertiser 
rather than from his competitors without specifying individually 
the general level of the prices charged, respectively, by each of those 
competitors and the amount that consumers are liable to save by 
making their purchases from the advertiser rather than from each 
of the competitors. (Operative part in 5).
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Article 5(1) and (2) of [the Trade Mark Directive] and Article 3a(1) of 
[the Comparative Advertising Directive] must be interpreted as mean-
ing that the proprietor of a registered trade mark is not entitled to 
prevent the use by a third party of a sign identical with, or similar to, 
his mark, in a comparative advertisement which satisfies all the condi-
tions, laid down in Article 3a(1) of [the Comparative Advertising Direc-
tive], under which comparative advertising is permitted. (Para. 51).
Where the conditions required under Article 5(1)(b) of [Trade Mark 
Directive] to prevent the use of a sign identical with, or similar to, a reg-
istered mark are met, a comparative advertisement in which that sign 
is used cannot satisfy the condition, laid down in Article 3a(1)(d) of 
[Comparative Advertising Directive], under which comparative adver-
tising is permitted. (Para. 46).
Thus, in the case where an advertiser uses, in a comparative adver-
tisement, a sign identical with, or similar to, a competitor’s mark, the 
competitor either does not establish the existence of a likelihood of 
confusion and, consequently, is not entitled to prevent the use of that 
sign on the basis of Article 5(1)(b) of Directive 89/104, or he estab-
lishes the existence of a likelihood of confusion and, consequently, 
the advertiser cannot challenge such prevention under Article 3a(1) of 
Directive 84/450, since the advertisement at issue does not satisfy all 
the conditions laid down in that provision. (Operative Part).
O2 objects to the use of its ‘bubbles 
trade mark’ in a comparative 
advertisement of Hutchison.
O2 Holdings/
Hutchison 3G UK
(comparative Advertisement)
CJEU 12 June 2008, case C-533/06, O2 Holdings/Hutchison 3G UK
Article 5(1) Trade Mark Directive; Article 3a(1) Comparative 
Advertising Directive
Th e proprietor of a registered trade mark is not entitled to prevent the use 
of a mark which is identic or similar to its own trademark in comparative 
advertising, if the advertisement satisfi es all the conditions laid down in 
the Comparative Advertising Directive, under which comparative advertis-
ing is permitted.
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Article 3a(1)( (b) ‘The fact alone that food products differ in terms of 
the extent to which consumers would like to eat them and the pleasure 
to be derived from consuming them, according to the conditions and 
place of production, their ingredients and who produced them, can-
not preclude the possibility that the comparison of such products may 
meet the requirement laid down in that provision that the products 
compared meet the same needs or are intended for the same purpose, 
that is to say, that they display a sufficient degree of interchangeability.’ 
(Para. 39).
Article 3a(1)(a) ‘An advertisement may be misleading, in particular if:
– it is found, in the light of all the relevant circumstances of the par-
ticular case, in particular the information contained in or omitted 
from the advertisement, that the decision to buy on the part of a 
significant number of consumers to whom the advertisement is 
addressed may be made in the mistaken belief that the selection of 
goods made by the advertiser is representative of the general level 
of his prices as compared with those charged by his competitor and 
that such consumers will therefore make savings of the kind claimed 
by the advertisement by regularly buying their everyday consumer 
goods from the advertiser rather than the competitor, or in the mis-
taken belief that all of the advertiser’s products are cheaper than 
those of his competitor, or
– it is found that, for the purposes of a comparison based solely on 
price, food products were selected which, nevertheless, have dif-
ferent features capable of significantly affecting the average con-
sumer’s choice, without such diff erences being apparent from the 
advertising concerned.’ (Para. 56).
Article 3a(1)( (c) ‘The condition of verifiability set out in that provi-
sion requires, in the case of an advertisement, such as that at issue in 
the main proceedings, which compares the prices of two selections of 
goods, that it must be possible to identify the goods in question on the 
basis of information contained in the advertisement.’ (Para. 64).
Lidl objects to a price based 
comparison of a selection of 
food products by Vierzon.
Lidl/Vierzon
(comparison of price)
CJEU 18 November 2010, case C-159/09, Lidl/Vierzon
Article 3a(1)(a), (b) and (c) Comparative Advertising Direction
In a comparison of price based on a selection of products, the products com-
pared do not need to be exactly the same.
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AVERAGE CONSUMER
Article 10(2)(e) of Regulation (EEC) no. 1907/90 of the Council of 
26 June concerning specific trade standards for eggs (OJ L 173, p. 5) 
provides that several additional statements on the packaging of eggs 
should not mislead.
According to the German court judging the facts ‘a non-negligible part of 
the public could be misled by the designation “6-Korn – 10 frische Eier” 
which is also a trade mark and by the enclosed information leaflet, since 
it is wrongfully suggested that the fodder of the chickens exclusively 
consists of six types of cereal and that the eggs have special qualities’.
As appears from previous decisions concerning possible misleading 
nature of a denomination, mark or advertising statement, the CJEU 
started in its examination whether the denomination, the mark or 
the advertising statement could mislead the buyer from the presumed 
expectations of an average consumer who is reasonably well-informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect. In previous decisions the 
Court not order any expert opinions or surveys.
‘ In order to determine whether a statement intended to promote sales 
of eggs is liable to mislead the purchaser, in breach of Article 10(2)(e) 
of Regulation (EEC) No 1907/90 of 26 June 1990 on certain market-
ing standards for eggs, the national court must take into account the 
presumed expectations which it evokes in an average consumer who is 
reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. 
However, Community law does not preclude the possibility that, where 
the national court has particular difficulty in assessing the mislead-
ing nature of the statement or description in question, it may have 
recourse, under the conditions laid down by its own national law, to 
a consumer research poll or an expert’s report as guidance for its judg-
ment.’ (Operative part).
‘In the absence of any Community provision on this point, it is for the 
national court, which may find it necessary to order such a survey, to 
determine, in accordance with its own national law, the percentage 
of consumers misled by a promotional description or statement that, 
in its view, would be sufficiently significant in order to justify, where 
appropriate, banning its use.’ (Para. 36).
As to the question of confusion under trade mark law this criterion was 
adopted in the Lloyd/Loints case.
Gut Springenheide markets under 
the designation ‘6-Korn – 10 
frische Eier’ pre-packed eggs. Th e 
fodder of the chickens consisted 
only for 60% of six types of cereals. 
According to the Oberkreisdirektor 
des Kreises Steinfurt –Amt für 
Lebensmittelüberwachung, this 
was misleading.
Gut Springenheide
(average consumer)
CJEU 16 July 1998, case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide/Steinfurt
Regulation concerning specific trade standards for eggs
In order to determine whether a statement is liable to mislead a consumer, 
account must be taken of the presumed expectations which it evokes in an 
average consumer who is reasonably well-informed and reasonably obser-
vant and circumspect.
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CUSTOMS REGULATION
Goods coming from a non-member State which are imitations of goods 
protected in the European Union by a trade mark right or copies of 
goods protected in the European Union by copyright, a related right 
or a design cannot be classified as ‘counterfeit goods’ or ‘pirated goods’ 
within the meaning of those regulations merely on the basis of the fact 
that they are brought into the customs territory of the European Union 
under a suspensive procedure;
Those goods may, on the other hand, infringe the right in question and 
therefore be classified as ‘counterfeit goods’ or ‘pirated goods’ where 
it is proven that they are intended to be put on sale in the European 
Union, such proof being provided, inter alia, where it turns out that the 
goods have been sold to a customer in the European Union or offered 
for sale or advertised to consumers in the European Union, or where it 
is apparent from documents or correspondence concerning the goods 
that their diversion to European Union consumers is envisaged;
In order that the authority competent to take a substantive decision 
may profitably examine whether such proof and the other elements 
constituting an infringement of the intellectual property right relied 
upon exist, the customs authority to which an application for action is 
made must, as soon as there are indications before it giving grounds for 
suspecting that such an infringement exists, suspend the release of or 
detain those goods,
Those indications may include, inter alia, the fact that the destina-
tion of the goods is not declared whereas the suspensive procedure 
requested requires such a declaration, the lack of precise or reliable 
information as to the identity or address of the manufacturer or con-
signor of the goods, a lack of cooperation with the customs authorities 
or the discovery of documents or correspondence concerning the goods 
in question suggesting that there is liable to be a diversion of those 
goods to European Union consumers. (Operative part).
Customs had seized pirated 
shavers and mobile phones made 
by Nokia resp. Philips, which were 
destined for transit outside the EU.
Philips and Nokia
(no manufacturing fiction in case of transit)
CJEU 1 December 2011, cases C-446/09 and C-495/09, 
Philips and Nokia
Customs regulation no 1383/2003
Counterfeit goods cannot be seized by the customs on the fi ction that those 
goods are deemed to have been manufactured in that Member State, when 
those goods are destined for another market than the European Union 
market.
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TRIPS
On the ground of article 50(6) TRIPs, upon request of the defendant, 
provisional measures will be revoked or otherwise cease to have effect, 
if proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of the case are not 
initiated within a reasonable period, to be determined by the judicial 
authority ordering the measures where a Member’s law so permits or, 
in the absence of such a determination, not to exceed 20 working days 
or 31 calendar days, whichever is the longer.
‘A measure whose purpose is to put an end to alleged infringements of 
a trade-mark right and which is adopted in the course of a procedure 
distinguished by the following features:
– the measure is characterised under national law as an ‘immediate 
provisional measure’ and its adoption must be required ‘on grounds 
of urgency’,
– the opposing party is summoned and is heard if he appears before 
the court,
– the decision adopting the measure is reasoned and given in writing 
following an assessment of the substance of the case by the judge 
hearing the interim application,
– an appeal may be lodged against the decision, and
– although the parties remain free to initiate proceedings on the mer-
its of the case, the decision is usually accepted by the parties as a 
‘fi nal‘ resolution of their dispute, is to be regarded as a ‘provisional 
measure’ within the meaning of Article 50 of the TRIPS Agreement’ 
(Operative part).
Hermès obtained successfully a 
provisional measure against FHT 
as to the marketing of infringing 
ties.
See further, for answers to 
various detail questions as to 
the (direct effect) of article 50(6):
CJEU 13 September 2001, 
case C-89-99, Schieving-Nijstad/
Groeneveld; Route 66 (not 
included)
IER 2001/59. Article 50(6) 
TRIPs has been implemented 
in article1019(i) Dutch Code of 
Civil Procedure.
Hermès/FHT
(provisional measures)
CJEU 16 June 1998, case C-53/96, Hermès/FHT
Article 50(6) TRIPs
Provisional measures given in summary proceedings (‘kort geding’) 
should be followed by full court proceedings (‘bodemprocedure’).
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‘1.  Th e Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs Agreement) […], applies in the event of a conflict 
between a trade mark and a sign alleged to infringe that trade mark 
where that confl ict arose before the date of application of the TRIPs 
Agreement but continued beyond that date.
2.  A trade name may constitute a sign within the meaning of the 
fi rst sentence of Article 16(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement). That 
provision is intended to confer on the proprietor of a trade mark the 
exclusive right to prevent a third party from using such a sign if the 
use in question prejudices or is liable to prejudice the functions of 
the trade mark, in particular its essential function of guaranteeing 
to consumers the origin of the goods.
 The exceptions provided for in Article 17 of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agree-
ment) are intended, inter alia, to enable a third party to use a sign 
which is identical or similar to a trade mark to indicate his trade 
name, provided that such use is in accordance with honest practices 
in industrial or commercial matters.
3.  A trade name which is not registered or established by use in the 
Member State in which the trade mark is registered and in which 
protection against the trade name in question is sought may be 
regarded as an existing prior right within the meaning of the third 
sentence of Article 16(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) if the proprietor 
of the trade name has a right falling within the substantive and tem-
poral scope of that agreement which arose prior to the trade mark 
with which it is alleged to conflict and which entitles him to use a 
sign identical or similar to that trade mark..’ (Operative part).
On the basis of its trade mark 
‘Budweiser’, Anheuser Busch 
objected to the use of the trade 
name ‘Budweiser Budvar’ by 
Budějovický Budvar.
Budweiser
(trade mark vs trade name under TRIPs)
CJEU 16 November 2004, case C-245/02, Anheuser Busch/
Budějovický Budvar; Budweiser
Articles 16 and 17 TRIPs.
A trade name may constitute a sign within the meaning of Article 16 
TRIPs. A later trade mark cannot oppose an earlier trade name.
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18 CJEU 4 October 2001, case C-517/99, Merz & Krell/OHIM; Bravo
18 CJEU 19 September 2002, case C-104/00 P, Deutsche Krankenversicherung/OHIM; Companyline
18 CJEU 5 February 2004, case C-150/02 P, Streamserve/OHIM; Streamserve
19 CJEU 5 February 2004, case C-326/01 P, Telefon & Buch/OHIM; Universaltelefonbuch
19 CJEU 16 September 2004, case C-329/02 P, Sat.1/OHIM; Sat.2
19 CJEU 16 September 2004, case C-404/02, Nichols/Registrar of Trade Marks; Nichols
20 CJEU 5 October 2004, case C-192/03 P, Alcon/OHIM; BSS
20 CJEU 21 October 2004, case C-64/02 P, Erpo/OHIM; Das Prinzip der Bequemlichkeit
20 CJEU 9 March 2006, case C-421/04, Matratzen Concord/Hukla; Matratzen
20 CJEU 15 September 2005 case C-37/03 P, BioID/OHIM; BioID
21 CJEU 15 March 2012, C-90/11 en C-91-11, Alfred Strigl/Markenamt en Securvita/Öko-Invest
21 CJEU 12 July 2012, C-311/11 P, Smart Technologies/OHIM
ABSOLUTE GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL (SHAPES)
22 Dyson (a characteristic is not a sign)
 CJEU 25 January 2007, C-321/03, Dyson/Registrar of Trade Marks
24 Linde/Winward/Rado (shape marks, public interest)
 CJEU 8 April 2003, joined cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde, Winward & Rado/DPMA
25 Henkel (shape of packaging)
 CJEU 12 February 2004, case C-218/01, Henkel/DPMA; liquid wool detergent
26 Werther’s Original (acquired distinctiveness of the shape of a sweet)
 CJEU 22 June 2006, cases C-24/05 and C-25/05, Storck/OHIM; shape of a sweet
27 Philips/Remington (technically dictated shape)
 CJEU 18 June 2002, case C-299/99, Philips/Remington; three-headed shaver
28 Benetton Group/G-Star International (substantial value)
 CJEU 20 September 2007, C-371/06, Benetton Group/G-Star; Elwood trousers
29 Lego/OHIM (technical solution)
 CJEU 14 September 2010, C-48/09 P, Lego/OHIM
30 Freixenet Bottle
 CJEU 20 October 2011, C-344/10 P en C-345/10, Freixenet/OHIM
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Other cases concerning shape marks
31 CJEU 29 April 2004, cases C-456/01 P, C-457/01 P and C-468/01 P t/m C-472/01 P, Henkel and P&G/
OHIM; dishwasher tablets
31 CJEU 7 October 2004, case C-136/02 P, Maglite/OHIM; flashlight
31 CJEU 30 June 2005, C-286/04 P, Eurocermex/OHIM; Corona beer bottle
31 CJEU 12 January 2006, C-173/04 P, SiSi/OHIM; standing pouches
31 CJEU 24 May 2012, C-98/11 P, Lindt & Sprüngli/OHIM
32 CFI 5 March 2003, case T-128/01, DaimlerChrysler/OHIM; Jeep-grille
32 CFI 3 December 2003, case T-305/02, Nestlé/OHIM; shape of a water bottle
32 CFI 24 November 2004, case T-393/02, Henkel/OHIM; shape of a white and transparent bottle
ABSOLUTE GROUNDS FOR REFUSAL (COLOUR, SMELL AND SOUND)
33 Libertel (colour marks, general interest)
 CJEU 6 May 2003, case C-104/01, Libertel/BMB; colour orange
34 Heidelberger Bauchemie (colour combinations)
 CJEU 24 June 2004, case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie; blue and yellow
35 Sieckmann (smell marks)
 CJEU 12 December 2002, case C-273/00, Sieckmann/DPM; smell mark
36 Shield Mark (sound marks)
 CJEU 27 November 2003, case C-283/01, Shield Mark/BMB; sound marks
Other cases on refusal on absolute grounds
37 CJEU 28 June 2004, case C-445/02, Glaverbel/OHIM; surface of glass
37 CJEU 21 October 2004, case C-447/02, KWS/Saat/OHIM; colour orange
37 CJEU 7 July 2005, case C-418/02, Praktiker Märkte/DPMA; retail trade services
38 CJEU 30 March 2006, case C-259/04, Elizabeth Emanuel/Continental Shelf 128; Elizabeth Emanuel
38 CJEU 5 July 2011, C-263/09 P, Edwin Co. Ltd/ OHIM & Elio Fiorucci
38 CJEU 19 June 2012, C-307/10, Patent Attorneys /Registrar of Trade Marks; IP Translator
INFRINGEMENT (RISK OF CONFUSION)
40 Arthur & Félicie (sign identical to mark)
 CJEU 20 March 2003, case C-291/00, LTJ Diffusion/Sadas; Arthur (& Félicie)
41 Adam Opel/Autec (scale model)
 CJEU 25 January 2007, C-48/05, Adam Opel/Autec
42 Puma/Sabel (confusion and association)
 CJEU 11 November 1997, case C-251/95, Puma/Sabel; bounding feline
43 Canon/Cannon (similarity and reputation)
 CJEU 29 September 1998, case C-39/97, Canon/Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer; Canon/Cannon
44 Lloyd/Loint’s (confusion and aural similarity)
 CJEU 22 June 1999, case C-342/97, Lloyd/Klijsen; Lloyd/Loint’s
45 Picasso/Picaro (likelihood of confusion)
 CJEU 12 January 2006, case C-361/04, The Picasso estate/DaimlerChrysler; Picasso/Picaro
46 Obelix/Mobilix (confusion and aural similarity)
 CJEU 18 December 2008, C-16/06 P, Les Éditions Albert René/Orange A/S; Obelix/Mobilix
47 Il Ponte Finanziaria/ FMG Textiles (series of trade marks)
 CJEU 13 September 2007, C-234/06, Il Ponte Finanziaria/ FMG Textiles
48 OHIM/Shaker; Limoncello
 CJEU 12 June 2007, C-334/05 P, OHIM/Shaker; Limoncello
50 Carbonell/La Española (likelihood of confusion of figurative trademarks)
 CJEU 3 September 2009, C-498/07 P, Aceites del Sur/Koipe; Carbonell/ La Española Ferrero/OHIM 
(similarity)
51 Ferrero/OHIM; Kinder (similarity)
 CJEU 24 March 2011, C-552/09 P, Ferrero/OHIM; Kinder
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52 Calvin Klein
 CJEU 2 September 2010, C-254/09 P, Calvin Klein Trademark Trust/OHIM
53 Adidas/Marca II (infringementquestion)
 CJEU 10 April 2008, C-102/07, Adidas/Marca II
54 Céline (use of trade name as trade mark)
 CJEU 11 September 2007, C-17/06, Céline SARL/Céline SA
56 Montex/Diesel (transit)
 CJEU 9 November 2006, C-281/05. Montex/Diesel
Other cases concerning confusion
57 CJEU 22 June 2000, case C-425/98, Marca/Adidas; three versus two stripes
57 CJEU 28 April 2004, case C-3/03 P, Matratzen Concord/OHIM-Hukla; Matratzen
57 CJEU 12 October 2004, case C-106/03 P, Verdial/OHIM; Saint-Hubert 41/Hubert
58 CJEU 6 October 2005, C-120/04, Medion/ Thomson; Life/Thomson Life
58 CJEU 1 December 2005, case C-512/04 P, Vitakraft/OHIM-Krafft; Krafft/Vitakraft
58 CJEU 23 March 2006, case C-206/04 P, Mülhens/OHIM en Zirh; Sir/Zirh
58 CJEU 27 April 2006, case C-235/05 P, L’Oréal v OHIM – Revlon; Flex/Flexi Air
59 CJEU 16 July 2011, C-317/10 P, Union Investment/UniCredito & OHIM
59 CJEU 24 May 2012, C-196/11 P, Formula One/OHIM; F1 word/device marks
INFRINGEMENT (WELL-KWOWN MARKS)
60 Chevy (reputation)
 CJEU 14 September 1999, case C-375/97, General Motors/Yplon; Chevy
61 PAGO (reputation in the EU)
 CJEU 6 October 2009, C-301/07, PAGO/Tirolmilch
62 Davidoff/Gofkid (dilution and similar goods)
 CJEU 9 January 2003, case C-292/00, Davidoff/Gofkid; Davidoff/Durffee
63 Adidas/Fitnessworld (dilution and embellishment)
 CJEU 23 October 2003, case C-408/01, Adidas/Fitnessworld Trading; three stripes versus two stripes
64 Intel (reputation and dilution)
 CJEU 27 November 2008, C-252/07, Intel Corporation/CPM United Kingdom
66 L’Oréal/Bellure (taking unfair advantage of a well-known mark)
 CJEU 18 June 2009, C-487/07, L’Oréal /Bellure
Other cases on reputation
68 CJEU 10 May 2012, C-100/11 P, Helena Rubinstein & L’Oréal/ OHIM & Allergan
69 HvJ EU 14 november 2013, zaak C-383/12 P, Environmental Manufacturing/BHIM & Société Elmar 
Wolf
INFRINGEMENT (INTERNET)
69 Google France (adwords)
 CJEU 23 March 2010, C-236/08, C-237/08, C-238/08, Google France
71 L’Oréal/eBay (use of a trade mark on an online marketplace)
 CJEU 12 July 2011, C-324/09, L’Oréal/eBay
73 Interflora/Marks & Spencer (adwords)
 CJEU 22 September 2011, C-323/09, Interflora/Marks & Spencer
INFRINGEMENT (OTHER)
75 Winters/Red Bull (filling in order)
 CJEU 15 December 2011, C-119/10, Winters/Red Bull
76 Specsavers/Asda (trade mark as used)
 CJEU 18 July 2013, C-252/12, Specsavers/Asda
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TRADE MARK LIMITATIONS
77 Dior/Evora (advertising by reseller)
 CJEU 4 November 1997, case C-337/95, Dior/Evora
78 BMW/Deenik (non-official dealer)
 CJEU 23 February 1999, case C-63/97, BMW/Ronald Deenik
79 Arsenal/Reed (badge of support)
 CJEU 12 November 2002, case C-206/01, Arsenal/Matthew Reed
80 Gerri/Kerry spring (indication of geographical origin)
 CJEU 7 January 2004, case C-100/02, Gerolsteiner Brunnen/Putsch; Gerry/Kerry
81 Gillette/ LA-Laboratories (indication of intended purpose)
 CJEU 17 March 2005, C-228/03, Gillette/LA-Laboratories
82 Hölterhoff/Freiesleben (use to indicate characteristics)
 CJEU 14 May 2002, case C- 2/00, Hölterhoff/Freiesleben; Spirit Sun & Context Cut
83 Portakabin/Primakabin (adwords and exhaustion)
 CJEU 8 July 2010, C-558/08, Portakabin/Primakabin
85 Viking Gas/ Kosan Gas (refilling)
 CJEU 14 July 2011, C-46/10, Viking Gas/Kosan Gas
PARALLEL TRADE
86 Silhouette/Hartlauer (European exhaustion)
 CJEU 16 July 1998, case C-355/96, Silhouette/Hartlauer; Silhouette spectacles
87 Van Doren + Q/Lifestyle; Stüssy (burden of proof)
 CJEU 8 April 2003, case C-244/00, Van Doren + Q/Lifestyle; Stüssy
88 Class International (in transit)
 CJEU 18 October 2005, case C-405/03, Class/SmithKline Beecham; Aquafresh toothpaste
89 Makro/Diesel (consent)
 CJEU 15 October 2009, C-324/08, Makro/Diesel
90 Copad/Dior (damage to the aura of luxury goods)
 CJEU 23 April 2009, C-59/08, Copad/Dior
91 Coty/Simex (no exhaustion on perfume testers)
 CJEU 3 June 2010, C-127/09, Coty/Simex
Other cases on parallel trade
92 CJEU 1 July 1999, case C-173/98, Sebago/G-B Unic; Docksides
92 CJEU 20 November 2001, cases C-414/99 and C-415/99, Zino Davidoff/A & G Imports, Levi Strauss/
Tesco and Costco; Cool water & Levi’s
92 CJEU 30 November 2004, case C-16/03, Peak Holding/Axolin-Elinor; Peak Performance
93 CJEU 11 July 1996, cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Boehringer/
Paranova
94 CJEU 26 April 2007, C-348/04, Boehringer Ingelheim /Swingward
97 CJEU 22 December 2008, C-276/05, The Wellcome Foundation/Paranova
Other repackaging decisions
99 CJEU 11 November 1997, case C-349/95, Frits Loendersloot/Ballentine
99 CJEU 12 October 1999, case C-379/97, Upjohn/Paranova; Dalacin
99 CJEU 23 April 2002, case C-443/99, MSD/Paranova
99 CJEU 23 April 2002, case C-143/00, Boehringer/Swingward
PARALLEL TRADE WITHIN THE EEA
100 CJEU 13 July 1966, cases 56-58/64, Grundig, Consten/EC; Gint
100 CJEU 31 October 1974, case 16/74, Centrafarm/Winthrop; Negram
100 CJEU 22 June 1976, case 119/75, Terrapin/Terranova
100 CJEU 22 June 1994, case C-9/93, IHT Danziger/Ideal Standard
101 CJEU 23 October 2003, case C-115/02, Administration des douanes/Rioglass
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GENUINE USE
102 Ansul/Ajax (real commercial exploitation)
 CJEU 11 March 2003, case C-40/01, Ansul/Ajax; Minimax
103 La Mer (a real commercial purpose)
 CJEU 27 January 2004, case C-259/02, La Mer Technology/Laboratoires Goemar; 
Laboratoire de la mer
104 Vitafruit (no de minimis rule)
 CJEU 11 May 2006, case C-416/04 P, The Sunrider/OHIM; Vitafruit
105 Armin Häupl/Lidl Stiftung (normal use)
 CJEU 14 June 2007, C-246/05, Armin Häupl/Lidl Stiftung
106 Radetzky (genuine use)
 CJEU 9 December 2008, C-442/07, Radetzky-Orden/Kameradschaft Radetzky
107 Silberquelle/ Maselli-Strickmode (genuine use)
 CJEU 15 January 2009, C-495/07, Silberquelle/ Maselli-Strickmode GmbH
108 Onel/Omel (territorial scope of use)
 CJEU 19 December 2012, C-149/11, Leno/Hagelkruis
Other cases
109 CJEU 25 October 2012, C-553/11, Bernhard Rintisch/Klaus Eder; Proti
109 CJEU 18 April 2013, C-2/12, Colloseum /Levi Strauss
109 CJEU 18 July 2013, C-252/12, Specsavers/Asda
BAD FAITH
110 Lindt & Sprüngli/Frans Hauswirth
 CJEU 11 June 2009, C-529/07, Lindt & Sprüngli/Frans Hauswirth
111 Malaysia Dairy (bad faith)
 CJEU 27 June 2013, C-320, Malaysia Dairy/ Ankenævnet for Patenter og Varemærker; Yakult
LOSS OF DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER
112 Bostongurka (perception of the end user)
 CJEU 29 April 2004, case C-371/02, Björnekulla/Procordia; Bostongurka
113 Levi Strauss/Casucci (time of assessment)
 CJEU 27 April 2006, case C-145/05, Levi Strauss/Casucci; overstitching
OTHER USE OF A TRADE MARK
114 Robelco/Robeco (use as trade name)
 CJEU 21 November 2002, case C-23/01, Robelco/Robeco
TERRITORIAL SCOPE PROHIBITIONS
115 DHL/Chronopost (territorial scope)
 CJEU 12 April 2011, C-235/09, DHL/Chronopost
COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING
116 Toshiba/Katun (reference to product numbers)
 CJEU 25 October 2001, case C-112/99, Toshiba/Katun; OEM-numbers
117 Pippig/Hartlauer (use of a competitor’s logo)
 CJEU 8 April 2003, case C-44/01, Pippig/Hartlauer
118 Siemens/Vipa (use of identical order numbers)
 CJEU 23 February 2006, case C-59/05, Siemens/VIPA
119 Lidl/Colruyt (comparative advertising relating to the prices of a products selection)
 CJEU 19 September 2006, C-356/04, Lidl/Colruyt
121 O2 Holdings/Hutchison 3G UK (comparative advertising)
 CJEU 12 June 2008, C-533/06, O2 Holdings/Hutchison 3G UK
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122 Lidl/Vierzon (comparison of price)
 CJEU 18 November 2010, C-159/09, Lidl/Vierzon
AVERAGE CONSUMER
123 Gut Springenheide (average consumer)
 CJEU 16 July 1998, case C-210/96, Gut Springenheide/Steinfurt
CUSTOMS REGULATION
124 Philips and Nokia (no manufacturing fiction in case of transit)
 CJEU 1 December 2011, C-446/09 en C-495/09, Philips en Nokia
TRIPS
125 Hermès/FHT (provisional matters)
 CJEU 16 June 1998, C-53/96, Hermès/FHT
126 Budweiser (trade mark vs trade name under TRIPs)
 CJEU 16 November 2004, case C-245/02, Anheuser Busch/Budějovický Budvar; Budweiser

